Flesh on the bones : A critical meta-analytic perspective of achievement lens studies by Kaufmann, Esther
  
 
Flesh on the bones: 
A critical meta-analytic perspective of 
achievement lens studies 
 
 
Esther Kaufmann 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation thesis written at the Center for Doctoral Studies in the Social and 
Behavioral Sciences of the Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences 
and submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) of the Faculty of 
Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic Director: Prof. Dr. B. Ebbinghaus 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. W. W. Wittmann 
Co-Supervisor: Prof. Dr. U.-D. Reips 
 
Defense: 30. September, 2009 
  
  i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to express my deep gratitude to a number of people and 
institutions, without whose help this work would not have been possible.  
First of all, I would like to thank my supervisors, Prof. W. W. Wittmann and 
Prof. Dr. Reips as well as Dr. J. A. Athanasou and Dr. L. Sjödahl for their enormous 
knowledge and great humanity that influenced me profoundly. 
Secondly, it was a great honour and pleasure for us that our project was also 
supported by the Brunswik Society, namely, Prof. Hammond and Prof. Wolf. My deep 
thanks also to Prof. Wilkening, Prof. Scholz, Prof. Jonas, and Dr. Mutz for their 
advice and support. Dr. Karelaia and Prof. Hogarth for their meta-analyses, which 
supplement ours.  
Thirdly, I would like to thank the Graduate School for providing me with its 
infrastructure. For feedback to our work, which was highly appreciated: Prof. 
Geschwend, Prof. Erdfelder, the CDSS students, Salina Yong, Gillian Sjödahl, Dr. 
Waldkirch. 
I would like to acknowledge the authors of the studies used in our meta-
analysis, without whose work it wouldn't have been possible to realize such an 
interesting project.  
Taken together, this work gave me the opportunity to profit from enormous 
expert knowledge and to live abroad in Mannheim. I'm enormously grateful for this 
experience.  
Beside the academic field, I would like to thank my parents, Elisabeth and 
Paul Kaufmann, Barbara Brettschneider, and my sisters Madlen Kaufmann, Gaby 
and Patrick Steiner for their understanding and support. Finally, without Phil Wyniger 
I would miss something special, thank you. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ii
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
       Page 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................................................vi 
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF EQUATIONS............................................................................................................................ix  
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................. x 
 
1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................1 
 
2 THEORIES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING .........................................4 
2.1 Normative theories ...............................................................................................5 
2.1.1 Riskless vs. risk judgments........................................................................6 
2.2 Descriptive theories ..............................................................................................7 
2.3 Criticism of judgment and decision-making research............................................7 
2.3.1 Are decision makers biased?.....................................................................8 
2.3.2 Cognitive Continuum Theory .....................................................................9 
2.3.3 Validity problem .......................................................................................12 
2.3.4 Neglected idiographic approach ..............................................................13 
 2.3.4.1 Aggregation problem: Ecological vs. individualistic fallacy ...........16 
2.3.5 Summary .................................................................................................17 
2.4 Probabilistic Functionalism .................................................................................18 
2.4.1 Social Judgment Theory ..........................................................................21 
 2.4.1.1 Classical Lens Model....................................................................22 
 2.4.1.2 Lens Model Equation....................................................................25 
2.5 Reviews on judgment achievement ....................................................................30 
2.5.1 Within the Social Judgment Theory .........................................................30 
 2.5.1.1 Meta-analysis by Stewart (1997) ..................................................31 
 2.5.1.2 Meta-analysis by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008).............................31 
 2.5.1.3 Research on the Lens-Model components ...................................33 
2.5.2 Related to other judgment and decision-making approaches ..................34 
 2.5.2.1 Expertise in research areas ..........................................................34 
2.6 Summary of chapter 2 ........................................................................................35 
 
3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....................................................................................36 
  iii
 
4 METHODS.............................................................................................................38 
4.1 Literature search.................................................................................................38 
4.1.1 Search strategies.....................................................................................38 
4.1.2 Results of our literature search................................................................43 
4.1.3 Control strategies ....................................................................................44 
4.1.4 Excluded achievement studies ................................................................45 
4.2 Coding studies....................................................................................................46 
4.2.1 Coding reliability ......................................................................................47 
4.3 Description of the studies ...................................................................................50 
4.3.1 In relation to other reviews on judgment achievement.............................50 
4.3.2 Journal of the publications .......................................................................53 
4.3.3 Research approaches..............................................................................54 
4.3.4 Research areas .......................................................................................55 
4.3.5 The number of cues.................................................................................59 
4.3.6 The criterion.............................................................................................59 
4.3.7 The type of correlation .............................................................................60 
4.3.8 Summary of chapter 4.3 ..........................................................................60 
4.4 Meta-analysis: Cumulating research findings .....................................................66 
4.4.1 Historical review ......................................................................................67 
4.4.2 Actual spread of the meta-analysis..........................................................68 
4.4.3 The weaknesses of meta-analysis...........................................................70 
4.4.4 Different meta-analysis approaches ........................................................72 
4.4.5 Evaluation research on meta-analysis approaches .................................74 
4.5 Hunter-Schmidt approach...................................................................................76 
4.5.1 Bare-bones meta-analysis .......................................................................78 
 4.5.1.1 Idiographic data base ...................................................................78 
 4.5.1.2 Nomothetic data base...................................................................80 
 4.5.1.3 Moderator variables......................................................................80 
4.5.2 Psychometric meta-analysis ....................................................................81 
 4.5.2.1 An extension of Tucker's Lens Model Equation............................83 
 4.5.2.2 Procedure .....................................................................................84 
  4.5.2.2.1 Idiographic data base ........................................................85 
  4.5.2.2.2 Nomothetic data base........................................................85 
 4.5.2.3 Artefacts .......................................................................................85 
  iv
  4.5.2.3.1 Measurement error ............................................................85 
  4.5.2.3.2 Dichotomization .................................................................88 
 4.5.2.4 Corrections of artefact information................................................89 
4.6 Publication bias ..................................................................................................89 
4.6.1 Funnel plots .............................................................................................89 
4.6.2 Calculating Fail-safe numbers .................................................................90 
4.7 Calculations ........................................................................................................91 
 
5 RESULTS..............................................................................................................93 
5.1 Idiographic data base .........................................................................................93 
5.1.1 Bare-bones meta-analysis .......................................................................96 
 5.1.1.1 Judgment achievement.................................................................97 
 5.1.1.2 Judgment achievement components ..........................................101 
5.1.2 Psychometric meta-analysis ..................................................................107 
 5.1.2.1 Judgment achievement...............................................................107 
 5.1.2.2 Judgment achievement components ..........................................108 
5.1.3 Intercorrelations of the components ......................................................113 
5.2 Nomothetic data base.......................................................................................116 
5.2.1 Bare-bones meta-analysis .....................................................................116 
 5.2.1.1 Judgment achievement...............................................................116 
 5.2.1.2 Judgment achievement components ..........................................120 
5.2.2 Psychometric meta-analysis ..................................................................131 
 5.2.2.1 Judgment achievement...............................................................131 
 5.2.2.2 Judgment achievement components ..........................................135 
5.2.3 Intercorrelation of the components ........................................................141 
5.2.4 Robustness analysis..............................................................................144 
 5.2.4.1 Type of used model ....................................................................144 
 5.2.4.2 Weighting strategy......................................................................145 
 5.2.4.3 Type of correlation......................................................................147 
 5.2.4.4 Conclusion..................................................................................147 
 
 
 
 
 
  v
6 DISCUSSION ......................................................................................................148 
6.1 Idiographic-based meta-analysis ......................................................................148 
6.2 Nomothetic-based meta-analysis .....................................................................153 
 
7 CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH......................164 
 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................169 
 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................... A 
A: Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... I 
B: Literature search ................................................................................................................................ II 
C: LME component calculation...............................................................................................................V 
D: Comparison with the meta-analysis by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) ..............................................VI 
E: Psychometric meta-analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) ............................................XI 
F: Results of our idiographic-based meta-analysis ............................................................................ XIV 
G: Results of our nomothetic-based meta-analysis ......................................................................... XVIII 
H: Results of our robustness analysis ............................................................................................... XXII 
I: Bias-adjusted R2 ...........................................................................................................................XXVII 
J: Success of single expert models ..................................................................................................XXIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vi
LIST OF TABLES 
          Page 
 
Table 1.   Summary of the components of correlations of the LME ..................................................... 28 
Table 2.   Agreement of our data base with other reviews................................................................... 48 
Table 3.   Review articles including studies overlapping with our meta-analysis................................. 52 
Table 4.   Number of judges in studies analysed judged more than once ........................................... 55 
Table 5.   Studies included in our meta-analysis.................................................................................. 61 
Table 6.   Miscellaneous studies included in our meta-analysis .......................................................... 65 
Table 7.   Summary of disadvantages of meta-analysis ...................................................................... 72 
Table 8.   Methodological characteristics of meta-analysis.................................................................. 73 
Table 9.   Summary of the current evaluation research on meta-analytic approaches........................ 76 
Table 10. Description of 11 artefacts.................................................................................................... 82 
Table 11. Publication bias .................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 12. Correlation components ....................................................................................................... 94 
Table 13. Descriptive statistics for judgment achievement ................................................................ 100 
Table 14. Descriptive statistics for the judgment achievement components ..................................... 103 
Table 15. Descriptive statistics for components of correlation of the LME ........................................ 110 
Table 16. Descriptive statistics for experts components of correlation of the LME............................ 111 
Table 17. Descriptive statistics for students components of correlation of the LME.......................... 112 
Table 18. Intercorrelation of the LME components ............................................................................ 114 
Table 19. Intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas .......................................... 115 
Table 20. Bare-bones meta-analysis of judgment achievement ........................................................ 117 
Table 21. Bare-bones meta-analysis of the knowledge component .................................................. 122 
Table 22. Bare-bones meta-analysis of the consistency component................................................. 125 
Table 23. Bare-bones meta-analysis of the task-predictability component........................................ 128 
Table 24. Psychometric meta-analysis of judgment achievement ..................................................... 134 
Table 25. Psychometric meta-analysis of the knowledge component ............................................... 136 
Table 26. Psychometric meta-analysis of the consistency component.............................................. 138 
Table 27. Psychometric meta-analysis of the task-predictability component..................................... 140 
Table 28. Intercorrelation of the LME components ............................................................................ 142 
Table 29. Intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas .......................................... 143 
Table 30. Weighting strategy judges and profiles .............................................................................. 146 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii
LIST OF TABLES 
          Page 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix B: Literature search 
B: Table 1. Results of our literature search in data bases ..................................................................... II 
B: Table 2. Results of our literature search in (online) data bases ....................................................... III 
B: Table 3. Results of our literature search in German data base........................................................IV 
Appendix D: Comparison with the meta-analysis by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) 
D: Table 1. Reasons for the exclusion of studies in our meta-analysis ................................................VI 
D: Table 2. Different coding in our data base in comparison to Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) ............VII 
D: Table 3. Study-characteristics agreement with the data-base by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) ....VIII 
D: Table 4. Seven studies with no differences in the LME components ...............................................IX 
D: Table 5. Seven studies with differences in the LME components .....................................................X 
Appendix E: Psychometric meta-analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) 
E: Table 1. Correlation corrected for dichotomizing ............................................................................XIII 
Appendix F: Results of our idiographic-based meta-analysis 
F: Table 1. Judgment achievement: Low, medium, and high level .................................................... XIV 
F: Table 2. Experts’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas .......................... XVI 
F: Table 3. Students’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas ....................... XVII 
Appendix G: Results of our nomothetic-based meta-analysis 
G: Table 1. Bare-bones meta-analysis of the non-linear knowledge component ............................ XVIII 
G: Table 2. Psychometric meta-analysis of the non-linear knowledge component ........................... XIX 
G: Table 3. Experts’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas........................... XX 
G: Table 4. Students’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas........................ XXI 
Appendix H: Results of our robustness analysis 
H: Table 1. Judgment achievement: Fixed-effect vs. random-effect model...................................... XXII 
H: Table 2. Knowledge component: Fixed-effect vs. random-effect model ..................................... XXIII 
H: Table 3. Consistency component: Fixed-effect vs. random-effect model....................................XXIV 
H: Table 4. Environmental predictability component: Fixed-effect vs. random-effect model ............XXV 
H: Table 5. Non-linear knowledge component: Fixed-effect vs. random-effect model ....................XXVI 
Appendix I: Bias-adjusted R2 
I: Table 1. Meta-analysis: non-adjusted vs. bias-adjusted values..................................................XXVIII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  viii
LIST OF FIGURES 
          Page 
 
Figure 1.   Classification of decision theories ......................................................................................... 5 
Figure 2.   Cognitive Continuum Theory............................................................................................... 11 
Figure 3.   Lens Model.......................................................................................................................... 24 
Figure 4.   Lens Model with superimposed statistical parameters ....................................................... 27 
Figure 5.   Flowchart of the literature-search model............................................................................. 42 
Figure 6.   Number of publications ....................................................................................................... 54 
Figure 7.   Precental distribution of idiographically vs. nomothetically analyzed judgment tasks ........ 58 
Figure 8.   Funnel plot........................................................................................................................... 90 
Figure 9.   Scatter plot of judgment achievement................................................................................. 99 
Figure 10. Scatter plot of the knowledge component......................................................................... 104 
Figure 11. Scatter plot of the consistency component ....................................................................... 105 
Figure 12. Scatter plot of the environmental predictability component .............................................. 106 
Figure 13. Forest plot of judgment achievement................................................................................ 119 
Figure 14. Forest plot of the knowledge component .......................................................................... 121 
Figure 15. Forest plot of the consistency component ........................................................................ 124 
Figure 16. Forest plot of the task-predictability component ............................................................... 127 
Figure 17. Forest plot of the non-linear knowledge component ......................................................... 130 
Figure 18. A comparison of the different corrected psychometric analyses ...................................... 133 
Figure 19. Comparison of different models ........................................................................................ 145 
                                                                                                                                                                          
  
APPENDICES 
Appendix F: Results of our idiographic-based meta-analysis 
F: Figure 1. Scatter plot of the non-linear knowledge component....................................................... XV 
Appendix I: Bias-adjusted R2 
I: Figure 1. Comparison of non-adjusted vs. bias-adjusted Rs-components ...................................XXVII 
I: Figure 2. Comparison of non-adjusted vs. bias-adjusted Re-components ...................................XXVII 
Appendix J: Success of single expert models 
I: Figure 1. Scatter plots of single expert model success.................................................................XXIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ix
LIST OF EQUATIONS 
          Page 
 
Equation 1.   Lens Model Equation ...................................................................................................... 25 
Equation 2.   Mean population correlation............................................................................................ 78 
Equation 3.   Observed variance .......................................................................................................... 78 
Equation 4.   Sampling error variance .................................................................................................. 79 
Equation 5.   Averaged sample size..................................................................................................... 79 
Equation 6.   80% credibility interval .................................................................................................... 79 
Equation 7.   Corrected achievement correlation ................................................................................. 83 
Equation 8.   Corrected formula for dichotomization ............................................................................ 88 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix C: LME component calculation 
C: Equation 1. G component ..................................................................................................................V 
C: Equation 2. C component ..................................................................................................................V 
C: Equation 3. Rs component .................................................................................................................V 
Appendix E: Psychometric meta-analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) 
E: Equation 1. Attenuation factor...........................................................................................................XI 
E: Equation 2. Fully corrected mean correlation ...................................................................................XI 
E: Equation 3. Variation........................................................................................................................XII 
E: Equation 4. Variance........................................................................................................................XII 
E: Equation 5. Unexplained residual variance......................................................................................XII 
E: Equation 6. Fully corrected variance................................................................................................XII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  x
ABSTRACT 
The major purpose of probabilistic functionalism is to appraise the “… interplay and 
relative contribution of environmental factors in the (organism’s) adjustment to a 
given ecology” (Brunswik, 1956, p. 143), the Lens Model Equation is of utmost 
importance because it permits the precise analysis of the “interplay” (Hammond, 
1966, p. 72), well known as judgment achievement. Consequently, our meta-analysis 
on the Lens Model Equation leads to evaluation of the mind adaptation assumption in 
five different research areas. To prove this we used idiographic and nomothetic data 
of Lens Model Equation studies to prevent any fallacy (ecological vs. individualistic). 
In our analysis regarding the experience level within areas only business students’ 
judgment achievement indicated moderator variables. In all areas except in 
psychology judgment achievement is almost moderate. In addition, in our 
psychometric analysis judgment achievement clearly increases, but the values in 
psychology science are still low. Different sensitivity analysis supported the 
robustness of our results that imply area differences in experts judgment 
achievement. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Important decisions, for example whether or not to get married, and 
to whom, we make rarely. Decisions such as which shoes to wear in the 
morning or at what time we actually get up, we make daily. Furthermore, 
some of us get paid to make correct decisions as experts, like physicians 
or teachers. Teachers, for instance, estimate the reading abilities of 
students, which influences their further school career. Consequently, our 
judgments and also those of experts greatly affect our personal and public 
life. Therefore, the question arises, how good the experts’ judgment, on 
which our public life depends, actually is. Or, why are some people more 
accurate in their judgments than others? Better quality of judgment is 
badly needed in areas such as education and medicine, where it could 
improve human conditions and save many lives.  
The ultimate goal of judgment and decision-making research is to 
improve a person’s judgment. In the research carried out on judgment and 
decision making, differential judgment achievement is the central issue. By 
reviewing judgment achievement and the underlying cognitive processes, 
it is possible to make recommendations for improving a person’s judgment 
and decision making. 
In the following, an array of approaches to judgment and decision 
making is overviewed by the Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT, 
Hammond, 2007). The CCT shows that most research uses an 
experimental design. Studies with an experimental design based on 
variance analysis, as for example the Heuristic and Bias school of thought 
(Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). This approach, as many others, 
implies a bad picture of human decision makers as mostly biased. In order 
to evaluate whether humans are really bad decision makers we should 
urgently supplement the experimental approach (or variance analysis 
approach) point of view with a correlative approach like the Social 
Judgment Theory (SJT).  
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The SJT is (Brehmer, 1988): 
A general framework for the study of human judgment. Despite its 
name, it is not a theory for it provides no testable hypotheses about 
judgment. Instead, it is a meta theory, which gives direction to 
research on judgment. (p. 13) 
Furthermore, the focus on the SJT allows us to consider the validity 
(APA, 1954) and the aggregation problem (Robinson, 1950; Wittmann, 
1985) in judgment and decision-making research, which is mostly 
neglected by other judgment and decision-making approaches.  
This dissertation considers how judgment achievement across and 
between persons varies in the framework of the SJT, where it is defined as 
“the degree of correlation between a judge’s responses to cue profiles … 
and the criterion measurements for those profiles” (Cooksey, 1996, p. 
367). For example, it is the degree of correlation between 1) judgments, 
such as a teacher’s reading-achievement estimation based on cues like 
socio-economic status of the students, and 2) the criterion, such as the 
end-of-year reading achievement of students measured by a test. 
Judgment achievement can be described by components of correlations, 
called the Lens Model Equation (LME, Tucker, 1964). Studies applying the 
LME include judgment tasks in which the three factors mentioned above 
are known. As a result, the components of the LME applied to judgment 
tasks can show how judgments come about. 
The LME has been applied in numerous contexts to individuals (i.e. 
idiographic approach) or across individuals (i.e. nomothetic approach).  
However, no comprehensive meta-analysis of the LME has been 
published that includes also individual data. But this is needed to check 
the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950). In addition, we used a meta-
analytic approach according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) to overcome 
the individualistic fallacy. This meta-analytic approach was selected, since 
the estimated population correlation can be corrected by the observed 
correlation for downward bias due to various artefacts, such as 
measurement error. In comparison to other meta-analytical approaches, 
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the Hunter and Schmidt method also offered the best estimate of the 
population parameter (see Field, 2001, 2005). Hence, conducting a meta-
analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) is also to determine 
whether the variance in reported components of LME was entirely the 
result of artefacts like sampling or measurement error. Therefore, this 
psychometric meta-analysis approach according to Hunter and Schmidt 
(2004) describes judgment achievement in the framework of the SJT in 
order to determine the actual judgment achievement of individuals or 
across individuals.  
Furthermore, to find out why some people are more accurate than 
others, we meta-analysed the judgment achievement over all studies 
using an idiographic research approach with the components of the LME. 
Firstly, the error-free judgment achievement (knowledge) component 
describes the correlation between judgments and criterion, assuming the 
judge is perfectly consistent and the environment is perfectly predictable. 
Secondly, the consistency component reveals how perfectly consistent a 
judge actually is, expressed as a correlation between cues and judgments. 
Finally, the environmental predictability is expressed as the correlation 
between the cues and the criterions.  
In addition, the meta-analysis was repeated with studies also using 
a nomothethic research approach and checked for possible moderator 
variables (i.e. applied research area, experience level). 
Finally, the goal of this dissertation is – by means of a psychometric 
meta-analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) – to permit a first-
time overview of judgment achievement across and between different 
studies in the framework of the SJT. This is urgently needed to evaluate 
the SJT approach and to relate the results to other judgment and decision-
making theories. This evaluation of judgment achievement according to 
Hammond’s CCT (2007) is more precisely described in the following 
chapters.  
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2 THEORIES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING  
A major concern in psychology is to understand judgment and 
decision making (JDM). The field of JDM has developed over the last 50 
years and is an important precursor of modern cognitive psychology. 
During this time, psychologists have proposed various approaches to 
researching JDM. Brehmer (1987) summarized critical points of JDM 
research as follows: 
Psychological research does not provide any unified picture of 
human judgment either there is a variety of theoretical approaches 
to judgment, each with its own definition of the term. (p. 199)  
This heterogeneity in approaches and definitions is also 
represented in the different classification systems. For instance, there are 
reviews separating correspondence vs. coherence theories (see 
Hammond, 2007), or normative, descriptive, and prescriptive decision 
theories (see Baron, 2004; Scholz, Mieg & Weber, 2003). To simplify the 
following overview, we will focus on only one classification system, namely 
Shanteau’s (2001, see Figure 1 for an overview) classification of 
normative and descriptive theories. As the modern history of research on 
JDM has been dominated and started with the normative theory, we will 
present this theory first. Then, we will introduce the division of normative 
theories into riskless and risky judgments with an example. Second, the 
descriptive theories will also be presented. Finally, the Social Judgment 
Theory (SJT), combining both theories, will be explained in detail. 
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Figure 1. Classification of decision theories according to Shanteau (2001). 
 
2.1 Normative theories 
According to Over (2004), “normative theories tell us how we should 
ideally make judgments and take decisions” (p. 4). Normative theories are 
concerned with the development and application of models based on 
formal logic derived from economics (e.g. Expected Utility Theory) or 
statistics (e.g. Probability Theory). Researchers take these models as 
norms. These norms are standard or “benchmark”, against which 
judgments are evaluated. On the one side, if judgments systematically 
deviate from the proposed models, this is called bias. On the other side, if 
both – judgments and “benchmark” – match, this implies that the judgment 
is correctly or optimally made. Hence, in this approach, the models are the 
golden standard to be reached by good judgment. The suggested golden 
standard fully describes how people would behave if they followed certain 
requirements of rational decision making. According to this, the decision 
maker is like a “rational actor”. Hence, any rational person would follow the 
proposed models. 
Historically, the impetus for the normative approaches to research 
on JDM comes from the seminal book Theory of Games and Economic 
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Behavior (Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944, see Figure 1), introducing the 
classical “Expected Utility Theory”.  
In addition, as you can see in Figure 1, Shanteau (2001, p. 55) 
divided normative theories into riskless (or certain) choices and risky (or 
uncertain) choices. These are explained in more detail in the following. 
 
2.1.1 Riskless vs. risk judgments 
Although Shanteau (2001) introduced two riskless judgment 
theories, the Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (see Edwards & Newman, 1982) 
and the linear models, we only focus on linear models because of its 
relevance to our meta-analysis.  
Linear models (e.g. a regression model, see Dawes & Corrigan, 
1974) have been used to describe judgment under certainty. For example, 
Dawes (1971) applied linear models to the selective admission of 
psychology graduate students at the University of Oregon. His research 
showed that a linear model of three quantitative admission variables 
(graduate record exam score, grade point average, and a crude index of 
the quality of the undergraduate institution) was consistently the best 
predictor of success in graduate education. This robustness of linear 
models – well-known as the beauty of linear models (Dawes, 1979, see 
also chapter 2.4.1.2) – is also confirmed by many other studies. 
In addition, to describe risk judgments, Sheanteau (2001) introduce 
two further normative models; the decision tree and the Bayesian network 
(see Figure 1). As both theories are not relevant for our meta-analysis we 
refer to Shanteau (2001) for an overview.  
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2.2 Descriptive theories 
In comparison to normative theories, descriptive theories have 
mostly been used. “Descriptive theories in psychology try to describe how 
people actually think” (Over, 2004, p. 4). To introduce descriptive theories, 
Sheanteau highlighted the Subjectively Expected Utility Theory, the 
Information Integration Theory (Anderson, 1981), the Heuristic and Biases 
Program (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), the Naturalistic Decision Making 
Approach (Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993), the Fast and 
Frugal Heuristic Approach (Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Research 
Group, 1999), the Image Theory (Beach, 1990, see Figure 1). However, 
as a consequence of the mentioned research on JDM, the need for 
psychologists to help professionals make better decisions was recognized 
and encountered with the Expert Decision Making Approach; for an 
overview see Shanteau and Stewart (1992). To add that is this approach 
supports also our analysis (see chapter 2.5.2.1).  
Finally, the SJT was also included in descriptive theories on JDM 
research, although this approach combines the normative and descriptive 
theories (see Shanteau, 2001, p. 554). In the following section, we will 
introduce the SJT and focus on the reasons for its selection for our meta-
analysis. 
 
2.3 Criticism of judgment and decision-making research 
Despite the differences between normative and descriptive 
approaches, there have been many successful applications of both 
theories on JDM in many settings. However, the interesting question, 
whether decision makers are fully rational or biased, or simply how 
accurate judgment and decision makers are, is still unanswered. In 
addition, two major critique points are described. First, the validity 
problem, or the required increase of external validity on JDM research. 
Second, the nomothetically orientated research on JDM without 
                                    
   8 
considering the aggregation problem, and the resulting neglected focus on 
idiographic research approach.  
 
2.3.1 Are decision makers biased? 
In the following, we will illustrate the answer to the question whether 
decision makers are biased in a chronological order. 
In the introduced normative approach, researchers do not insist that 
people never make mistakes in their judgments, but they do insist that the 
mistakes are unsystematic. The deviations of the judgments from an 
objective value (optimizing model) are called biases. Additionally, as 
previously noted, research shows that the principles of normative theories 
are systematically violated by the decision makers. Edwards (1968) and 
his colleagues, for instance, concluded that human judgment does not 
accord with a model of Bayes’ rule for making judgments.  
Subsequent research showed that the judgment maker is not fully 
rational as implied by the normative theories. Therefore, a new theoretical 
approach was developed. From the perspective of the new approach, the 
optimizing model was an unrealistic standard for human judgment. This 
standard excludes that the world is large and complex and we do not have 
the capacity to understand everything. We also have a limited time in 
which to make decisions. Therefore, Simon (1955, 1956) proposed a more 
limited criterion and introduced the concept of “bounded rationality” in 
decision making. According to Simon, people are fully rational, but only if 
they are not restricted by task aspects, such as time limit, or personal 
aspects like computational capacities. Hence, decision makers would 
make rational judgments, if they could gather and process sufficient 
information. 
The concept of “bounded rationality” was not in line with the view of 
the Heuristic and Biases Approach. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) 
conducted experiments, in which the conditions are optimal; this means 
that the persons could gather and process sufficient information for their 
judgments. However, the Heuristic and Bias Approach implied a more 
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negative view of human judgment making compared to the bounded 
rationality approach. In addition, in the time to follow, people were trained 
to overcome or avoid errors of judgment. But these efforts were largely 
deemed to be unsuccessful. Consequently, the studies generally lead to 
the conclusion that “things are even worse than we thought; not only is 
judgment incompetent, it resists remedial efforts” (see Hammond, 1996, p. 
204). The Heuristic and Biases Approach is also highly criticized, however 
(see Hammond, 1996, p. 204).  
In sum, there is a large body of findings accumulated from research 
on JDM. The reported modern history of research starts with an optimal 
view of decision makers and ends with the contrary: A view of decision 
makers as almost always biased, as implied by the Heuristics and Biases 
Approach. 
However, to reveal the weakness of the conclusion that decision 
makers are often biased, we are interested to relate this statement to a 
comprehensive overview of the different applied decision theories, which 
are clarified in the following. 
 
2.3.2 Cognitive Continuum Theory 
To give a comprehensive overview of judgment and decision-
making research, the Cognitive Continuum Theory (CCT, see Hammond, 
2007) is applied to the described decision theories. Cooksey (1996) 
introduced the CCT as follows:  
Hammond proposed the CCT as a unifying theory for the field of 
human judgment and decision making. He intended to integrate, not 
replace, the currently popular, yet disparate, theories in the field. (p. 
13) 
Furthermore, the focus of the CCT is the relation between the judge 
and the task. Task properties are considered important, because they 
influence judgments. The CCT groups task properties into three principal 
categories: 1) complexity of task structure, 2) ambiguity of task content, 
and 3) form of task presentation (e.g. number of cues, reliability of cues, 
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interrelationships among cues). The different task structures call for a kind 
of thinking on a continuum from analytic to intuitive thinking. 
Consequently, there are three continua on which any judgment will fall. 
According to Hammond (2007), “one must keep these [three dimensions] 
in mind when trying to understand performance in any judgment situation” 
(p. 129). A good illustration of this is the study by Hammond, Hamm and 
Grassia (1986).  
However, because we are interested in giving a comprehensive 
overview on JDM research, we refer to Hammond (2007, p. 123; Cooksey, 
1996, p.13) for detailed information about the CCT and show it in Figure 2. 
As you can see in this Figure, the described JDM theories can be 
embedded in it and are separated into coherence and correspondence 
approaches (see Cooksey, 1996): 
A coherence-based focus describes, explains, or predicts judgment 
competence on the basis of logical, mathematical, or statistical 
rationality. The interest is in whether or not the judgment is 
consistent with what some well-established set of rules or axioms 
would have produced, not the accuracy of a judgment with respect 
to some environmental criterion. A correspondence-based focus, on 
the other hand, describes, explains, or predicts judgment 
competence on the basis of its empirical accuracy. Here, the 
interest is in how well judgments map onto events in the world, not 
in the fact that judgments may have followed some internally 
consistent set of rules or axioms. (p. 44) 
To summarise: Boxes two and three represent all normative and 
some descriptive theories representing coherence theories. As a 
consequence, to get an overview on humans’ abilities of JDM, more 
research on the side of correspondence theories is needed, such as the 
SJT.  
To complement the resulting conclusion that more research with a 
correspondence-theory approach should be carried out, two critique points 
– the validity problem and the aggregation problem – in judgment and 
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decision-making research are considered in more detail in the following. 
Both critique points support the application of the SJT as well. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The CCT (modified from Hammond, 1996, p. 235) 
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2.3.3 Validity problem 
Since the APA publication (1954) on validity, validity – the 
generalisation of psychological measurement – is also considered in 
research on JDM. Hogarth (according to Hammond, 2007) described the 
goal of JDM research to generalize the results as follows: 
Researchers who study people’s decision making processes seek 
results that are generalizable. However, conclusions are often 
based on contrived experimental ‘incidents’ with little understanding 
as to how these samples of behaviour relate to the population of 
situations that people encounter in their naturally occurring 
environments (i.e., the so-called real world). (p. 217) 
Most JDM researchers used experimental designs, i.e. controlled 
conditions of the laboratory. Cooksey (1996) critiques experimental 
research as follows: “organism behaves in under atypical conditions in 
pursuit of tasks and goals which were not representative of the natural 
environment in which the organism was embedded” (p. 1). Consequently, 
the studies are not external or ecologically valid, do not represent the real 
decision-making situation, and it is therefore also difficult to generalise the 
results of the studies. To raise the ecological validity of psychological 
science, Brunswik recommended that psychology should be a science of 
organism-environment relations rather than a science of the organism (see 
Dunwoody, 2006). This suggestion also influenced Newell and Simon 
(1972): 
Just as a scissors cannot cut paper without two blades, a theory of 
thinking and problem solving cannot predict behaviour unless it 
encompasses both an analysis of the structure of the task 
environments and an examination of the limits of rational adaptation 
to task requirements. (p. 55) 
However, as Dunwoody (2006) noted:  
Brunswik’s argument still carries weight today, and psychology in 
general, and cognitive psychology specifically, have still not dealt 
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with the criticism levied against it by Brunswik 50 years ago. (p. 
139) 
Furthermore, as mentioned before within the CCT, theories are 
separated into coherence and correspondence approaches (see Cooksey, 
1996). This classification of decision theories reveals that despite the 
importance of the characteristics of the task to raise the ecological validity 
in JDM research, most studies only concentrate on the coherence 
theories, and therefore on the characteristics of the judge. However, 
explanations of judgment are found both in characteristics of the judges, 
such as experience, and in characteristics of the task. 
In sum: To find out, whether a decision maker is actually biased as 
implied by the Heuristic and Biases Program, it is also necessary to raise 
the external validity of the research on JDM and therefore to include more 
studies with a correspondence approach like the SJT.  
 
2.3.4 Neglected idiographic approach 
An important neglected critique regarding research on JDM 
concerns the fact that most studies use the nomothetic approach.  
The historical background leads to the introduction of the terms 
which resemble two disciplines of sciences. At the beginning of the last 
century, different disciplines dominated science, and each of them wanted 
to influence the others with its methods. To avoid methodological 
confusion, Windelband suggested two disciplines, as nomothetic 
disciplines (e.g. natural science) seek only general law – in contrast to 
idiographic disciplines (e.g. history), which seek to understand a particular 
event. Windelband’s (1894) definition of “nomothetic” (greek: “nomos” = 
law) and “idiographic” (greek: “idios” = own, private) science as two distinct 
kinds of knowledge is traceable to Aristotle and to Kant.1  
Nomothetic knowledge, Windelband argues, is knowledge of the 
sort contained in the general laws formulated in the natural 
                                                 
 
1 Windelband was a member of the Southwestern School of Neo-Kantianism. 
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sciences (Naturwissenschaften). The defining characteristic of a 
general law is that it reflects “what always is” within some explicitly 
circumscribed domain of empirical events covered by the law. 
Idiographic knowledge by contrast, is knowledge of an essentially 
historical or biographical sort. Its defining characteristic is its 
reflection of “what once was”, and so idiographic knowledge is 
precisely that sort of knowledge needed to understand some unique 
entity or event. … sought in the Geisteswissenschaften, or what 
would be referred to English as the moral sciences or human 
sciences, or, most commonly, the humanities (see Lamiell, 2003, p. 
89). 
Later, as mostly reported, Allport (1937) introduced Windelband’s 
distinction between the idiographic and the nomothetic approach to 
psychology. However, Hurlburt and Knapp (2006) argue that it is often 
overlooked that the terms were already part of the psychological discourse 
of the “leading logician”, Hugo Münsterberg, in 1898. In turn, Münsterberg 
had a strong influence on Stern, who is the pioneer of individual 
psychology. This new psychology had its focus on a new unit, the person 
as the “unitas multiplex” (see Kreppner, 1992, p. 539). Stern also 
influenced Allport, who collected terms describing personal characteristics 
and found that some of them could be investigated at a nomothetic level. 
But, the majority of these terms are more or less unique dispositions 
based on life experiences, and they introduced an idiographic level of 
research in Psychology. Therefore, Allport (1937) argued that the 
psychology of personality needs both approaches as follows: 
The dichotomy [between nomothetic and idiographic], however, is 
too sharp: It requires a psychology divided against itself… . It is 
more helpful to regard the two methods as overlapping and as 
contributing to one another. In the field of medicine, diagnosis and 
therapy are idiographic procedures, but both rest intimately upon 
knowledge of the common factors in disease determined by the 
nomothetic sciences of bacteriology and biochemistry. Likewise, 
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biography is clearly idiographic, and yet in the best biographies one 
finds an artful blend of generalization with individual portraiture. A 
complete study of the individual will embrace both approaches. (p. 
29) 
In summary, Stern and Allport’s research experience leads to the 
introduction of idiographic and nomothetic approaches also in psychology. 
In the following, many scientists argue that the idiographic 
approach does not belong in the realm of science, because the focus of 
science is on the development of universal, nomothetic laws of behavior. 
Therefore, it would be impossible to generalize results (for a review of 
such critiques, see Runyan, 1983).  
Nevertheless, of the criticism mentioned above, some scientists’ 
also focus on the idiographic approach (see Asendorpf, 2000; Molenaar, 
2004). For example Brunswik (1956) concerned the uniqueness of each 
organism, as it engaged in functional behaviour within the context of a 
particular ecology, and developed his probabilistic approach. This 
approach is used by Hammond (1955) to study cognitive processes. The 
study of cognitive processes on the individual level is also supported by 
Newell and Simon. In line with Brunswik, they prefer the analysis of the 
cognitive activity of each individual separately (see Newell & Simon, 1972, 
p. 874).  
Consequently, we can conclude that also dominant cognitive 
psychologists like Newell, Simon, and Hammond use individual data in the 
same way as Allport and those who preceded him, who emphasize the 
importance of the idiographic approach not as a substitute for or an enemy 
of the nomothetic approach, but as an informer and companion of it.  
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2.3.4.1 Aggregation problem: Ecological vs. individualistic fallacy 
Today, psychology, and especially research on JDM, is dominated 
by the nomothetic research approach, which investigates large groups of 
people in order to find general laws of behavior to apply to everyone. With 
the nomothetic approach, however, the aggregation of individual data 
could produce misleading interpretations (Asendorpf, 2000), such as the 
ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950). The ecological fallacy arises because 
associations between two variables at the group level (or ecological level) 
may differ from associations between analogous variables measured at 
the individual level. In his study, Robinson (1950) computed the literacy 
rate and the rate of the foreign-born population for each of the 48 states in 
the USA. The correlation between the 48 pairs of numbers was .5 – so, 
the greater the proportion of immigrants in a state, the higher its average 
literacy. This is an ecological correlation, because the unit of analysis is a 
group of people, not an individual. In contrast, on the individual level the 
correlation was lower (-.1), so immigrants were on average less literate 
than native citizens. The positive correlation at the level of state 
populations resulted because immigrants tended to settle in states where 
the native population was more literate. Therefore, the ecological 
correlation gives a wrong result, because using averages diminishes the 
variability in the underlying individual data. Thus, Robinson cautioned 
against drawing conclusions about individuals on the basis of the 
aggregation level, or “ecological” data. As Robinson was first to mention 
this problem in the aggregation of correlation data, this fallacy was also 
given the name Robinson effect. 
Furthermore, the ecological fallacy is not only a problem in 
aggregation within one study, but also in aggregation across studies in 
meta-analysis research (Viechtbauer, 2007, p. 114). In meta-analysis, the 
unit of analysis is mostly studies, not the individual participant within a 
study, and consequently, meta-analysis summarizes relationships at 
study-level, and these relationships may not correspond to the observed 
relationships at the individual level.  
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In addition, also the individualistic fallacy (i.e. exception, 
psychological or atomistic fallacy) – the counterpart of the ecological 
fallacy – should be considered. The individualistic fallacy occurs when a 
group conclusion is reached on the basis of exceptional cases. An 
example could be a man cooking badly, from which we conclude that “men 
are terrible cooks”. In short, a stereotype leads to our conclusion (for an 
overview of typology of ecological fallacies, see Alker, 1969). 
To summarize: Although the aggregation of judgment achievement 
prevents individualistic fallacy, ecological fallacy should not be overlooked.  
In the following, we emphasize that some modern cognitive 
psychologists are aware of the importance of the introduced aggregation 
problems. Cooksey, Freedbody and Davidson (1986, p. 49) mention the 
aggregation problem in their description of JDM research as follows: 
“Apart from the SJT work …., the study of judgment and decision making 
has tended to remain in the methodological traditions of nomothetic design 
and analysis” (p. 49). Furthermore, they contend that “an individual’s 
decision system needs to be viewed in isolation and as a coherent whole, 
before aggregation across judges occurs” (p. 49). Consequently, they 
concluded that “aggregation [across individuals] can occur, but only after 
individual judgment policies have been completely specified” (p. 50). “Only 
after understanding the uniqueness of individual judgment policies will we 
be in a position to talk about the commonalities between policies – that is 
aggregation” (p. 50).  
 
2.3.5 Summary of chapter 2.3 
In sum, the critique on JDM – the validity and aggregation problems 
– and the CCT support the research on JDM in the framework of the SJT, 
which includes the Lens Model (Brunswik, 1952). The SJT is suitable to 
research JDM, because the Lens Model focuses on individuals and 
therefore on the idiographic approach. Additionally, the SJT includes also 
the nomothetic approach and, therefore combines both theories on JDM. 
At last, because the SJT also includes the correspondence theory, it can 
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be shown how the judgment achievement of a person is influenced by the 
cognitive system of the judge and/or by task properties. Consequently, of 
all mentioned critique on research in judgment and decision making, we 
will focus on the SJT in more detail. As the SJT is embedded in 
Probabilistic Functionalism, it will be introduced first.  
 
 
2.4 Probabilistic Functionalism 
In the following we will introduce the background of the SJT in more 
detail. First, the Probabilistic Functionalism Approach, leading to the 
development of the SJT, will be introduced. Then, we focus on the 
classical Lens Model and the deduced Lens Model Equation (LME). 
Probabilistic Functionalism is traceable to Brunswik’s work on 
perception during the 1930s (see Wolf, 1995, p. 16 for biographical 
information on Brunswik). In those times the gestalt psychologists studied 
a wide variety of perceptual illusions and turned their attention to the study 
of error. Because Brunswik and also Gibson insisted that the study of 
illusions was misguided, both wanted to study behaviour in a natural 
environment, which lead them to become known as ecological 
psychologists. However, Brunswik’s interest in the structure of the 
environment in relation with an organism is based on his early 
collaboration with Tolman (1935). In their publication “The Organism and 
the Causal Texture of the Environment”, environment texture was already 
the focus. They assume that persons try to cope with an environment 
consisting of interrelated and thus “textured” objects and events. However, 
this point of view contrasts sharply with the theme psychologists took from 
physical science in those days and that led them to focus on the exact 
mathematical laws of behaviour (see Hammond, 2007). Beside this 
collaboration, Brunswik (1939) conducted his own rat experiments in 
Berkeley of Tolman’s invitation. In these experiments his research showes 
that rats follow a probability-matching rule representing the probability of 
getting food or the environmental conditions.  
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Consequently, this research experience may have lead Brunswik to 
recognize the importance of the environment in its influence on cognition 
processes, the key feature for the development of Probabilistic 
Functionalism. Hence, the essence of Brunswik’s theory and methodology 
is seen in his definition of psychology’s task: 
As the analysis of the interrelationship between two systems in the 
process of “coming-to-terms” with one another, the assertion that 
psychology must treat each system with equal respect, the directive 
that psychology “… must also be concerned with the texture of the 
environment as it extends away from the common boundary” of the 
two systems (Hammond, 1966, p. 16) 
In addition, Brunswik integrated theory and methodology into one 
unified system mostly applied to perception. Probabilistic Functionalism 
was the framework for this development. Probabilistic Functionalism 
introduced the idea of an environment that included probability relations 
among the variables of interest (e.g. reading ability and reading 
achievement) instead of perfect relations among the variables, the so-
called determinism approach. In those days the deterministic approach 
was dominant. 
The Probabilistic Functionalism Approach leads to an environment 
which is not perfectly predictable and thus uncertain from the viewpoint of 
an individual. Furthermore, Functionalism implies a “utilitarian, adjustment-
centered biological conception of psychology which may be traced to 
Charles Darwin’s view on the struggle for existence” (Brunswik, 1952, p. 
55). Brunswik (1955) argues that the real world is an important 
consideration in research (see also Dunwoody, 2006). Every person lives 
within and interacts with an environment. Thus, psychological processes 
are adapted in a Darwinian sense to the environment in which they 
function.  
In summary, according to the Probabilistic Functionalism Approach, 
our judgment is adapted to the environment in which the judged criterion is 
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not perfectly related to information on which the judgment is based. 
Therefore, the criterion is not perfectly predictable for a decision maker.  
In addition, the major purpose of Probabilistic Functionalism is to 
appraise the “… interplay and relative contribution of environmental factors 
in the (organism’s) adjustment to a given ecology” (Brunswik, 1956, p. 
143). 
According to Goldstein (2004, p. 22), “Brunswik’s Probabilistic 
Functionalism emphasizes 1) adjustment to the world, and 2) the mediated 
nature of that adjustment”. Already Hursch, Hammond and Hursch (1964) 
noted the environment’s importance to adjustment or judgment 
achievement as follows: 
Without a knowledge of the limitations placed on achievement by 
the statistical characteristics of a given ecological or response 
system, it is impossible (a) to evaluate a subject’s achievement 
within that system, (b) to compare a subject’s achievement across 
ecological situations which have different statistical characteristics, 
and (c) to understand why the subject’s achievement was as high or 
low as it was. (p. 43) 
It must be noted that Brunswik’s conceptualization failed to take 
hold in 1940s and 1950s psychology. Since the 1960s, Brunswik’s ideas 
have enjoyed a steadily increasing influence on research in a variety of 
areas, such as methodology (e.g. Hunter, Schmidt & Jackson, 1982; 
Wittmann, 1985), human-technology interaction (e.g. Kirlik, 2006), but 
most notably in the study of human judgment (e.g. Hammond, Hamm, & 
Grassa, 1986). Brunswik’s influence on JDM starts with the application of 
the Lens Model to human judgments by Hammond (1955), as you can see 
below.  
Finally, the importance of Probabilistic Functionalism is summarized 
by Hammond (2007): 
[Brunswik] demonstrated that the departure from the physical-
science model of scientific work and the adoption of the biological 
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model would allow us to solve the problem of how to harmoniously 
advance academic work and make more usable its results. (p. 265) 
Therefore, Brunswik’s Probabilistic Functionalism Approach is a 
biological rather than physical-science view of psychology.  
 
2.4.1 Social Judgment Theory 
In the following, the SJT within the Probabilistic Functionalism 
framework is outlined. 
As previously noted, Hammond (1955) first transferred Brunswik’s 
ideas from visual perception to social judgment as clinical 
psychodiagnosis. Hammond’s work was inspired by Meehl’s study (1954), 
which presented strong arguments in favour of substituting statistical 
prediction for clinical judgment in diagnostic tasks (see chapter 2.5.2). As 
a consequence of Hammond’s work, a comprehensive perspective on 
JDM, called the SJT, was developed. SJT is, as Brehmer (1988) noted: 
Despite its name, it [SJT] is not a theory for it provides no testable 
hypotheses about judgment. Instead, it is a metatheory which gives 
direction to research on judgment. (p. 13) 
The SJT evolved through the 1960s and 1970s, as Hammond and 
his colleagues synthesized research that applied the Lens Model 
(Brunswik, 1952) to judgments under the rubric of the SJT (Brehmer & 
Brehmer, 1988; Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, & Steinmann, 1975).  
The SJT is characterized by four varieties of the lens model (Dhami, 
Hertwig & Hoffrage, 2004, p. 964, for a pictoral representation of these 
designs, see also Hammond & Stewart, 2001, p. 472), namely the single-
system design, the double-system design, the triple-system design, or N-
system design. From this model, also a hierarchical N-system model is 
derived (see Cooksey, 1996). 
In sum, the Lens Model is a useful framework for conceptualizing 
the judgment process for an individual judge or a group of judges. 
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2.4.1.1 Classical Lens Model 
Beside the mentioned variants of the classical Lens Model, the 
double-system design is illustrated in more details in the following. Then 
we will focus on the deducted LME.  
Cooksey (1996) defined the classical Lens Model – the double-
system design – as follows: 
Brunswik’s original conceptual device for depicting the fundamental 
unit of focus for psychology where the ecology and the person’s 
cognitive system are accorded equal importance from a research 
perspective and the linkages between the two systems are made 
explicit. The lens analogy comes from the linkages between the 
various surface cues and the depth region of the ecology and the 
depth region of cognition being convergently focused like rays of 
light onto the distal criterion on the one side and onto judgments on 
the other. (p. 370) 
The Lens Model is used to describe the judgment achievement of 
an individual judge. For example, as previously noted, the application of 
the Lens Model to the expectation of a student’s year-long reading 
achievement (Cooksey et al., 1986) is illustrated in Figure 3.  
In a typical lens-model study, a person (in our example, a teacher) 
considers a number of student profiles and makes an estimate of a 
criterion (e.g. ye, end-of-year reading achievement) for each student. “A 
profile is a descriptive term, which refers to the configuration of cue values 
(e.g. information such as the socio-economic status of students) used to 
depict a particular case for judgment” [italics added] (Cooksey, 1996, p. 
372, also called cue profiles, events, or cases). 
In his Lens Model, Brunswik applied the key principle of parallel 
concepts. “This principle states, quite simply, that the ecological system 
and the cognitive system of the organism can and should be described 
using the same types of concepts” (see Cooksey, 1996, p. 3). Hence, the 
two parallel concepts, representing the left and the right side of the lens, 
are explained. The right-hand side of the lens model represents the 
                                    
   23 
teacher’s estimates (Ys) as a cognitive process (see also Figure 3, chapter 
2.4.1). For each student, there is some objective criterion value (ye, e.g. 
standardized test score) for his reading success at the end of the year. 
This is shown on the left-hand side of the model as the environment of the 
judgment task. The teacher’s task is to make the “best” judgment possible 
of this criterion performance for each student. The judgment is based on 
available information (x1, e.g. socio-economic status, reading ability) that is 
perceived to be related to or predictive of the end-of-year reading success. 
The available information is called cues. According to Cooksey (1996) 
cues are: 
Any numerical, verbal, graphical pictorial or other sensory 
information which is available to a judge for potential use in forming 
a judgment for a specific case and/or which can be available in the 
environment for making predictions about a criterion. (p. 368)  
The cues are represented in the center of the Lens Model. In fact, 
different cues may be used at different times, i.e., they may substitute for 
each other; this is well known as “vicarious functioning”. Although Heider 
rejects Brunswik’s probabilism, he accepts the idea of the 
intersubstitutability of cues (see Hammond, 1996, p. 141). A good 
example of vicarious functioning is given by Hammond (1996) and shows 
that cues are redundant and thus intersubstitutable:  
When pigeons are unable to locate the sun because of a cloud 
cover, magnetic lines of force function vicariously for the sun. Thus, 
“under complete overcast, if the sun compass fails to operate, the 
second step seems to be achieved by a magnetic compass.” (p. 
115)  
Vicarious functioning takes a key position within the Lens Model, as 
illustrated by Brunswik (1957): 
Vicarious functioning emcompasses both the divergent and the 
convergent part of the lens like patterns that characterize all 
achievement. In the field of cognition, it is the divergent part – 
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ecological validity – which is ecological and the convergent part – 
utilization – which is organismic. (p. 22)  
Also Darwin recognized the parallels between vicarious mediation 
(of information in the environment) and vicarious functioning (in the 
organism, see Hammond, 1996, p. 162) which make-up the vicarious-
functioning processes. 
In sum, the ability to shift dependence from one cue to another, or 
vicarious functioning, is a great advantage in an uncertain environment 
that offers redundant information.  
Furthermore, the vicarious functioning process underlies Brunswik’s 
achievement concept. In our educational example, judgment achievement 
is the achievement of a teacher’s expectations. In this context, the 
teacher’s expectation is defined as how well a teacher can predict the real 
reading ability, expressed as a correlation between the teachers’ reading-
achievement estimate and the actual test score of a reading-achievement 
test (ra, see Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Adapted Lens-Model representation for comparing a judgment 
with a known criterion (modified from Brunswik, 1952). 
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As described before, according to the Probabilistic Functionalism 
Theory, the cues are not perfectly related to the judged criterion in the 
environment. Therefore, in our example, even with optimal use of the 
information (cue utilization, consistency, Rs, see Figure 3), a teacher’s 
reading-achievement estimate will not be perfectly accurate. Ecological 
validity or environmental predictability (Re, see Figure 3) limit the judgment 
achievement. In the following, the term task predictability will be used, 
although the term ecological validity was introduced for it by Brunswik. For 
a discussion about the terminology we refer to Hammond (1998). 
 Achievement can be maximized, however, when the available 
information is strongly related to the actual-reading achievement test or 
when high validity of the available information exists. However, the 
environment is not deterministic, which leads to not prefect predictability of 
an event or judgment achievement.  
 
2.4.1.2 Lens Model Equation 
The achievement correlation (ra), also known as validity index, can 
be decomposed into several components, combined in the so-called Lens 
Model Equation (LME). Consequently, limitations of judgment 
achievement are revealed by the components of the LME. One of the 
goals of the developers of the LME was to compare a subject’s 
achievement across different situations. 
The initiation for the development of the LME came in 1964 (see 
Hammond et al., 1964; Hursch et al., 1964; Tucker, 1964) and ultimately 
lead to the well-known Tucker LME. Tucker (1964) simplifies the LME by 
adding the component G (see Equation 1, and see Stewart, 2004, for 
biographical information about Tucker). Tucker’s version of the LME 
became standard:  
 
 
22 11 seesa RRCRGRr −−+=     (1) 
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To summarise: The LME consists of a linear (i.e. GRSRe) and a 
non-linear part. Mostly, the linear part explains the greatest part of 
judgment achievement. This also represents the introduced beauty of 
linear models (see Dawes, 1979, see chapter 2.1.1). 
Since the early publication of the LME, several expansions of the 
basic LME have been developed. Castellan (1972), for instance, 
generalised the LME to multiple criteria, because in most judgment tasks 
we have to evaluate multiple criteria. He critized the classical Lens Model 
and the derivate LME as follows: 
The linear lens model as described is applicable only to situations 
involving a single criterion. But there are many judgment tasks 
involving several criteria. For example, in the case of clinical 
judgment, the decision concerning a patient may be whether the 
patient is schizophrenic and / or whether the patient should be 
hospitalized. (p. 244)   
Hence, because the described Lens Model is applicable only to 
situations involving a single criterion (i.e. univariate Lens Model) and there 
are many judgment tasks involving several criteria, Castellan proposed a 
multivariate Lens Model. An example is the study by Cooksey et al. 
(1986). Another example of the extension of the LME is Stewart’s (1976) 
hierarchical version. With this variation of the LME, it is possible to 
contribute different sets of variables. In addition, Castellan’s and Stewart’s 
expansion of the LME lead to the generalized LME by Cooksey and 
Freebody (1985). Finally, Stewart (1990, Stewart & Lusk, 1994) integrated 
Murphy’s Skill Score into the Lens-Model concepts to give a more precise 
assessment of forecasting accuracy.  
As the focus of our work is the classical LME, however, we will 
describe the application of the standard LME by Tucker (1964), derived 
from the Lens Model (see Figure 4). The LME reflects symmetry by the 
parallel application of two regressions, one to the organism and the other 
to the environment. Additionally, parallel components are derived for both 
systems expressed by the LME. Therefore, firstly, the regression is based 
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on cues (x1-k, independent variables) of multiple judgments, such as 
predictions of students’ reading-achievement levels, by one teacher (Ys, 
dependent variable). This first regression models the consistency 
component (Rs) of the LME. Secondly, in the same way, the 
environmental-predictability component (Re) of the LME was modelled 
through the criterion value, such as the actual reading-achievement level 
of students (ye, dependent variable) and the cues of multiple judgments.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Adapted Lens-Model with superimposed statistical parameters 
for comparing a judgment with a known criterion (modified from Cooksey, 
1996, p. 206). 
 
However, the results of the two mentioned regression analyses are 
correlated, leading to the judgment achievement. Hence, a teacher’s 
prediction of reading-achievement level (ra) can be described with the 
components of correlations of the LME as follows (see Table 1): 
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Table 1 
Summary of the components of correlations of the LME (Tucker, 1964) 
 
Component 
 
Symbol 
 
Description 
 
Achievement 
 
ra 
 
Correlation between the judgment and the 
criterion 
 
Knowledge 
(error-free achievement, 
linear) 
G The correlation between the environmental 
predictability component and the consistency 
component  
 
Consistency/ 
Cue utilization 
Rs The strength of the relation between the judgment 
and the cues (i.e. multiple correlation of the 
judgment and the cues) 
 
Environmental / Task 
predictability 
Re The strength of the relation between the criterion 
and the cues (i.e. multiple correlation of the 
criterion and the cues) 
 
Knowledge  
(nonlinear) 
C The correlation between the variance not 
captured by the environmental predictability 
component or the consistency component 
(residual variance) 
 
In the following, the single components of the LME illustrated by our 
educational example.  
How well a teacher knows the reading-achievement criteria of a 
reading-achievement test is revealed by the components G (linear 
knowledge) and C (nonlinear knowledge). Therefore, the component G 
(and also C) can be considered to be an estimate of the correlation a 
teacher can achieve if the environment is fully predictable (Re = 1) and if 
the teacher makes perfectly consistent estimates (Rs = 1). G represents 
the error-free judgment achievement of the judge and is called knowledge.  
How similar repeated reading-achievement estimations of a teacher 
are is represented by the component Rs and is called consistency.  
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How well available information represents the reading-achievement 
criteria of a reading-achievement test is described by the component Re. 
Therefore, the component Re is called environmental predictability. For 
example, even if you are the best teacher in the world, you may be unable 
to predict the reading achievement of your students, because most of the 
variance in achievement comes form sources other than the used cues.  
To summarize, in a more general way, the LME is a precise, 
mathematical way of describing the judgment achievement (ra) of a person 
by four components (G, Rs, Re, C). Furthermore, the LME is used to 
identify the underlying sources of judgment achievement. This equation is 
of utmost importance, because it permits the precise analysis of the 
interplay and relative contribution of environmental factors in the 
(organism’s) adjustment to a given ecology.  
The success of the regression-based LME in current research was 
not predictable. On the one hand, in the early days, there were strong 
critics against this approach. Hildegard (1955) summarized the critique 
against Brunswik’s approach as follows: “Correlation is an instrument of 
the devil” (p. 228). On the other side, this approach coined the metaphor 
“man as intuitive statistician”, as regression analysis is used to model how 
the mind works. However, the numerous publications in the framework of 
the SJT show clearly that correlation-based research is today widely 
accepted by the scientific community and leads to reviews on this 
research. In the following, we will introduce these reviews on SJT-based 
research. 
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2.5 Reviews on judgment achievement 
In the following, we separate achievement from feedback and 
learning studies within the SJT (see chapter 4.1.2). Then, we will introduce 
research on LME components, leading also to presentation of the 
symmetry concept. Finally, to prove a complete overview of judgment-
achievement studies, we will relate this SJT research to other JDM 
approaches – focusing on research areas and expertise knowledge, and 
leading to our research questions.  
 
2.5.1 Within the Social Judgment Theory 
A comprehensive overview of the area of the SJT is the “Role of 
Representative Design in an Ecological Approach to Cognition” (Dhami et 
al., 2004). In line with Dhami et al. (2004, p. 964), the following overview of 
the SJT is separated into research areas like a) judgment achievement, b) 
multiple-cue probability learning, or c) cognitive-feedback studies applying 
the lens model. 
Firstly, of all multiple-cue probability learning studies until 1999, 
there is an annotated bibliography available by Holzworth, including 315 
references. The subject of multiple-cue probability learning studies is how 
or how well an individual learns probabilistic (not perfectly linked) relations 
between two variables (e.g. reading ability and reading achievement). 
Secondly, a complete literature review on cognitive-feedback 
studies until 1989 was done by Balzer, Doherty and O'Connor. These 
studies involve periodic information about the subjects’ judgment 
strategies. Therefore, cognitive feedback may include a summary 
measure of past performance and/or information about the association 
between each cue and the subject’s judgment. Furthermore, in their 
review Balzer et al. (1989) make explicit three types of feedback, namely: 
information about task, cognition, and functional validity. In summary, the 
data showed that many studies suggest that most of the benefit comes 
from the task information.  
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Finally, although judgment achievement should be the main 
research topic in psychology (Brunswik, 1966), it is often neglected in 
current research (see Dunwoody, 2006), as Dhami et al. (2004) point out: 
The majority of studies outside the Brunswikian tradition (97%) and 
the neo-Brunswikian studies (72%) described participants’ 
judgment policies and compared policies among participants 
without reference to their degree of achievement. (p. 967) 
However, there are numerous publications also on achievement 
studies leading to two meta-analyses (Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008; Stewart, 
1997). We will present them in a historical order and relate them to our 
research.  
 
2.5.1.1 Meta-analysis by Stewart (1997) 
More than ten years ago, Stewart (1997) carried out a meta-
analysis of experts’ judgment achievement and ecological validity. In this 
meta-analysis, only two components of five lens-model components were 
considered, and they focus only on experts. Therefore, our meta-analysis 
should be extended to all components of the LME and include non-
experts’ judgments. To mention is that this meta-analysis was not 
available, hence, we can’t compare our results with it.  
 
2.5.1.2 Meta-analysis by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) 
During the work on this dissertation-thesis we became aware that 
Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) also carried out a meta-analysis in the 
framework of the SJT. However, there are four differences in these two 
meta-analyses, which are explained in the following: 
 
1)    Karelaia and Hogarth’s meta-analysis includes only a bare-bones 
meta-analysis. According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) and in 
contrast to Karelaia and Hogarth (2008), we include also 
measurement-error corrections, because: 
                                    
   32 
A theory of data that fails to recognize measurement error 
will lead to methods of meta-analysis that do not correct for 
measurement error. Such methods will then perforce 
produce biased meta-analysis results. (p. 31) 
Hence, Karelaia and Hogarth’s meta-analysis implicitly assumes 
perfect reliability or the absence of measurement error, which is 
clearly not the case in any study in science. Furthermore, Hunter 
and Schmidt’s research experience (2004, p. 68) showed that when 
they made corrections for sampling error and other artefacts, they 
usually found little appreciable variation across studies remaining 
after these corrections. Finally, they also wished to inform that 
researchers should not forget that even a fully corrected meta-
analysis suggested by their 2004 book will not correct for all 
artefacts. And therefore, they conclude: “Even after correction, the 
remaining variation across studies should be viewed with 
scepticism. Small residual variance is probably due to uncorrected 
artefacts rather than to real moderator variable” (p. 81).  
 
2) In addition to Karelaia and Hogarth’s meta-analysis, we will also 
focus on studies with an idiographic research approach and can 
therefore check our data for the ecological fallacy (see Robinson, 
1950). 
 
3) Furthermore, Karelaia and Hogarth’s data base, including cognitive 
feedback studies and also multiple-cue probability learning studies, 
is different from our studies and complements this dissertation-
thesis.  
 
4) Finally, Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) neglected to analyse their 
studies in different research areas and also expertise within 
research areas (see chapter 2.5.2.1).  
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Taken together, our meta-analysis is more limited than Karelaia and 
Hogarth’s meta-analysis (2008), hence, only their results on one shot 
learning are comparable to our results (Table 2, p. 412). They showed that 
judgment achievement is moderate (ra = .41) and the other values are high 
(G = 63; Rs = .80; Re = .71) except one low value (C = 0.07). However, in 
the following if we refer to the work by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008), we 
focus on this aspect of their work. In addition, they focus also on expert 
models, as this is not the scope of our analysis we refer to chapter 7.  
In conclusion, there are two meta-analyses done in the framework 
of the SJT, neither one used a psychometric Hunter-Schmidt approach or 
focused on the difference of judgment-achievement values in research 
areas. Furthermore, also the comprehensive data base used by the 
Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) meta-analysis left some questions open, 
such as what kind of cues or criterions influenced judgment achievement. 
Hence, a more detailed analysis is urgently needed.  
 
2.5.1.3 Research on the Lens-Model components  
A variety of research on the statistical and empirical behaviour of 
the components of the LME has been carried out over the last 40 years. 
For an overview see Cooksey (1996, p. 216). This research is designed to 
investigate the interrelationships among the components and their proper 
interpretation(s). For instance, a number of studies have found evidence 
that the reliability of judgment is lower for less predictable tasks (i.e. 
Brehmer, 1976; Harvey, 1995). Additionally, as Lee and Yates (1992) 
showed the lens-model statistics (i.e. G) decrease with an increasing 
number of cues.  
In summary, a lot of designed studies have been conducted, but no 
research, apart from the two noted meta-analyses, has ever compared the 
already published studies and compared the actual components of the 
LME. Therefore, our research results can also be important from a more 
theoretical point of view to validate the existing research on the LME 
components. 
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2.5.2 Related to other judgment and decision-making approaches  
There are already several reviews and meta-analyses on judgment 
achievement (for pros and cons of reviews and meta-analyses, see 
chapter 4.4).  
An important starting-point for several reviews on judgment 
achievement is Meehl’s work from 1954. He compared clinical-judgment 
makers’ accuracy with the model of actual formulas (i.e. mechanical, 
statistical, actuarial), and as already introduced, this work clearly shows 
the advantages of actual formals compared to clinical judgments. 
Interestingly, the experience levels as well as the cues given to a judge did 
not affect the superiority of the actual method. However, Meehl (1954) 
showed that the model accomplished an almost better judgment than the 
experts. The recent review article on this topic by Grove et al. (2000) 
confirms Meehl’s conclusion that mechanical prediction of human 
behaviour is equal or superior to clinical prediction methods. In addition, 
an overview focusing only on consulting area and judgment achievement 
supported the superiority of the model (see Aegisdottir et al., 2006). It 
must be mentioned, however, that reviews on this field only focus on 
aggregated data and ignore single judgment and decision-maker.  
 
2.5.2.1 Expertise in research areas 
It must be mentioned that in the review by Grove et al. (2000), there 
is also a trend toward greater advantage for expert models in the medical 
and forensic field as opposed to educational or finance settings, implying 
that variations in judgment achievement depend on subject area (i.e. 
research areas, domains). In addition, Armstrong’s review (2001) implies 
differences in research areas in judgment achievement.  
Furthermore, Shanteau (2002) supports the view of domain 
differences in judgment research and claims for research on expertise 
knowledge within different domains. 
Altogether, although there are several meta-analyses and 
overviews on lens-model research, none of them take different research 
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areas into account. One exception is the work by Dhami et al. (2004); as 
Dhami et al. (2004) also coded their studies according to research areas, 
but never published this aspect.  
To summarize: the lens-model approach is a domain-independent 
approach, treading all areas equal. However, as introduced, research on 
judgment achievement focuses on domain-differences (e.g. Armstrong, 
2001; Grove et al., 2000).  
 
2.6 Summary of chapter 2 
After the introduction of an array of different judgment and decision-
making theories, their drawbacks led us to focus on the SJT. Because the 
SJT is defined as domain-independent, there are no overviews 
considering either different research areas or expertise knowledge within 
the research areas. Hence, we included these missing aspects in the SJT 
in our research questions, which are introduced in the following. 
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3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To reveal why some people are more accurate than others, 
numerous studies have applied the LME to judgments. Although the initial 
goal of the LME was to conduct comparative studies among judges and 
among situations, no complete meta-analysis according to Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004) of the LME has been conducted that gives an overview of 
judgment achievement between and across persons dependent on 
judgment tasks. To provide a comprehensive overview of judgment 
achievement in the framework of the SJT, we want to find out what the 
judgment achievement of persons actually is. Therefore, we will first focus 
on studies using an idiographic research approach. The following question 
interested us for our meta-analysis across persons:  
 
1) What is the actual value of judgment achievement expressed as the 
correlation between judgments and criterion? For example, how good 
are a teacher’s reading-achievement estimations actually?  
 
The following questions are raised because the judgment 
achievement in the included studies is described by additional 
components of correlations of the LME:  
 
2) What is the actual value of error-free judgment achievement 
(knowledge) expressed as the correlation between judgments and 
criterion, assuming the environment (i.e. judgment task) is perfectly 
predictable and the judges are perfectly consistent? For example, how 
good could a teacher’s reading-achievement estimation actually be, 
assuming that the reading achievements of the students are perfectly 
predictable and the teacher’s estimations are perfectly repeated?  
3) What is the actual value consistency expressed as the correlation 
between cues and judgments? For example, how similar are repeated 
reading-achievement estimations of a teacher actually? 
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4) What is the actual value of environmental predictability expressed as 
the correlation between cues and criterion? For example, how well 
could information used by a teacher predict the actual reading 
achievement of students?  
 
We began our analysis at the idiographic level, treating the data of 
the individuals as unique systems, before searching for commonalities in 
their judgment achievements.  
 
An important issue that cuts across all the above questions is the 
influence of moderating factors, such as task characteristics on judgment 
achievement. Consequently, the meta-analysis will be repeated and 
checked as to whether the correlations of the components also are held 
for possible moderator as: 
 
a) Analysis unit, such as individual (i.e. idiographic) or across individuals 
(i.e. nomothetic) analysis: Are there any differences, indicating an 
ecological fallacy? (see also chapter 2.3.4.1). 
 
b) Applied research area (i.e. medical, business, educational and 
psychological science, or other research areas): How accurate are 
individuals’ judgments in different domains in comparison to judgments 
across research areas? Are there any differences? What are the 
underlying reasons for accuracy or inaccuracy? (see also chapter 
2.5.2.1). 
 
c) If the expertise within one area may influence judgment achievement: 
For example, are medical experts’ judgment achievements lower than 
teachers’? (see Shanteau, 2002). 
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4 METHODS 
In the following section, the literature search and the resulting data 
base are described. Two control strategies and nine exclusion criteria 
leading to the final data base are also explained, followed by the coding 
procedure used. In addition, the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) method of 
meta-analysis is shortly introduced.  
 
4.1 Literature search 
4.1.1 Search strategies 
The literature search is restricted to those articles published from 
1964 until August 2008. In 1964, several publications (Hammond et al., 
1964; Hursch et al., 1964; Tucker, 1964) led to the development of the 
LME, which provided the stimulus for many later studies. These studies 
including judgment achievement decomposed by the LME represent our 
data base. The relevant studies were identified by the five different search 
strategies (for an overview, see Figure 5) described in the following:  
 
1) The mailing-list of the Brunswik Society was used to inform the 
society members about our research goal. Furthermore, the 
society members were asked whether they know any important 
literature in this research area. 
 
2) The Brunswik Society Newsletter (1991-2007)2 was searched for 
references. In addition, we used the annual Newsletter to inform 
about our project and to call for studies since 2006 (see 
Kaufmann, 2006, 2007; Kaufmann & Sjödahl, 2006; Kaufmann et 
al., 2007, 2008). 
 
                                                 
 
2 http://www.brunswik.org/newsletters/index.html 
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3) To get an overview, the search was based on important articles 
and books in this research area. We used the following articles: 
 
- Hammond, Hursch and Todd (1964) 
- Hursch, Hammond and Hursch (1964) 
- Tucker (1964)  
- Castellan (1972) 
 
These articles were used for our search in the Web of Science 
database. Web of Science allows the user to conduct “cited 
reference searching”. Thus, the search started with the key article 
on LME (Tucker, 1964). Later articles referencing it will be 
identified shortly. The same strategy is also used with other 
important articles in the research area. 
 
As previously noted, we also used books for our search, such as: 
 
-    Cooksey (1996)  
- Hammond (2000) 
- Hammond and Stewart (2001)  
  
 More precisely, we used the reference list of the books for our 
search. We also consulted google’s book data 
(http://books.google.com) and searched for cited research. 
 
4) For our search in 10 different data bases, seven different key-
words were used. The key-words we got from our previously 
searched articles are suitable for our meta-analysis. To include 
both British and U.S. articles, we also considered the English 
expression, which is sometimes slightly different; “judgment”, for 
instance in American English, and “judgement” in British English. 
As one data base is in German, the German equivalents of the 
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English expressions are used (see the parentheses in the 
following key-word list):  
 
1. Social judg(e)ment theory (Soziale Urteilstheorie) 
2. Lens model equation (Linsen Modell Gleichung) 
3. Lens model analysis (Linsen Modell Analyse) 
4. Lens model (Linsen-Model) 
5. Judg(e)ment achievement (Urteilsleistung) 
6.  Idiographic approach (Idiographischer Ansatz) 
7.  Judg(e)ment accuracy (Urteilsgenauigkeit) 
 
These key-words were used in the following data bases: 
 
- ERIC: Educational Resources Information Center, 
since1966 
 
- EricOnline: Educational Resources Information Center, 
online 
 
- PSYNDEX: German literature on psychology, since 1977 
 
- PsychInfo: Previously PsycLit., since 1806,  
international literature on psychology 
 
- Web of Science: Journals on humanity, social sciences, and  
natural sciences 
 
- WISO-Net: Literature on business science and social 
sciences 
  
The EricOnline data base includes references to unpublished 
reports and conference papers in addition to published works. 
                                    
   41 
Hence, using EricOnline leads to the prevention of publication 
bias (see chapter 4.6). The previously introduced key-works were 
also used in the following online search engines: 
 
- Google: 
 
http://www.google.com 
- Google Scholar: http://scholar.google.com 
- Yahoo: http://www.yahoo.com 
- Social Science Research Network: http://www.ssrn.com/ 
 
The resulting literature was first scrutinized for key-words in the 
title and in the abstract. Then, we checked, whether the reference 
list cited Tucker, Hammond or Brunswik. For a comprehensive 
overview including data and results of our literature search and 
further information about the used data base we refer to the 
Appendix B: Tables 1, 2, 3.  
 
5) Finally, we also created different google-alerts with the key-words 
in order to be informed about the ongoing work on this subject, 
such as newly initiated projects or publications.  
 
The literature review is therefore as up-to-date as possible. 
However, new articles on this subject have undoubtedly appeared since 
the last up-date of our literature search in August 2008.  
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Figure 5. A flowchart of the literature-search model including the five 
search strategies, two control strategies, and the nine exclusion criteria.  
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4.1.2 Results of our literature search 
In line with Dhami et al. (2004, p. 964) our literature search showed 
that the lens model was used to study judgment achievement or judgment 
accuracy, multiple-cue probability learning, or cognitive feedback. 
Most studies resulting from our search applied the Lens Model to 
investigate multiple-cue probability learning (see Holzworth, 1999).  
In addition, many studies applied the Lens Model to study the 
effectiveness of cognitive feedback. Feedback, for example cognitive 
feedback, consists of three types, which possibly depend upon the 
judgment design implemented: Task information (summarizing how cues 
relate to some distal criterion), cognitive information (summarizing how 
cues relate to the person’s judgments), and functional validity information 
(summarizing the links between ecology and judgment measurement and 
models, see Cooksey, 1996, p. 367). Consequently, each type of cognitive 
feedback also represents three types of different studies. For an overview 
see Balzer et al. (1989), who also conclude that “because there are 
differences among cognitive feedback studies, any attempt to generalize 
across these studies must attempt to take these differences into account” 
(p. 414). 
Finally, our literature search showed that only a minority of studies 
applied the Lens Model to investigate judgment achievement. This result 
of our literature search is in line with Dhami et al. (2004), as they 
conclude:  
“…the relative neglect of the study of achievement by neo-
Brunswikians is surprising in light of Brunswik’s (1943, 1952) 
emphasis on achievement as the topic of psychological research, 
…”. (p. 968) 
Consequently, feedback and learning studies were excluded, since 
the focus of this meta-analysis is judgment accuracy across different 
situations and contexts. For a general meta-analysis, in which multiple-cue 
probability learning and feedback studies were also considered, see 
Karelaia and Hogarth (2008). 
                                    
   44 
4.1.3 Control strategies 
In order to exclude all feedback and learning studies and include 
only judgment achievement studies, our data base was checked by two 
major strategies (for an overview of our control strategies, see Figure 5): 
 
1) Checked by researcher in the field: 
 The included studies were mailed to relevant researchers in the 
field (Stewart, Tickle-Degnen) for scrutiny. For all studies published 
since 2000, we also actively tried to contact the first author. Hence, 
we wrote to Cooksey (19.05.07) and Trailer (24.05.08) and asked 
for the results of their current work. Furthermore, three studies were 
sent to Doherty, who is a co-author of them (23.06.08, see Gorman 
et al., 1978; Roose & Doherty, 1976; Steinmann & Doherty, 1972). 
Werner and Bernieri were also contacted (02.07.08). Thanks to 
Werner we found an unpublished dissertation by Lehman (1992). 
We also used these contacts to scrutinize the coding of the studies 
(see chapter 4.2).  
 
2) In addition, the database was checked by other review articles to 
determine 
a. whether all feedback studies were excluded by the review by 
Balzer et al. (1989) and 
 
b. whether all learning studies were excluded by the annotated 
bibliography by Holzworth (1999). 
 
c. Naturally, we also took advantage of the fact that Karelaia 
and Hogarth (2008) conducted a meta-analysis as well. 
Therefore, our resulting literature base was checked after the 
publication of the article by Karelaia and Hogarth to see 
whether we actually excluded all learning and feedback 
studies. 
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After these control checks, we found no need to include or exclude 
any feedback or learning studies in our meta-analysis.  
 
4.1.4 Excluded achievement studies 
To compare the included studies focused on judgment 
achievement, nine exclusion criteria were applied to these studies (see 
Figure 5). These nine exclusion criteria are explained in detail in the 
following. 
First, our data base was restricted to studies in German and 
English. We must mention, however, that, our data base included only 
English publications in the end. We found only a minor sample of German 
studies and had to exclude them, as they did not meet all inclusion criteria 
(e.g. Wittmann, 1985, see below).  
Secondly, we only used studies containing a regression analysis in 
order to exclude any heterogeneity between the studies resulting from 
different analysis methods.  
Thirdly, we also excluded studies in dynamic situations (Kirlik, 
2006). Hence, only studies with stable situation representations are 
included, so as to prevent that the differences in judgment achievement 
will result from the representation of the situation. 
Fourthly, as mentioned above, we excluded studies aggregated 
across cues instead of individuals, in order to prevent any aggregation 
bias (e.g. Wittmann, 1985). 
Fifthly, we checked for data included twice in the data base, to 
prevent double counting – which was not the case (see Wood, 2008).   
Sixthly, we also excluded the study by Hammond (1955). Although 
he was the first to apply the Lens Model to judgments, he could not 
include the LME, because it hadn't been developed yet. Even after the 
publication by Tucker (1964), a number of studies applied the Lens Model 
to judgments without using the LME (see Lyons, Tickle-Degnen, Henry, & 
Cohn, 2004; Tickle-Degnen & Lyons, 2004). For a comprehensive 
overview of the excluded studies, see Appendix D: Table 1.  
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Seventhly, we only included studies, in which the LME analysis was 
used as a primary analysis. For instance, the study by Camerer (1981), 
who calculated the LME components of already published studies and 
meta-analysed these studies. Hence, we see this study as a secondary 
analysis. In addition, Camerer’s focus was bootstrapping modelling (in the 
following we use the term expert model), which is not the focus of this 
work. These arguments lead us to the exclusion of the analysis by 
Camerer (1981) in a first step, but we checked and compared our results 
with Camerer’s study in our robustness analysis (see Kaufmann & 
Athanasou, 2009).   
Eighthly, 35 studies meet our inclusion criteria without regarding 
statistical presumption for a meta-analysis. Hence, studies were excluded 
because of a lack of data for conducting a meta-analysis (e.g. Goldberg, 
1970; Tape, Heckerling, Ornato, & Wigton, 1991).   
Finally, we would like to mention that two components, namely 
achievement and task predictability, should be available from the studies.  
Consequently, a total of 31 studies met the inclusion criteria (see 
Tables 5 and 6). 
 
4.2 Coding studies 
First, all essential information according to the research questions 
and potential moderating variables as well as information by other reviews 
articles in the fields (e.g. Armstrong, 2001; Cooksey, 1996; Dhami et al., 
2004) were included to a first version of a coding scheme, which was then 
adopted by coding the first articles.  
The following major coding categories were included: 
a) Study ID: A unique number for every study  
b) Study characteristics (e.g. publication year, author) 
c) Characteristics of the research participants (e.g. students) 
d) Characteristics of the judgment tasks (e.g. number of cues) 
e) Effect size: The effect size was collected or calculated for 
each task. Consequently, where it was possible, we broke 
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down multivariate judgment tasks to univariate ones, in order 
to achieve a more precise analysis. In addition, we 
calculated missing LME components (for the formulas, see 
Appendix C).  
Consequently, all essential information was extracted from the 
selected studies and included in a SYSTAT (2000) file (for a detailed 
coding scheme, see CD, coding.doc). 
 
 
4.2.1 Coding reliability 
Finally, the studies were coded by the author alone, therefore, it 
was not possible to calculate the interrater reliability, such as cronbach’s 
alpha.  
However, the coding of the studies was checked by two control 
strategies: a) by the authors of 10 studies, and b) by other review articles 
(e.g. Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008). These control strategies are described in 
detail in the following.  
Our study coding was first checked by the authors. Thanks to 
Athanasou (Athanasou & Cooksey, 1996), Werner (Cooper & Werner, 
1990; Lehman, 1992; Werner et al., 1989; Werner et al., 1983), Doherty 
(Gorman et al., 1978; Roose & Doherty, 1976; Steinmann & Doherty, 
1972) and Stewart (Stewart, 1990; Stewart et al., 1997) 10 studies were 
controlled by the authors themselves. 
We then reported the agreement between our database and other 
reviews (see Table 2). To simplify matters, Table 2 is separated into two 
sections. Hence, before representing the agreement of LME values, we 
reported the agreement of the different study characteristics.  
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Table 2 
Agreement of our data base with study characteristics and LME values by 
other reviews  
 
 
 
 
 
Review 
 
 
 
Number of 
overlapping 
studies 
 
Comparison 
characteristics: 
Study 
characteristics/ 
LME components 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement 
 
Armstrong (2001) 
 
4  
(7, 8, 9, 16) 
 
Number of cues, 
number of 
judgments 
 
100% 
 
Ashton (2000) 
 
2  
(2, 5a) 
 
Number of 
judgments 
 
100% 
 
Karelaia & Hogarth (2008) 
 
Number of judges, 
number of 
judgments, 
number of cues, 
experience level 
 
92% 
 
 
 
19  
(2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 
12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
27, 28, 29) 
 
ra, G, Rs ,Re, C 
 
88% 
 
Aegisdottir et al. (2006) 
 
2 (16, 18) 
 
ra, Re 
 
100% 
 
Grove et al. (2000) 
 
3 (9, 16, 18) 
 
ra, Re 
 
50% 
 
As you can see in Table 2, we first compared our data with the 
review by Armstrong (2001). The first row shows the review, the second 
row contains the total number of overlapping studies and the study 
numbers in parentheses. These numbers are the same you will find in 
Tables 5 and 6. To give an example, number 17 represents the study by 
Athanasou and Cooksey (2001). However, four studies (Ashton, 1982; 
Goldberg, 1976; Roose & Doherty, 1976; Wiggins & Kohen, 1971) are 
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checked for two study characteristics: number of judgments and number of 
cues (see third row). We had a 100% agreement. In addition, our data 
base was compared to the article by Ashton (2000) for the study 
characteristic number of judgments. The data of two overlapping studies 
(Einhorn, 1974; Levi, 1989) is completely identical. Finally, as mentioned 
before, we utilised the fact that Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) also 
conducted a meta-analysis: We selected all judgment achievement studies 
from their data base and compared them to ours. There were 19 studies 
used in both meta-analyses, which could be distinctly identified, as the 
same studies. Therefore, it is a conservative estimation, as several studies 
are not clearly identifiable, as for instance the publication year is different 
(see Stewart, 1989, 1990). First of all, we compared as to whether our 
classification of achievement studies was comparable, and there was only 
one misclassification. Hence, we achieved a 95% agreement. Secondly, 
we checked the separation of the studies or the number of judgment tasks 
included by single studies. Instead of 30 judgment tasks, we used only 28. 
Although there are some differences, if a final meta-analysis is conducted 
over this subsample of studies, there is almost no difference between this 
subsample of databases. However, there are differences if we separate 
some tasks (Gorman et al., 1978; Stewart, 1997), as Karelaia and 
Hogarth’s did not and reverse (Cooper & Werner, 1990; Harvey & Harries, 
2004; Wright, 1979). But, most of the studies are coded in the same way 
(74%). Thirdly, we compared the four study characteristics number of 
judges, judgments, cues, and expertise level of the judges (see Appendix 
D: Table 3). The data base agrees with 92%. In addition, we checked the 
LME values, and our high agreement was confirmed (88% for details, see 
Appendix D: Tables 4, 5). Furthermore, we checked by Aegisdottir et al. 
(2006), and the LME components ra and Re resulted in a 100% agreement. 
Grove et al. (2000) were also used for checking our LME components ra 
and Re. However, our component Re, was not comparable with the 
mechanical accuracy of Grove et al. (2000). Hence, we reached an 
agreement of merely 50%.  
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To summarize: Our data base was compared with five reviews, and 
except for the review by Grove et al. (2000), a high agreement was found.   
 
 
4.3 Description of the studies 
The resulting 31 studies of the literature search are described in 
Tables 5 and 6. The tables display the name(s) of the author(s) and the 
publication year along with the study characteristics that were used to 
describe the studies and the study results. Furthermore, the studies are 
separated into five different research areas. Within each research area, 
they are ordered according to the experience of the judges. And, finally, 
within an experience level, the studies are ordered according to the 
number of used cues. 
However, in the following, we will describe the complete data base 
for our meta-analysis. Firstly, we will compare them to important review 
articles in the field. Then, we will focus on the database in relation to the 
type of publication. Thirdly, we will introduce the main study 
characteristics, such as research approach and research area. 
Furthermore, we will mention further study characteristics like the number 
of cues and the type of judgment criterion.   
 
4.3.1 In relation to other reviews on judgment achievement 
The following Table 3 gives an overview of the number of 
overlapping studies from our meta-analysis with other reviews in the field. 
However, only the nomothetic data base was considered, as we weren't 
aware of any idiographic-based review on judgment achievement. 
In the first row, the table shows the study, then the number of 
overlapping studies. As already mentioned, the number is the same as in 
Tables 5 and 6. Finally, in the last row, the total number of the overlapping 
studies can be found.  
Within the SJT approach there is a great overlap between our data 
base and the study by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008). However, the 
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differences were already mentioned. In contrast, there is only a small 
overlap with the study by Dhami et al. (2004), whereas this review wasn't a 
meta-analysis. Beyond the SJT approach, there seems only a small 
overlap between our studies and other review articles from two to four 
studies, although two of these are also meta-analysis. However, if the total 
number of studies is considered, it becomes clear that the greatest overlap 
is with the Armstrong’s review (2001). 
To summarize: Although there are differences in the coding of the 
data (see chapter 4.2.1), the greatest overlap of our data base within the 
SJT is with the meta-analysis by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008), and beyond 
the SJT approach with the Armstrong review (2001).  
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4.3.2 Journal of the publications 
All articles included in our meta-analysis are written in English and 
were published within the last 40 years. It must be mentioned that the 
study by Lehman (1992) is an unpublished doctoral thesis. However, to 
report the complete data base, we included this study with the publication 
year or finishing of the thesis 1992 (see Lehman – according to our 
personal communication, the thesis will be published in the coming year).  
The oldest study was published in the Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology in 1971. The two most recent articles were published in 
2004 (see Table 5, 6). As you can see in the following Figure 6, eight of 
the 31 articles were published in the 1970s, 11 were published in the 
1980s, seven were published in the 1990s, and five between 2000 and 
2005. All articles apart from two (Athanasou & Cooksey, 2001; MacGregor 
& Slovic, 1986) were published in ISI-indexed journals in May 2006. 
Journals that have published more than one study are: 
 
1) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes3  
(see Einhorn, 1974; Goldberg, 1976; Gorman et al., 1978; Roose & 
Doherty, 1976; Steinmann & Doherty, 1972; Stewart et al., 1997; 
Wright, 1979),  
2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(see Bernieri et al., 1996; Wiggens & Kohen, 1971)  
 
Thus, articles in this research area were mainly published in the 
1980s in the Journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes.  
Finally, Figure 6 clearly gives evidence of the continuing value of 
the LME for judgment analysis since more than 40 years.  
 
                                                 
 
3 Organizational Behavior and Human Performance before 1985  
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Figure 6. The number of publications separated by their research 
approach – idiographic versus nomothetic, or both.  
 
4.3.3 Research approaches 
As you can also see in Figure 6, the study characteristic applied 
research approach is presented. Studies are considered idiographic, if 
they generate a correlation between judgments and criterion within each 
individual before obtaining any aggregate or nomothetic measures of 
relationship.  
Furthermore, the study characteristic used research approach is 
presented in the last column in Tables 5 and 6. If an asterisk is found in 
this last column, the LME is applied only to individuals (i.e. idiographic 
approach), and if a + is added, also the nomothetic approach is 
considered. 
 However, as you can see in Figure 6, most studies used a 
nomothetic research approach and seldom an idiographic approach. In 
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addition, most studies are not considered or compared both research 
approaches. Although the data base is enlarged because we added some 
studies (e.g. Lehman, 1992), in our 2007 data base (see Kaufmann, 2007) 
the conclusion is that the idiographic research approach is clearly 
neglected in recent LME research. 
 
4.3.4 Research areas 
Tables 5 and 6 present the characteristics of the studies resulting 
from our comprehensive literature search. A total of 31 studies included 49 
different judgment tasks. Different tasks within a study are symbolized by 
a roman numeral. In these 49 judgment tasks, 1151 judgment 
achievements were made by 1055 subjects. Hence, 96 judgment 
achievements of 68 persons were analysed for more than one task. As 
you can see in Table 4, two studies used the same judges for analysing 
four tasks, one study for three tasks, and, finally, three studies used their 
judges for the analysis of two tasks. It must be mentioned, however, that 
the studies reported in Table 4 include experts as well as non-experts and 
come from different research areas as introduced in the following.    
  
Table 4 
The number of judges in studies analysed judges more than once ordered 
by the amount of judgment task for each judge 
 
 
 
Study 
 
Number of analysed judgment tasks 
for each individual  
(total number of judges) 
 
Gorman et al. (1978)  
 
4(8) 
Stewart (1997) 4(4) 
Nystedt & Magnusson (1975) 3(4) 
Einhorn (1974) 2(29) 
Kim et al. (1997) 2(3) 
Cooksey et al. (1986) 2(20) 
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In addition, in Tables 5 and 6 the judgment tasks are separated into 
five research areas. Within the research areas, tasks are arranged 
according to the amount of cues considered. Furthermore, in their 
categories the studies are also sorted by the experience level as experts 
or students. In the following, the study characteristics within each research 
area are described in more detail: 
 
1) Six studies applied to the medical science category include a total 
of 221 clinical oriented educations (e.g. clinical psychologists) and 
258 analyzed judgment achievements for 10 judgment tasks. The 
studies applied to medical science include those with the overall 
lowest and the overall highest number of judgments and represent 
the only category including only experts. Furthermore, this 
category contains the most studies with an idiographic approach, 
including 95 analyzed judgment achievements of 58 individuals in 
eight different tasks. We would like to mention the small sample in 
the first study by Einhorn (1974), which includes only three 
pathologists. However, these three pathologists are the only ones 
in these categories who made their judgments on real biopsy 
slides, representing a more natural situation than the commonly 
used patient profiles. In addition, in our opinion, this is also the 
only prognostic task compared to the remaining diagnostic tasks.  
 
2) Table 5 contains eight studies applied to business science. As 
three person’s judges’ two tasks, 40 analyzed judgment 
achievements by 37 persons in five different tasks reported 
individual data. The study by Wright (1979) analyzed only the five 
most accurate judgments of the 47 included persons at the 
idiographic level. However, if also studies with a nomothetic 
research approach are considered, eight studies report nine 
judgment tasks judged by 236 persons. In addition, experts in the 
included studies in business science are managers, bank loan 
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officers, and security analysts. Studies applied to business science 
have the largest range of the number of cues (seven to 64). In two 
studies the number of cues is unknown. Furthermore, all 
judgments were based on paper profiles.   
 
3) In Table 5, three studies applied to educational science are 
included. 136 persons judged four different judgment tasks in this 
category. Most of them (72%) are students from the study by 
Wiggins and Kohen (1971). Once again, all judgments were based 
on paper profiles. The study by Cooksey et al. (1986) includes a 
multivariate lens model design (see chapter 2.4.1.2). However, 
they analysed judgment by single criteria, and therefore, two tasks 
are available. In addition, in this category, 58 judgment 
achievements by 38 individuals are available.  
 
4) Table 5 includes eight studies of 225 persons, which are applied to 
psychological science. 59 persons are experts, as they all have 
experience in their judgment tasks, in contrast to the 166 students 
included in psychological science studies. In this category, 43 
judgment achievements of 19 individuals (11 experts) made 1580 
judgments in six different tasks are available.  
 
5) Because six studies could not be categorized accurately, the other 
research area category was created. Therefore, Table 6 contains 
an additional column for the applied research area. In this 
category, studies like weather forecasts or judgments of time 
taken to run a marathon are included. This category includes the 
individual data base on nine experts or meteorologists in five 
different tasks. Individual data is also available from 97 of the 228 
students who judged 11 tasks. The study by Stewart et al. (1997) 
is the only one which compares non-experts and experts across 
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four meteorological tasks. Furthermore, this study is also the only 
to analyse the judgment achievement retrospectively.  
In summary, 1055 persons judged 49 tasks across 31 studies: 21% 
of persons were included in studies applied to medical science, 22% in 
studies applied to business science, 13% in studies applied to educational 
science, 21% to psychological science, and 23% were applied to other 
research areas. As can be seen in Tables 5 and 6, the first application of 
the LME was in disciplines such as medical or business science. By and 
by, the application of the LME was expanded to other research areas, 
such as psychology or meteorology. In addition, the great majority of 
studies used students, often enrolled in psychology classes. An exception 
in our review is the category of medical science. In medical science, all 
studies include experts. 
With a look across judgment tasks you can see that 80% (eight 
judgment tasks, see Figure 7) in medical science used an idiographic 
research approach. However, the application of the idiographic research 
approach decreases to a level of 50% in psychological studies.  
 
Figure 7. The precental distribution of idiographically vs. nomothetically 
analyzed judgment tasks within the five research areas.  
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In the following, several task characteristics across research areas are 
illustrated.   
 
4.3.5 The number of cues 
As you can see in Tables 5 and 6, the number of cues is also 
consider in each study, although in two studies in business science the 
number of cues is unknown.  
Although the Fast and Frugal Heuristic Approach (Gigerenzer et al., 
1999) assumes that decision makers use only few cues, only five studies 
used less than five cues. One of these five studies applies to in business 
(Wright, 1979), medical (Nystedt & Magnusson, 1975), and psychology 
(Szucko & Kleinmuntz, 1981) science. In addition, two of these five studies 
are in the miscellaneous research area (MacGregor & Slovic, 1986; 
Steinmann & Doherty, 1972). Although four of the five studies applied an 
idiographic research approach, only one also uses a nomothetic research 
approach (Nystedt & Magnusson, 1975). Furthermore, in three of the five 
studies, the type of correlation is unknown (see chapter 4.3.7). The 
remaining 26 studies used more than five cues. 
 
4.3.6 The criterion 
Hammond (2007, p. 53) separated judgment achievement 
competence into accuracy in judging objects and events in the physical 
environment and accuracy in judging objects and events in the social 
environment. According to Hammond, judgment in our physical 
environment should be more accurate. One of his given reasons is that in 
the physical environment we receive clear and fast outcome feedback. On 
the other hand, in our social environment we could mistakenly judge our 
best friend to be honest, while it may take years to learn that he is not. 
However, all studies in Table 5 in medical science, psychological, and 
educational science are embedded in a social environment. On the other 
hand, studies in business science and the miscellaneous research area 
are all embedded in a physical environment. Consequently, if there is a 
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tendency in our analysis that judgment achievements in medical, 
psychological, and educational science are more accurate than judgment 
achievements in business and the miscellaneous research area, 
Hammond’s hypothesis that judgments in physical environments are more 
accurate would be supported.  
However, we should also add the type of criterion. On the one 
hand, the criterion is subjective – for example the single physician’s 
judgment in the study by LaDuca et al. (1988, see Table 5, to provide an 
overview, studies with a subjective criterion are marked with a triangle in 
the criterion column). On the other hand, the criterion is objective, as, for 
example actual temperature, which is measured by an instrument (see 
Stewart, 1997, Table 6).  
 
4.3.7 The type of correlation 
Usually, the correlation coefficient (e.g. Spearman’s roh) was 
calculated, and a median or average coefficient for the sample was 
quoted. Studies with an unknown type of correlation are symbolized with r0 
(see last column in Tables 5 and 6). Furthermore, Spearman’s roh is used 
in business, in psychological science or in other research area studies. 
 
4.3.8 Summary of chapter 4.3 
Our data base is heterogeneous and relates to different study 
characteristics, such as the number of used cues or research area. 
However, we also conclude that the idiographic approach was mostly 
neglected in recent studies (Kaufmann, 2007). Hence, the 
complementation of the nomothetic with an idiographic analysis is 
recommended in order to achieve a comprehensive overview on judgment 
achievement in the framework of the SJT. 
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4.4 Meta-analysis: Cumulating research findings 
The goal of science is to cumulate knowledge in theories. But, to 
begin with, scientists need an overview of the data. Before the 
development of a meta-analysis, narrative literature reviews provide an 
overview of the data in an area, and finally lead to a theory. Such literature 
reviews often show conflicting findings. Some studies, for example, find a 
statistically significant relationship between two variables of interest, while 
others do not report this fact (for details, see below). The main difference 
between literature reviews and the further development of a meta-analysis 
is that literature reviews are based on studies without cumulating them. 
Hence, the term meta-analysis “has become encompass all of the 
methods and techniques of quantitative research synthesis” (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 1993, p. 1). Glass (1976) summarised the term meta-analysis as 
follows: 
The term is a bit grand, but it is precise, and apt, and in the spirit of 
“meta-mathematics”, “meta-psychology”, and “meta-evaluation”. 
Meta-analysis refers to the analysis of analysis. I use it to refer to 
the statistical analysis of a large collection of analysis results from 
individual studies for the purpose of integrating the findings. (p. 3) 
However, this difference between narrative reviews and meta-
analysis leads to critique for instance by Hunter and Schmidt (2004) who 
claimed that “the perfect study is a myth” (p. 17). “There are no perfect 
studies” (p. 18), and therefore, such narrative literature reviews cannot 
answer any questions, because they are based on imperfect studies. 
Hence, Hunter and Schmidt suggested a meta-analytical approach that 
may provide a solution for correcting imperfect studies and allows the 
researcher to synthesize the data from multiple studies.  
To summarize, one can say that in contrast to narrative reviews, a 
meta-analysis is a systematic and objective alternative for synthesizing 
empirical evidence. As this procedure requires informed judgment by the 
meta-analyst, however, methodologists still develop guidelines to conduct 
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and report meta-analyses in order to increase the objectivity of the meta-
analytic approach.  
In the following we will give a historical overview starting from the 
first meta-analysis and concluding with the current spread of meta-
analyses. Then, the weaknesses of the meta-analysis will be illustrated, 
and strategies to overcome them will be presented. As there are different 
meta-analytic approaches, we will focus on evaluation research, which led 
us to prefer the Hunter-Schmidt approach. Consequently, the Hunter-
Schmidt approach is introduced in more detail. Finally, we will describe the 
methods of detection of publication bias. 
 
4.4.1 Historical review 
In the following, some of the numerous antecedents of the meta-
analysis are described: 
The first qualitative synthesis of findings from different studies was 
conducted by Pearson in 1904. He averaged the correlations between the 
inoculation for typhoid fever and mortality for five separate samples (see 
Cooper & Hedges, 1994).  
An extension of Pearson’s work is the early quantitative-review 
method well-known as the box-score approach by Meehl (1954, see also 
chapter 2.5.2). This work also introduces the “Statistical vs. Clinical 
Prediction” problem in psychology. Meehl’s review includes 20 studies, in 
which predictions by clinical psychologists are compared with those of 
simple actuarial tables. In this case the success of clinical or actuarial 
predictions was marked and led to a frequency overview of these two 
types of predictions. However, clinical psychologists are usually 
outperformed by the actuarial predictions.  
The narrative review on the effect of psychotherapy by Eysenck 
(1952) is also worth mentioning as an antecedent of the first meta-analysis 
method. In this review Eysenck’s conclusion that psychotherapy has no 
beneficial effects on patients must have been a provocation for Glass and 
his experience as a therapist, which finally led him to a statistical 
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evaluation of Eysenck’s conclusion. In 1970, Glass published his meta-
analysis, which aggregated the findings of 375 psychotherapy outcomes 
and concluded that psychotherapy does indeed work (Smith & Glass, 
1977).  
At the same time, a contrary meta-analytic approach was 
developed by Hunter and Schmidt (see Hunter, Schmidt & Jackson, 1982).  
In summary, both approaches, the Glass and the Hunter-Schmidt 
method, are to be considered starting points for the success of the meta-
analysis as an influential research tool.  
 
4.4.2 Actual spread of the meta-analysis 
Since the late 1970s, when Glass and Hunter-Schmidt 
independently developed two different meta-analytic approaches, the 
power of meta-analyses increased. In the following, the spread of the 
meta-analysis is highlighted by the number of publications leading to 
efforts for study registration and to special issues on the topic.  
The increasing success of the meta-analysis as a research tool is 
also clearly shown by Hunter and Schmidt’s internet search with the term 
“meta-analysis”. This search yielded 2’500 hits in 1999 and 552’000 hits in 
2004 (see 2004, p. 24). Our repeated internet search with google 
generated 4’320’000 hits, although only 930’000 hits were indicated by the 
online search engine google scholar in 2007 (June). A year later, 
6’260’000 hits resulted with a google and 1’210’000 with a google scholar 
search. Some authors use terms like “research synthesis” or “review” 
instead of the term “meta-analysis”. Therefore, these estimations clearly 
understate the actual spread of the meta-analysis method. However, these 
results showing a steady increase of the use of the meta-analysis are also 
in line with Schulze’s search (2007).  
After a number of meta-analyses were published, some meta-
analyses were rerun. So, also the meta-analysis by Glass was confirmed 
focusing on a German sample to find any psychotherapy effects (see 
Wittmann & Matt, 1986). In addition, the increasing use of the meta-
                                    
   69 
analysis leads not only to replicated meta-analyses, but also to an 
aggregation of 350 meta-analyses published on the subject of 
psychological, pedagogical, and behavioural intervention in the early 
1990’s (Lipsey & Wilson, 1993).   
Relating to the increased use and number of publications on meta-
analyses, efforts concerning the registration of studies are also 
established. The aim of study registration was to have easy access to all 
unpublished and published studies on a subject and to prevent publication 
bias (see chapter 4.6). The following three study databases are well-
known (this list is chronologically ordered):  
1) The Cochrane Collaboration was founded first and is a database 
of controlled clinical trails and systematic reviews (see http:// 
www.cochrane.org/). If a new study is available on this site, 
updated results are always available via the internet.  
2) The Campbell Collaboration is a database for social sciences 
founded in 1999 (see http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/). It is 
supported by well-known researchers in the field, such as 
Borenstein, Hedges, Shadish.  
3) The What Works Clearinghouse is a database for educational 
studies and reviews founded in 2002 by the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Institute of Education Sciences (see 
http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/). 
The importance of meta-analysis in psychology also becomes 
visible in the special issues on meta-analysis in the Journal of Psychology 
(Zeitschrift für Psychologie) in 2007 and in Organizational Research 
Methods in 2008, although a special journal for meta-analysis does not 
exist in 2009, but a new journal, Research Synthesis Methods, has been 
launched. 
In sum, the wide use of meta-analyses started in 1970, and more 
and more scientists are applying them to contrary findings in their research 
areas. About the actual situation of the meta-analysis as a research tool, 
Schulze (2007) concludes: 
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Meta-analysis has earned its place in the pantheon of scientific 
methods. It became a standard method of research synthesis in 
many empirical research fields, especially in the social sciences. (p. 
87) 
 
4.4.3 The weaknesses of meta-analysis 
 Although meta-analysis is highly appreciated by researchers, some 
disadvantages should be acknowledged. In the following, four main 
disadvantages with recommendations of how to control them will be 
presented (see also Eysenck, 1994, and Table 7): 
 
1) Publication bias or the “File-Drawer-Problem” is defined as a bias 
towards studies with significant results; they are more likely to be 
accepted. In our case, it could be that studies with positive 
correlations are more likely to be accepted for publication than 
studies with a negative correlation. This fact could be responsible 
for a considerable threat to the representativeness of meta-analysis 
samples (see chapter 4.6). In addition, one could assume that 
studies showing that experts are not as accurate in their judgments 
as students may have problems getting published. To prevent that 
any publication bias will influence the interpretation of our data, we 
considered the following strategies: 
a. We used a comprehensive literature-search strategy to 
decrease the possibility of overlooking studies. Hence, we 
also included data bases like ERIC (see Appendix B: Table 
1) which include references to unpublished reports or 
conference papers. 
b. We checked the possibility of publication bias by means of 
graphics, so-called funnel plots (see chapter 4.6.1).  
c. We estimated the publication bias (see chapter 4.6.2) with 
different estimators, in order to find out how many studies 
are needed to change the actual results.  
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2) “Apples and oranges problem” represents the fact that in meta-
analysis, studies that do not really deal with the same constructs 
and relationships are often integrated and summarized. 
Consequently, we carefully coded the studies to reveal any 
uniformity problems in our meta-analysis. Furthermore, we will 
consider this issue in our robustness analysis (see chapter 5.2.4 
and Kaufmann & Athanasou, 2009).  
 
3) The focus on the quantitative approach may lead to a negligence of 
the qualitative approach of the reviews. To not overlook the quality 
of the included studies, we also included the approach suggested 
by Slavin (1986), the so-called best-evidence synthesis, an attempt 
to combine qualitative and quantitative reviewing techniques in the 
same research review.  
 
4) “Garbage in – garbage out” problem: This represents the fact that 
studies of different methodological quality are included. Slavin 
(1986) suggests to define very strict methodological criteria for 
inclusion, and so the meta-analyst has assurance that the synthesis 
is based on only the “best” evidence. Consequently, we will focus 
on the inclusion criteria and consider this fact in the coding of our 
studies and in our robustness analysis.  
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Table 7 
Summary of disadvantages of meta-analysis and our suggested solutions  
 
Disadvantages 
 
Solution 
 
Publication bias 
 
- Comprehensive literature search (see chapter 4.1) 
- Funnel plots (see chapter 4.6.1) 
- File-safe-N calculation (see chapter 4.6.2) 
 
 “Apples and oranges problem” - Coding (see chapter 4.2) 
- Robustness analysis (see chapter 5.2.4) 
 
Quantitative aspects - Evidence synthesis approach (see chapter 4.3) 
 
Garbage in – garbage out - Coding (see chapter 4.2) 
- Inclusion criteria (see chapter 4.1.4) 
- Robustness analysis (see chapter 5.2.4) 
 
 
4.4.4 Different meta-analysis approaches 
Over the past 30 years, a number of variants of the meta-analysis 
were developed, such as the Hedges-Olkin (1985), the Rosenthal-Rubin 
(see Rosenthal, 1991), and the Hunter-Schmidt (2004) method of meta-
analysis (for an overview see Bangert-Downs, 1986; Rosenthal & 
DiMatteo, 2001).  
As can be seen in Table 8, they are different in several points, such 
as effect size, applied model, or as to whether they use a correction 
procedure, and, finally, in what type of test they apply to identify any 
possible moderator variables.  
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Table 8 
Methodological characteristics of the three dominant variants of meta-
analysis: the Hedges-Olkin (1985), the Rosenthal-Rubin (see Rosenthal, 
1991), and the Hunter-Schmidt (2004) approach 
 
Meta-analytic approaches 
 
Methodological 
Characteristics: Hedges-Olkin (1985) Rosenthal-Rubin (1991) Hunter-Schmidt (2004) 
 
Effect size 
 
d 
 
d 
 
r 
Model fixed-effect model fixed-effect model random-effect model 
Correction no correction -- artefact corrections 
Test Q Q 75% rule 
 
First, as you can see in Table 8, effect size belongs to two families: 
the r, correlation, and the d family (see Rosenthal, 1991). The d family 
comprises standardised mean differences and is available of studies 
reporting the results of experiments. On the other hand, in the r family, the 
correlation coefficient describes a bivariate relationship. However, one key 
feature of meta-analysis is the conversion of effect sizes. Hence, this 
meta-analysis characteristic is neglectable. 
Secondly, you can also see that in meta-analytic research two 
different models are used; the fixed-effects and the random-effects model. 
The two models have different assumptions regarding the underlying 
population. A fixed-effect model assumes that all of the studies in the 
meta-analysis are derived of the same population and that the true size of 
the effect will be the same for all of the studies in the meta-analysis. 
Hence, the source of variation in the effect size is assumed to be 
variations within each study, such as for instance sampling error. In 
contrast to the commonly used fixed-effects model Hunter and Schmidt 
(2004) recommend a random-effects approach. The random-effects model 
assumes that population effects vary from study to study. The idea behind 
this is that the observed studies are samples drawn from a universe of 
studies. Random-effect models have two sources of variation in a given 
effect size: that arising from within the study itself and its (the source) from 
                                    
   74 
variations in the population effect between studies. However, the variation 
of effects from study to study appears to be the rule rather than the 
exception for most-real-world data. Consequently, the random-effects 
model seems to be more adequate for our analysis (see also Kisamore & 
Brannik, 2008, p. 52). It should be noted, however, that assumptions made 
by random-effects models are more tenable, in general, than those made 
by fixed-effects models, although most of the meta-analyses published in 
Psychological Bulletin are based on fixed-effects models (Kisamore & 
Brannick, 2008). There are also exceptions using random-effects models 
(see Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008).   
Thirdly, we would like to mention that most methods of meta-
analysis are concerned with only one correction strategy, namely the 
artifactual source of variation across studies, the so-called sampling error. 
The Hunter-Schmidt method is the only method which allows to correct 
studies for 10 further artefacts, such as, for example, measurement error 
(see Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 18, for an overview see Table 10).  
Finally, the last mentioned meta-analysis characteristics the used 
test (i.e. Q test or 75% rule) for identify any moderator variables are 
presented (see chapter 4.5.1.3).  
 
 
4.4.5 Evaluation research on meta-analysis approaches 
Although the approaches are different, there are also studies that 
compare and evaluate them. In the following, we will introduce the recent 
evaluation research on meta-analysis in more detail (see Table 9). 
Field (2001) conducted two Monte Carlo studies to compare three 
meta-analytic approaches. This study shows that in the most common 
case in meta-analytic practice the Hunter-Schmidt method tends to 
provide the most accurate estimates of the mean population effect size 
(see also Hall & Brannick, 2002; Field, 2001). Beside these simulation 
studies, also studies on real data support the use of the Hunter-Schmidt 
method (see Kisamore & Brannick, 2008).  
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Further research on the comparison of meta-analytic procedures 
shows that the Hunter-Schmidt method is more precise than the Hedges-
Olkin approach when it comes to point estimates, homogeneity tests5 to 
prevent Type I error rates, the error of rejecting a hypothesis when it 
actually should be accepted (see Aguinis, Sturman, & Pierce, 2008). 
However, this analysis is based solely on simulations. Studies based on 
real data are not available on this subject at the moment.  
Consequently, we can summarise the introduced evaluation 
research on meta-analytic procedure to the effect that the Hunter-Schmidt 
method is more precise than the Hedges-Olkin method – but also more 
conservative. In addition, our selection of the Hunter-Schmidt approach is 
also supported by the fact that the mentioned LME (Tucker, 1964) is the 
base for the Hunter-Schmidt approach (for more details, see chapter 
4.5.2.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
5 Although the Hunter-Schmidt method does not advocate the use of null 
hypothesis significance testing, a statistical significance test was performed.  
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Table 9 
Summary of the current evaluation research on meta-analytic approaches 
 
Studies: 
 
Investigation: 
 
Results: 
 
Field (2001) 
 
model 
 
random-effect model 
Kisamore & Brannick (2008) model random-effect model 
Aguinis et al. (2008) Performance: 
Point estimates 
Hunter-Schmidt 
 Homogeneity tests: 
Type I error rates 
Type II error rates 
 
Hunter-Schmidt 
Hedges and Olkin 
 Moderating effect tests: 
Type I error rates 
Type II error rates 
 
Both 
Both 
 
4.5 Hunter-Schmidt approach 
As mentioned before, our analyses follow the steps recommended 
by Hunter-Schmidt (2004). Hunter and Schmidt’s interest in the differential 
validity of employment tests for blacks and whites (Schmidt, Berner, & 
Hunter, 1973) led them to develop a quantitative research-synthesis tool 
for this area. Besides its most extensive use in the domain of personnel 
testing (see Hunter et al., 1982), it is also applicable for the assessment of 
the validity of any measurement procedure. In the beginning, this method 
was called validity generalization, because the original goal was to 
develop a research tool to estimate the population value (i.e. true value, 
validity value). With this method, the validity of one study can now be 
inferred from the validity found in hundreds of previous studies. This meta-
analysis procedure determines the degree to which validity findings can be 
generalized. These days, the Hunter-Schmidt method indicates that all or 
most of the study-to-study variability due to artefacts and the traditional 
belief in personal selection of a situation-specific validity of tests was 
erroneous (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 160).  
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However, the purpose of conducting a meta-analysis according to 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004) was to determine whether the variance in 
reported LME components was entirely the result of statistical artefacts. 
We would like to mention that such artefacts are often falsely interpreted 
as conflicting findings in reviews – instead of sampling error – and 
therefore lead to wrong conclusions. However, Hunter et al. (1982) have 
recommended that research integrators correct their correlation 
coefficients and the associated variances for statistical artefacts (like 
sampling or measurement error). Hence, it is unique for this meta-analytic 
approach that there are two types of meta-analysis: the bare-bones meta-
analysis and its extension, the psychometric meta-analysis. A bare-bones 
meta-analysis is only corrected for sampling error. A psychometric meta-
analysis is also corrected for other artefacts.  
Furthermore, the main difference between the Hunter-Schmidt 
method and the latter is in the use of untransformed correlation 
coefficients instead of Fisher’s z transformation in the correcting 
procedure.  
Finally, it must be mentioned that in our data base sometimes only 
the data of individuals (idiographic approach) is reported. In this case, the 
Hunter-Schmidt method is used, but across persons, using individual as 
analysis unit. This type of within cumulating is symbolized by a (*) in 
Tables 5 and 6 in the last column. In the following, we will therefore 
illustrate the two types of meta-analysis – firstly describing the use of 
individual data, and then using data across individuals.  
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4.5.1 Bare-bones meta-analysis 
4.5.1.1 Idiographic data base 
To overcome the weakness of ecological fallacy, we tried to obtain 
individual data from as many studies as possible and to control our 
analysis for ecological fallacy with this data base. Therefore, we also used 
the idiographic research approach; In this case, ri is a component of 
correlation of the LME (e.g. the achievement correlation) of person i, and 
Ni is the number of judgments of person i (e.g. 178 forecast days, see 
Table 6). It is to mention that this weighting strategy is different from that 
suggested by Hunter and Schmidt (2004). Hence, we will check this 
weighting strategy in our robustness analysis (see chapter 5.2.4.2) 
Furthermore, since sampling error cancels out in the average 
correlation across studies, we estimated the mean population correlation 
(r, see Equation 2, Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 81) in our meta-analysis 
by means of the sample correlations.  
                     
 
r  = 
[ ]
N
rN
i
ii
∑
∑
        (2) 
 
However, sampling error adds to the variance of correlations across 
persons. Therefore, the observed variance (σr2, see Equation 3, Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004, p. 81) is corrected by subtracting the sampling error 
variance (σe2, see Equation 4, Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 89). The 
resulting difference is then the variance of population correlation across 
persons.  
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Furthermore, the average sample size (N ) was calculated as 
follows (see Equation 5, Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 88):  
 
 
kTN /=          (5) 
 
 
where T is the total number of judgments across persons, and k is 
the number of analyzed judgments (e.g. 370 for the number of 
achievement analyzed judgments across studies, see chapter 5.1).  
Furthermore, in meta-analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt 
(2004, p. 205), credibility and confidence intervals are distincted. In 
contrast to the used confidence intervals, credibility intervals do not 
depend on sample size, and, hence, sampling error. Therefore, a 
credibility interval is an estimate of the range of real differences after 
accounting for the fact that sampling error may be due to some of the 
observed differences. If the lower credibility value is greater than zero, one 
can be confident that a relationship generalizes across persons examined 
in the study. As Hunter and Schmidt (2004) concluded that: “credibility 
intervals are usually more critical and important than confidence intervals” 
(p. 206), we used 80% credibility intervals in our analysis, formed by SDρ 
as follows (see Equation 6): 
 
 
 ρ = ± 1.28*SDρ        (6) 
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4.5.1.2 Nomothetic data base 
According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, p. 442, see also 
Athanasou & Cooksey, 1993), subgroups (i.e. judgment tasks) of the total 
study correlation are used for the meta-analysis across judgment tasks. 
Subgroup correlations are symbolized by a roman numeral in Tables 5 
and 6. To summarize: Our included 31 studies are separated into 49 
different judgment tasks. Hence, we used the described Hunter-Schmidt 
method with the equations 2 to 6 also for this meta-analysis, but across 
judgment tasks.  
 
4.5.1.3 Moderator variables 
To detect moderator variables, we focused on assessment with the 
75% rule (see Sackett, Harris, & Orr, 1986). As mentioned before, Hunter 
and Schmidt suggested subtracting the variation due to sampling error 
from the total variation. If sampling error removes approximately 75% of 
the overall variation, they conclude that the effect sizes are homogeneous, 
due the fact that they estimate one parameter.  
However, if the 75% rule indicates a lack of homogeneity of a single 
effect sizes, a search for a moderating variable is conducted. A variable Z 
(e.g. the applied research area) is a moderator variable of the relationship 
between variables X (e.g. a judgment) and Y (e.g. actual outcome), when 
the nature of this relationship is contingent upon values or levels of Z. 
Research approach, research area, and experience level within research 
area are candidates for moderator variables in the presented meta-
analysis (see also chapter 3). The data set is then split up according to the 
categories of the moderator variable, and separate meta-analyses are 
performed on each subset of data. It should be mentioned that moderator 
analyses are by nature observational studies, i.e. the meta-analyst simply 
observes, in retrospect, the characteristics of the studies (such as the 
research area). Therefore, the results from a moderator analysis do not 
provide any evidence of a causal relationship between variables Z and Y. 
Furthermore, a spurious relationship between variable Z and Y could be 
introduced by a moderator analysis.    
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4.5.2 Psychometric meta-analysis 
In contrast to other meta-analysis methods, the Hunter-Schmidt 
approach is the only one that allows the correction of 11 artefacts. This 
psychometric approach estimates the population correlation by correcting 
the observed correlations for downward bias due to various artefacts (see 
Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 35). However, the Hunter-Schmidt approach 
bases on the assumption that the perfect study is a myth (see Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2004, p. 17). This assumption is in line with Rubin (1990) as 
follows: 
Under this view, we really do not care scientifically about 
summarizing this finite population (of observed studies). We really 
care about the underlying scientific process – the underlying 
process that is generating these outcomes that happen to see – 
that we, as fallible researchers, are trying to glimpse through the 
opaque window of imperfect studies. (p. 157) 
Finally, an overview of all suggested artefacts by Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004, p. 35) leads to an approximation of an accuracy estimation 
based on imperfect studies; the suggested artefacts are listed and 
described by an example in the following Table 10. To summarize: 
Artefacts are sample bias, measurement error, or bias such as 
dichotomization of continuous dependent and independent variables, 
deviations from perfect construct validity in the dependent and 
independent variables, transient errors of measurement, and, finally, 
random response of errors of measurement, measurement error due to 
scorer disagreement, and variance due to extraneous factors.  
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Table 10 
Description of 11 artefacts that alter the value of outcome measures 
according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, p. 35), with the study by Cooksey 
et al. (1986) as an example 
 
1. Sampling error: 
E.g.: Study validity will vary randomly from the population value because of 
sampling error. 
 
2. Error of measurement in the dependent variable: 
E.g.: Study validity will be systematically lower than true validity to the extent that 
a teacher’s reading-achievement estimation is measured with random error. 
 
3. Error of measurement in the independent variable: 
E.g.: Study validity for a standardized test score (criterion) will systematically 
understate the validity of the actual reading achievement measured, because the 
actual standardized test score is not perfectly reliable. 
 
4. Dichotomization of a continuous dependent variable: 
E.g.: The teacher’s reading-achievement estimation could artificially be 
dichotomized into “successful” or “not successful”, although the estimate was in 
the form of a percentage score with possible values ranging form 0% to 100%. 
 
5. Dichotomization of a continuous independent variable: 
E.g.: The actual standardized test score could be artificially dichotomized into 
“successful” versus “not successful”. 
 
6. Range variation in the independent variable: 
E.g.: Study validity will be systematically lower than true validity to the extent that 
the teacher’s reading-achievement estimation causes students to have a lower 
variation in the actual test score (criterion) than is true.  
 
7. Attrition artefacts: Range variation in the dependent variable: 
E.g.: Study validity will be systematically lower than true validity to the extent that 
there is systematic attrition in students’ reading achievement, e.g. when good 
students are promoted out of the population, or when poor students are shut out 
from this class due to poor achievements.  
 
8. Deviation from perfect construct validity in the independent variable: 
E.g.: Study validity will vary if the factor structure of the reading test differs from 
the usual structure of reading tests for the same trait. 
 
9. Deviation form perfect construct validity in the dependent variable: 
E.g.: Study validity will differ from true validity if the actual reading achievement 
(criterion) is deficient or contaminated. 
 
10. Reporting or transcription error: 
E.g.: Reported study validity differs from actual study validity due to a variety of 
reporting problems: inaccuracy in coding data, computational errors, errors in 
reading computer output, typographical errors by secretaries or by printers. 
Note: These errors can be very large in magnitude. 
 
11. Variance due to extraneous factors that affect the relationship: 
E.g.: Study validity will be systematically lower than true validity if students differ 
in reading achievement at the time their performance is measured (because 
reading experience affects reading achievement). 
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4.5.2.1 An extension of Tucker’s Lens Model Equation 
As mentioned above, there is a relation between Tucker’s LME 
(1964) and the meta-analytic approach according to Hunter and Schmidt 
(2004), although they not refer to it. However, there is a historical 
connection, as Tucker supervised Schmidt’s thesis. The corrected 
judgment achievement in our example can furthermore be estimated 
empirically according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004) and its extension by 
Wittmann (1988) as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(7) 
 
           
Researchers interested in Brunswik research know that the famous 
LME is traced to Brunswik. As you can see from Equation 7, the linear part 
(i.e. GRsRe) of the LME is one part of our meta-analyzed judgment 
achievement estimation. This part is multiplied by psychometric concepts. 
Finally, the sampling error is added. As mentioned above, a bare-
bones meta-analysis is only corrected for sampling error. In a sampling-
error correction, there is a danger to overestimate the true correlation 
value (judgment achievement), leading to a positive error. On the other 
hand, there is also the danger of underestimating judgment achievement, 
a so-called negative error.  
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2 Dangers to 
underestimate 
(lack of 
symmetry)
Selection effects 
due to restriction
(enhancement)
of range
1 Danger to 
overestimate
1 Danger to 
underestimate
Psychometric
reliability of 
judgment and
criterion
2 Dangers to 
underestimate
eGrrSr ttRstta, true value += RR es 321321
Re
Sampling error
1 Danger to 
overestimate
(positive error)
1 Danger to 
underestimate
(negative error)
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A psychometric meta-analysis, however, includes more artefact 
corrections than only sampling error (see Table 10). In Equation 7 you will 
find artefact corrections like as reliability, validity, and selection effect. 
Although Hunter and Schmidt (2004) recommend 11 corrections for 
artefacts, they ignored the symmetry concept. The symmetry principle 
implies that judgment achievement is only maximal, if the judgment is 
made on the same level as the criterion. Otherwise, judgment 
achievement is not optimal. According to Wittmann (1985, 1988), there are 
four violations against symmetry.    
In our presented work we do not consider the symmetry concept; 
this should urgently be done in further research. Therefore, we concluded 
that our meta-analysis will underestimate the actual value, unless the 
symmetry concept is considered. 
In summary, in Equation 7 it is visible that a psychometric meta-
analysis leads to six dangers of underestimating to two dangers of 
overestimating the true judgment achievement value. In the following, we 
therefore use a psychometric meta-analysis to estimate judgment 
achievement as accurately as possible.  
 
4.5.2.2 Procedure 
Artefact information is not always available from our studies. In our 
example, we get sample size information from all studies. However, the 
other artefacts (such as the reported reliability) in studies are only 
sporadically available. As missing data for correcting artefacts is common 
in meta-analysis studies, Hunter and Schmidt (2004, p. 137) propose 
correction by means of distribution of artefact values, which is complied 
across the studies that provide information on that artefact. Therefore, we 
used the method of artefact distribution. Consequently, we conducted a 
meta-analysis in two stages: A bare-bones meta-analysis corrects for 
those artefacts for which information is available for all studies, in our case 
only for sampling error. Secondly, we estimated the artefact distribution on 
the available information in a psychometric meta-analysis.  
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As the first step a bare-bones meta-analysis is already introduced, 
we will focus on a psychometric meta-analysis in more detail based on our 
idiographic data base before we report the psychometric meta-analysis 
used with our nomothetic data base.  
 
4.5.2.2.1 Idiographic data base 
 According to the mentioned introduction also in the psychometric 
meta-analysis procedure for idiographic studies, each person is treated as 
a single study. Therefore, to keep our methodological introduction short, 
we refer to the chapter 4.5.2.2.2, which explains in more detail a 
psychometric meta-analysis applied to studies with a nomothetic research 
approach. This description can also be applied to the idiographic approach 
in that each study refers to a single person.  
 
4.5.2.2.2 Nomothetic data base 
As mentioned before, the psychometric meta-analysis bases on a 
bare-bones meta-analysis. This procedure has already been explained 
(see chapter 4.5.1), and, we will therefore only mention the supplemented 
steps for a psychometric meta-analysis (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 181) 
and the additional artefact corrections in the following.  
 
4.5.2.3 Artefacts 
According to the available data, we can only consider two artefacts 
in our psychometric meta-analysis: measurement error and 
dichotomization.  
 
4.5.2.3.1 Measurement error 
Because decision and judgments measurements are not always 
without error, the reliability values should also be considered, in order to 
find out how well the validity of judgement and decision making actually is. 
The reliability is therefore always the basis for validity tttc rr =(max) . 
Reliability is defined as the correlation between parallel tests and 
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interprets this reliability as the ratio of true-score variance to observed-
score variance (see Wiggins, 1973, p. 282). According to Wiggins (1973, 
p. 283, see APA, 1954, p. 28), "reliability is a generic term referring to 
many types of evidence". Furthermore, Wiggins (1973) mentions that: 
Clearly, different designs for determining the reliability of parallel 
observations take account of quite different sources of error. Thus, 
although reliability may be defined as the ratio of true-score 
variance to observed-score variance, the error that enters into 
observed scores differs from one design to another. Internal-
consistency procedures involve the estimation of error due to the 
selection of a given set of items or observations. Depending on the 
time interval between administrations of parallel forms, equivalence 
procedures may estimate error due to selection of specific items 
and/or to response variability of subjects. Stability procedures 
provide an estimate of response variability in subjects as well as of 
the effect of differences in conditions of test administration or 
observation. (p. 283) 
However, as mentioned before, variables in science are never 
perfect measures (for an overview, see Schmidt & Hunter, 1996). This 
leads to error of measurement and systematically lowers the correlation 
between measures in comparison to the correlation between the variables 
themselves. Reliability coefficients represent the measurement error in 
each study. In our case, we had to correct judgments and criteria’ (see 
Figure 3) for measurement error. Hence, we will first introduce our 
measurement corrections in judgments, and then on the criteria side.  
An overview of the included studies shows that only three studies 
reported reliability coefficients. The correlation coefficient for each person 
is reported in the studies by Levi (1989, r = .73 - .93) and Athanasou and 
Cooksey (2001, r = .20 - .99). Athanasou and Cooksey (2001) calculated 
the retest reliability by selecting 20 random scenarios out of 100 scenarios 
and then adding them to the 100 scenarios as a repeated task. The study 
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by Wiggins and Kohen (1971, r = .09) reports an aggregated reliability 
coefficient.  
For the missing retest-reliability information, we used the review on 
“Test-Retest Reliability of Professional Judgment” by Ashton (2000) to 
estimate judgments corrected for measurement error. An advantage of this 
review is its separation into different research areas, such as medical 
science and business science. Taking medical science as an example, we 
used the mean of the test-retest reliability of .73 (.76 for medical doctors; 
.70 for clinical psychologists) to correct the judgments for measurement 
error. In addition, we used the retest-reliability values for meteorologists’ 
hail forecasts (.93, see Ashton, 2000) for all meteorologist forecasts in our 
analysis.  
As mentioned before, also the measurement error in the criterion 
variable is considered. We defined three types of criteria: objective, 
subjective, and test criteria. The criterion is measured as objective for 
example if a physiologic measurement of the patient’s actual 
hemodynamic status (see Speroff et al., 1989, see Table 5) is used for a 
criterion. Consequently, the test-retest reliabilities of our criteria were 
corrected with the value 1 for objective criteria. We therefore entered 1 
into our data base for the reliability of the predictor, because we did not 
correct for measurement error, assuming that machine measurement is 
100% correct. However, in psychological tests or tests not measured by a 
machine, the test criteria values were corrected by other test-retest 
reliabilities by specific tests, such as the MMPI (see Einhorn, first study, 
1974, rtt = .71, see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) or the Wonderlic 
Personnel Test (see Reynolds & Gifford, 2001, rtt  = .94, see Dodrill, 1983). 
Finally, if a subjective value like the judgment of a single physician (see 
LaDuca et al., 1988, Table 5) is used, also the values of Ashton’s review 
(2000) are applied to correct the measurement error (rtt  = .76 for medical 
doctors). In Table 5, all subjective criteria are marked with a triangle in the 
criterion column. 
                                    
   88 
 Finally, it is to mention that because of missing data we mostly used 
aggregated retest-reliability values for our meta-analysis.  
 
 
4.5.2.3.2 Dichotomization 
In the following, the dichotomization of a continuous variable is 
considered. Many decisions, such as medical decisions (healthy or 
diseased) or job application decisions (accepted or not accepted), are 
binary. It should now be considered, that often such decisions are based 
on continuous criteria – like scores of medical tests that are dichotomized 
by using a cut-off value. So, “if a continuous variable is dichotomized, the 
point-biserial correlation for the new dichotomized variable will be less 
than the correlation for the continuous variable” (see Hunter & Schmidt, 
2004, p. 36). This artificial dichotomization may lead to an underestimation 
of the validity.  
An overview of our studies shows that only the study by Szucko and 
Kleinmuntz (1981) uses a point-biserial correlation. It can not be excluded 
that other studies with unknown types of correlation coefficients include 
further point-biserial correlations.  
According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, p. 36) we used the 
correction formula of a double dichotomization (see Equation 8): 
 
 
ρaρ =0         (8) 
 
 
where a = .80 (see Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 36). 
Consequently, the point-biserale correlation of .23 increases 20%, so, the 
corrected correlation used in our meta-analysis for the Szucko and 
Kleinmuntz (1981) study is actually estimated as .27 based on nomothetic 
data. In the Appendix E: Table 1 you will also find the corrected single 
judges’ values used for our meta-analysis based on individual data.  
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4.5.2.4 Corrections of artefact information 
For the detailed explanation of our artefact corrections we refer to 
the Appendix E. To summarize: We used the following three steps 
recommended by Hunter and Schmidt (2004): 
1) Cumulation of artefacts information 
2) Correction of the mean correlation 
3) Correction of the standard deviation of correlations. 
It is important to note that in the following psychometric procedures 
the estimation of 80% credibility interval, the 75% rule, and, finally, the 
detection of moderator variables is the same as in a bare-bones meta-
analysis (see chapter 4.5.1). Consequently, the same steps as already 
reported are applied. 
 
4.6 Publication bias 
4.6.1 Funnel plots 
As publication bias of the included studies is considered (see also 
chapter 4.4.3), a funnel plot (Light & Pillemer, 1984) evaluating the extent 
of the publication bias is illustrated. The funnel plot for all correlations of 
judgment achievement in the 49 judgment tasks included in our meta-
analysis is presented in Figure 8.  
The plot should look like a funnel (see dashed lines), when sample 
size is plotted on the x-axis and achievement correlations on the y-axis, 
because small samples are expected to show more variability than large 
samples. A not perfect funnel plot is yielded. To check for publication bias, 
the trim-and-fill method suggested by Duval and Tweedie (2000) was used 
to estimate the missing studies (see red triangles in Figure 8). Hence, in 
our robustness analysis we estimated the missing studies and 
supplemented our data base with them assuming only objective criterions 
in a psychometric meta-analysis (see chapter 5.2.2) before rerunning our 
analysis. 
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Figure 8. Funnel plot of achievement correlations (ra) versus sample size 
for the 49 tasks included in our meta-analysis. 
 
4.6.2 Calculating Fail-safe numbers 
In the following analysis, the same sample, judgment achievement 
of the included tasks in our meta-analysis, is used for the estimation of the 
Fail-safe number suggested by Orwin (1983). This Fail-safe number 
indicates the number of no significant, unpublished (or missing judgment 
achievement tasks) studies that would need to be added to a meta-
analysis in order reduce an overall statistically significant observed result 
to no significance. If this number is large relative to the number of 
observed studies, one can feel fairly confident in the summary 
conclusions. Rosenthal (1979) suggested the “five plus ten rule”, which 
means that if the Fail-safe number is not more than five times the number 
of reviewed studies plus ten, the obtained findings are probably robust.  
The Fail-safe numbers were calculated with an SPSS (2004) 
syntax6. It must be mentioned that in the following analysis judgment tasks 
with three or less judges (see Einhorn, 1974, second study; Kim et al., 
                                                 
 
6http://pages.infinit.net/rlevesqu/Syntax/MetaAnalysis/MetaAnalysisOfCorrCoef2.txt 
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1997) are excluded, which leads to on a slight overestimation of our 
results. 
However, the Faile-safe number of 61 concerns publication bias, 
leading this meta-analysis to dramatically overestimate the achievement 
correlations (see Table 11). Our analysis shows clearly that according to 
the rule of thumb by Rosenthal (1979), all calculations have the tendency 
of publication bias. However, a closer look at the data reveals on the one 
hand that in the overall analysis 61 judgment tasks are needed to change 
the results; hence, as this is more than double the data base, we assume 
that there is no publication bias in all overall calculations for the LME 
components, except for component C. On the other hand, there is a clear 
publication bias in all C calculations as well as in all sub-analyses, which 
should be considered in the interpretation of our results and in our 
robustness analysis.  
 
4.7 Calculations 
All further calculations were done with the Hunter-Schmidt meta-
analysis program (Schmidt & Le, 2005). In addition, for our publication and 
robustness analysis the program R (2007) was used.  
Furthermore, the meta-analysis follows the Campbell Collaboration 
Guidelines (2007) and suggestions by Shadish (2007) and Egger, Smith 
and Altman (2001).  
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Table 11 
Publication bias tendency according to Orwin’s (1983) Faile-safe number 
   
Components 
Research area: ra G Rs Re C 
 Medical science 9 19 23 29 0 
 Business science 16 20 21 22 - 4 
 Educational science 4 12 10 13 - 4 
 Psychological science 7 16 39 39 16 
 Miscellaneous 19 41 42 33 -10 
       
Experience:      
 Expertsa 17 40 67 49 0 
 Business 4 8 10 13 -2 
 Education 4 7 5 7 -2 
 Psychology -2 -1 12 14 -1 
 Miscellaneousa b b b b b 
       
 Studentsa 32 62 58 67 -8 
 Business 10 11 10 10 -1 
 Education 1 4 5 5 -2 
 Psychology 3 14 28 25 14 
 Miscellaneousa 10 22 25 18 -6 
 
Overall 
 
61 
 
122 
 
139 
 
118 
 
- 8 
a4 judgment tasks were excluded, because they include only two persons (see Stewart et al., 1997). b was not 
calculated because the sample size was too small (i.e. 4 judgment tasks included with only two persons, see 
Stewart et al., 1997).   
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5 RESULTS 
In the following, our results are presented at three different levels: 
First, we will focus the individual level without considering any meta-
analysis, followed by our meta-analysis – first based on individual data 
and then on nomothetic data, both separated into a bare-bones and a 
psychometric meta-analysis. 
Due to the fact that in some studies one component is missing, the 
sample sizes vary between the components. This may restrict our 
possibilities to interpret achievement in terms of relations between 
components within studies to a minor extent. 
In our meta-analysis, the components of correlations (from -1.00 to 
1.00) of the LME were interpreted according to Cohen’s (1988) standards, 
with absolute values ≤ .29 considered as small, ~ .49 as moderate, and ≥ 
.50 as large magnitudes. 
 
5.1 Idiographic data base 
Before presenting our results, we would like to mention that a 
similar analysis has already been published (see Kaufmann et al., 2007). 
In contrast to our earlier analysis, the current analysis varies in these 
points: 
a) We did not include four studies (Ashton, 1982; Lehman, 
1992; Trailer & Morgan, 2004; Werner et al., 1989) because 
our previous literature search did not reveal them. Hence, 
also the number of single judgments analyzed by the LME 
has increased from 264 to 370.  
b) In this analysis, we separated the combined category 
educational or psychological research area into two distinct 
categories. This categorisation is now in line with our meta-
analysis based on nomothetic data.  
c) In our current analysis, we added an analysis on the 
experience level within the different areas. 
d) We also calculated missing component values (see 
Appendix C).  
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e) We would like to mention that we used another analysing 
tool (Hunter-Schmidt meta-analysis program, Schmidt & Le, 
2005, instead of the SPSS syntax written by Marta Garcia-
Granero and adapted by Wright, 2005). 
f) Finally, we supplemented the already published bare-bones 
meta-analysis with a psychometric meta-analysis.   
 
To summarise: The following presentation is a more elaborated 
analysis of our previous publication. 
To begin with, we will overview the extreme values of judgment 
achievement. Consequently, three decision makers with a low judgment 
achievement and three decision makers with a high judgment 
achievement are described and compared in the following Table 12.  
 
Table 12  
Correlation components of three judges with high judgment achievement 
and three judges with low judgment achievement 
 
Components 
 
Study 
High judgment achievement ra G Rs Re C 
Stewart et al. (1997) .97 .99 .98 .97 .46 
LaDuca et al. (1988) .75 .89 .88 .93 .17 
Ashton (1982) .88 .98 .96 .95 -.10 
 
Low judgment achievement 
     
Szucko & Kleinmuntz (1981) .02 -.17 .47 .52 .09 
Wright (1979) .27 .70 .62 .02 .34a 
Trailer & Morgan (2004) .14 .54 .26 .98 .00a 
Note. A similar table was published in Kaufmann et al., 2007. We adapted this table to our actual analysis. 
aThese values are not founded in publications, and we therefore calculated them by ourselves, see Appendix C.  
 
The highest value of judgment achievement is found in a 
meteorological temperature forecast (Stewart et al., 1997, see Table 12). 
The components of the LME are large, reflecting an optimal decision 
condition. The task is highly predictable, and the meteorologist uses cues 
with high consistency. Judgment achievement is nearly optimal, because it 
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is almost equal to the (linear) knowledge component. It is notable that this 
component is also the maximal value of all error-free judgment values 
across persons. A comparison of single judges with high judgment 
achievement shows that even the other components are high, with the 
exception of component C, which leads to a great variation from -.10 to .46 
across different research areas (see Table 12).  
To enhance our knowledge about the underlying sources of 
judgment achievement, we also took an interest in single judges with low 
judgment achievement. The lowest achievement value shows a correlation 
in the wrong direction (-.13, Einhorn, 1974, second study), i.e., greater 
judged severity does not match lower rates of survival. The physician was 
moderately consistent (.48), and also the task was moderately predictable 
(.30). The individual analysis of the LME shows that the physician in this 
study used information not explicitly available in the cues picked by a 
physician. However, that the underlying sources of poor judgment 
achievement can vary is apparent from the last three cases in Table 12. 
The low achievement level of the judge in the study by Szucko and 
Kleinmuntz (1981) indicates that if the judge could acquire better 
knowledge he would achieve better judgment, provided that the high 
consistency remains. In contrast, the low judgment achievement of a judge 
from the study by Wright (1979) indicates low task predictability, and 
therefore, poor knowledge or lack of consistency is not the reason for the 
mentioned low judgment achievement. The last case (Trailer & Morgan, 
2004) shows that low judgment consistency can also be associated with 
poor achievement level.  
From an idiographic point of view, it may be of interest to compare 
two studies with seemingly equal objective, concrete criteria. Two such 
studies are Einhorn (1974) and Stewart et al. (1997, see Tables 5 and 6), 
both including experts. The first study used “patients’ months of survival” 
as a criterion, the latter study “actual temperature” as criterion, in both 
studies thus an objective, concrete criterion. Despite this formal similarity 
between criteria, the studies present very different achievement values. In 
the study by Stewart et al. (1997) we found our highest achievement value 
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(.97), while the study by Einhorn presents a negative achievement value (-
.13), and also our lowest judgment achievement value. Even though there 
may be several underlying factors responsible for this large difference in 
factors we are only able to speculate about, we can still pose a question: 
Are criteria generally regarded as equally objective or concrete also 
perceived in the same way by the single judge, i.e. as equally objective 
and concrete? 
However, in a first step, the descriptive statistics applied to our data 
based to the 370 judgment achievements reveal that half of them (49%) 
are low, and 33% are high, and only 17% are medium (see Appendix F: 
Table 1). In addition, a similar pattern is found in the medical and in other 
research areas, but clearly not in educational science. In the educational 
area 69% of the included judgment achievements are high.  
Finally, although the reported three judges in Table 12 with high 
judgment achievement are all experts, this should not imply that experts 
have better judgment achievement. If we compare judgment achievement 
across all areas by experienced and inexperienced judges (i.e. students), 
there is no tendency that experts reach a better judgment achievement at 
first glance.  
 
5.1.1 Bare-bones meta-analysis  
In the following, the meta-analytic results of the idiographic 
approach are presented in two sections. The first section describes the 
results for the achievement correlations across the judgment tasks 
presented in Figure 9 and Table 13. The second section reveals the 
additional LME components across the judgment tasks in Figures 10 to 12 
and Table 14.  
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5.1.1.1 Judgment achievement 
The scatter plot in Figure 9 shows clearly that the judgment 
achievement of individuals varies considerably. Furthermore, it shows a 
large 80% credibility interval for the mean from .07 to .70. The last two 
columns in Table 13 illustrate that the achievement correlations in our 
studies range from a low value of -.13 to a high level of .97. Further 
descriptive statistics on the overall average level of achievement 
correlations and on the achievement correlations separated by research 
areas are presented in Table 13. Looking at the second column in the last 
row, one can see a moderate mean of the 370 achievement correlations of 
.38 (see also Figure 9). But for studies applied to medical, business or 
psychological science, the achievement correlations are low. On the other 
hand, the achievement correlations increase to an almost high value in 
studies applied to the educational area, or to a high level in studies in 
other research areas. Therefore, the overall achievement correlation 
strongly depends on the value of the achievement correlations in studies 
applied to other research areas.  
Research areas: As can be seen in Table 13, the achievement 
correlation separated by research areas is more homogenous than the 
overall achievement correlation, except in other research areas. By means 
of the scatter plots, we realized that the study by Trailer and Morgan 
(2004) may be responsible for the great achievement variability in studies 
from other research areas. Therefore, we reran the analysis and excluded 
this study. As expected, judgment achievement increased (rother = .70; k = 
45), and the variance was reduced (varcorr = .03), leading also to a 
reduction of variance in this category in comparison to the variance of .06 
across studies. 
Expertise within research areas: As the experience of the judges is 
also of interest, we checked by means of a meta-analysis. The first 
impression from our descriptive analysis was confirmed. There are no 
great differences in experts’ and students’ judgment achievements across 
areas. In addition, our analysis of expertise within research areas reveals 
that this tendency is not supported by educational and miscellaneous 
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studies; in these two areas experts clearly reach better judgment 
achievement.  
The number of used cues: In addition, Figure 9 reveals the 
hypothesis that the number of cues in judgment tasks can influence 
judgment achievement. The scatter plot shows that in the study with the 
highest number of cues (Roose & Doherty, 1976, see the solid outline) the 
subjects judged less accurately than in the study with the fewest number 
of cues (Steinmann & Doherty, 1972, see the dashed outline). If we 
consider the number of cues and exclude the study with the highest 
number (Roose & Doherty, 1976, see the solid outline in Figure 9), the 
value of the achievement correlations increases to a high value (ra = .59), 
and the variation decreases (varcorr = .02; k = 24) in studies applied to 
business science.  
In summary, our analysis implies that the overall achievement 
correlation strongly depends on the achievement values in studies applied 
to other research areas and to educational science.  
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Medical science (experts)
Business science (experts)
Business science (students) 
Educational science (experts)
Educational science (students)
Psychological science (experts)
Psychological science (students)
Miscellaneous research areas (experts)
Miscellaneous research areas (students)
Averaged mean
80% Credibility Interval
 
 
Legend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The same legend is applied to the following Figures 10 to 12.  
 
Figure 9. The scatter plot of judgment achievement (ra) in the 370 
analyzed judgments of 30 different tasks, separated into the applied 
research areas. The 30 different tasks are in the same order as listed in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
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Table 13 
Descriptive statistics for the separation of research areas, experience level 
and overall component of judgment achievement (ra) according to a bare-
bones meta-analysis (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) 
 
Research area: 
 
N 
 
ra 
 
varcorr 
 
Min  
 
Max 
  Medical science 95 .27 .03 -.13 .94 
  Business 40 .25 .04 .06 .92 
  Education 58 .49 .02 .01 .65 
  Psychology 57 .25 .00 -.04 .67 
  Miscellaneous 120 .52 .09 .00 .97 
      
Experience:      
  Expertsa 196 .36 .05 -.01 .97 
      Business 35 .25 .05 .06 .92 
      Education 40 .57 .00 .48 .65 
      Psychology 11 .22 .00 -.01 .43 
      Miscellaneous 15 .73 .04 .35 .97 
      
  Students 174 .42 .07 -.04 .97 
      Business 5 .33 .00 .27 .40 
      Education 18 .30 .01 .00 .56 
      Psychology 46 .26 .01 -.04 .67 
      Miscellaneous 105 .47 .09 .00 .97 
 
Overall 
 
370 
 
.38 
 
.06 
 
-.13  
 
.97 
Note. N = Corresponding to k, according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, see Equation 5). ra = weighted mean 
correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). varcorr = corrected variation according to Hunter and 
Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). a includes also medical experts. 
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5.1.1.2 Judgment achievement components 
To increase our knowledge about the underlying reason for the 
great heterogeneity of the reported judgment achievement values, the 
meta-analysis of the different LME components was introduced.  
The G components: The scatter plot in Figure 10 reveals that the 
365 analyzed judgments have a high overall average value of the 
component G (.55) as well as an increase in heterogeneity in comparison 
to the reported judgment achievement values (varcorr = .13). The average 
value of the component G in the studies separated by research area is 
also high, except for the low value (.29) in studies applied to business 
science, and the moderate value (.42) in medical science. However, the G 
component separated into different areas reduced the heterogeneity only 
slightly in business area, in psychology, and in other research areas (see 
Table 14). If we consider the experience level in our analysis, the two 
areas educational and other research areas – in which expert’s judge 
higher than students – also represent high G components values, leading 
to the support of our hypothesis that high judgment achievement may be 
associated with high G component values.  
The Rs component: As can be seen in Table 14, the consistency in 
the judgments was high (Rs = .74) in all four research areas. However, as 
one can see in Figure 11, the component Rs across studies also shows a 
substantially high variability that ranges from a low value of -.16 to a high 
value of .99. Finally, if we consider the Rs component in the experience 
level within the research areas, it is surprising that the value is only 
moderate for experts (Rs = .47) and high (Rs = .85) for students in 
psychology (see Table 16).   
Like the previously reported component, the component Re shows a 
high value across research areas. In addition, according to the pattern of 
the component G, the component Re (.67) value is also high in studies 
separated by research area. If we rerun our analysis separated by the 
experience level within the research areas, only students in psychological 
science have a moderate task-predictability component, however, the 
increase in variability is also dominated by this subcategory. 
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In contrast to other components, the overall average value and also 
the values separated by the research area of the component C (.09) are 
quite low (see Table 14 and Appendix F: Figure 1) and without great 
variability in the data.  
Furthermore, all components have a large 80% credibility interval 
(see Figures 10 - 12). If we consider the number of cues and exclude the 
study with the highest number (Roose & Doherty, 1976, see the solid 
outlines in Figures 10 - 12), all the average components are high (G = .77; 
Rs  = .80; Re = .80) in the studies applied to business science, except for 
one (C = .16), which also increased, when we considered the experience 
level. However, it must also be mentioned that the variation slightly 
increased in the consistency components.  
We can conclude that all underlying components of judgment 
achievement based on individual data also represent high heterogeneity, 
especially the G component. 
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You will find the legend on page 99.  
 
 
Figure 10. The scatter plot of the knowledge component (G) in the 365 
analyzed judgments in 29 different tasks, separated into the applied 
research areas. The 29 different tasks are in the same order as listed in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
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You will find the legend on page 99.  
 
 
Figure 11. The scatter plot of the consistency component (Rs) in the 365 
analyzed judgments in 29 different tasks, separated into the applied 
research areas. The 29 different tasks are in the same order as listed in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
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You will find the legend on page 99.  
 
 
Figure 12. The scatter plot of the environmental predictability component 
(Re) in the 370 analyzed judgments in 30 different tasks, separated into 
the applied research areas. The 30 different tasks are in the same order 
as listed in Tables 5 and 6.  
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5.1.2 Psychometric meta-analysis  
In the following, our results of a psychometric meta-analysis based 
on individual data are described. For an overview of our correction we 
refer to chapter 4.5. 
 
5.1.2.1 Judgment achievement 
In the following Table 15, the psychometric meta-analysis based on 
individual data is presented. As noted previously, in educational, 
psychological and the miscellaneous area, there were no data or retest-
reliability values available for our measurement-error correction; hence, as 
we assume that in every study a measurement error is included, we made 
three different estimations: We assumed a retest-reliability value of .78 
(see Ashton, 2000), and two extreme retest-reliability values of .90 and .50 
are used for our measurement-error calculation.  
Table 15 presents the average judgment achievement corrected for 
measurement error. Judgment achievement across different research 
areas increased from a moderate value .38 to a minimum level of .46, and, 
finally, to a high level of .65. However, the variability pattern found in our 
previous bare-bones meta-analysis remains.  
Expertise. Also in the psychometric meta-analysis, our hypothesis 
that experts judge better than non-experts across all research areas, 
although their judgment is measurement error corrected, is not confirmed. 
However, a closer look at the data reveals that there are again domain 
differences supporting the hypothesis of differences between research 
areas (see Tables 16, 17).  
In summary, our results found with a bare-bones meta-analysis are 
confirmed. In addition, this analysis also shows that a simple bare-bones 
meta-analysis clearly underestimates judgment achievement. However, to 
shed light on the underlying reasons of judgment accuracy or inaccuracy 
we present a psychometric meta-analysis of the remaining LME 
components in the following.  
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5.1.2.2 Judgment achievement components 
The G component shows an increase from .55 to minimal .67 to .94 
across different research areas. Hence, in a psychometric meta-analysis 
the G component increased with a minimum of 12%. However, if we look 
at the different research areas, our analysis reveals differences, especially 
the knowledge component in medical science increases from a moderate 
level (.42) in a bare-bones meta-analysis to a high level (.57) in a 
psychometric meta-analysis (see Table 15). Furthermore, the experience 
level again represents the previous bare-bones meta-analysis, however, 
the level increased clearly, as both experts and non-experts knowledge 
components increased (see Tables 16, 17).  
The consistency component. In a psychometric meta-analysis the 
consistency component increased with a minimum of 5% (Rs = .79) in the 
.90 retest-reliability correction to 19% (Rs = .95) if we assume .50 retest-
reliability. However, if we look at the differences between research areas, 
there is only a slight increase to be found in other research areas 3% (Rs = 
.59) at the minimum assuming a .90 retest-reliability across all research 
areas (see Table 15). Finally, also experts in psychology science reach a 
high consistency level (Rs = .50) if we assume a conservative .90 retest-
reliability value for our measurement corrections. However, as can be 
clearly noticed, there is almost no variation in experts’ consistency 
components within the different research areas. On the other hand, the 
variation is dominant in student consistency in other research areas (see 
Tables 16, 17).  
The environmental predictability components. Our psychometric 
meta-analysis reveals high task predictability conditions across areas as 
well as within research areas (see Table 15). Furthermore, there is also no 
difference between experts and student tasks. Both also reach a high 
value between the different research areas. Hence, student tasks in 
psychological science increased from a moderate value (Re = .49) in a 
bare-bones meta-analysis to a high value (Re = .52) in a psychometric 
meta-analysis. However, the great variations in this category remain 
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(varcorr = .10) and dominate the overall variation across research areas 
(varcorr = .05, minimal, see Tables 16, 17). 
The non-linear knowledge components. In comparison to the 
presented components the C component has the smallest increase in a 
psychometric meta-analysis, or remains stable in a correction with a 
retest-reliability value of .90 (see Table 15). However, the slight 
differences between experts’ and students’ non-linear knowledge 
components imply that experts have slightly higher values across areas, 
and clearly higher values in psychological and other research areas. It 
must also be mentioned that experts in business science (C = .10) reach a 
lower level than business science students (C = .25), but both still have 
low non-linear knowledge components (see Tables 16, 17).   
Summing up our psychometric meta-analysis on the LME 
components based on individual data, we conclude that all values 
increased, but the heterogeneity still remains.  
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5.1.3 Intercorrelations of the components 
To enhance our knowledge about the underlying reasons in 
judgment achievement, we also considered its intercorrelations. The 
intercorrelation across research areas (see Table 18) and within research 
areas (see Table 19) is presented. At first glance, judgment achievement 
significantly correlates with every component (see Table 18). There is, 
however, a negative correlation between the knowledge and the 
environment component (-.02), which implies that task predictability is 
negatively associated with knowledge. However, if we separate our data 
base into experience levels (see Appendix F: Tables 2, 3), our results 
reveal that the negative correlation between knowledge and task validity 
remains in the student data base – and increases to a high level in 
experts’ judgment achievement, except when it comes to educational 
experts (-.44). However, as becomes obvious, there are a lot of missing 
values due to small sample size. Hence, the reported intercorrelation 
should be interpreted with caution (see Appendix F: Tables 2, 3).  
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Table 18 
Intercorrelation of the LME components  
 
Components 
 
Components 
Overall ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .84** .50** .25** .38** 
G .84** -- .47** -.02 .10 
Rs .50** .47** -- -.27** .06 
Re .25** -.02 -.27** -- .09 
C .38** .10 .06 .09 -- 
Experts      
ra -- .87** .46** .79** .27** 
G .87** -- .47** .65** .01 
Rs .46** .47** -- .34** -.15* 
Re .79** .65** .34** -- .21** 
C .27** .01 -.15* .21** -- 
Students      
ra -- .79** .49** .07 .45** 
G .79** -- .45** -.40** .14 
Re .49** .45** -- -.40** .10 
Rs .07 -.40** -.40** -- .17* 
C .45** .14 .10 17* -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
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Table 19 
Intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas  
 
Components in: 
 
Components 
Medical science ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .85** .14 .79** .47** 
G .85** -- .22* .60** .16 
Rs .14 .22* -- .14 -.08 
Re .79** .60** .14 -- .31** 
C .47** .16 -.08 .31** -- 
Business science      
ra -- .93** .60** .96** .07 
G .93** -- .37* .91** .01 
Rs .60** .37* -- .54** -.24 
Re .96** .91** .54** -- .05 
C .07 .01 -.24 .05 -- 
Education science      
ra -- .96** .80** -.74** -.07 
G .96** -- .70** -.83** -.18 
Rs .80** .70** -- -.60** -.30* 
Re -.74** -.83** -.60** -- .10 
C -.07 -.18 -.30* .10  
Psychology science      
ra -- .44** .14 .12 .28* 
G .44** -- .40** -.62** -.35* 
Rs .14 .40** -- -.26 -.43** 
Re .12 -.62** -.26 -- .42** 
C .28* -.35* -.43** .42** -- 
Miscellaneous      
ra -- .92** .68** -.23* .69** 
G .92** -- .55** -.42** .54** 
Re .68** .55** -- -.39** .44** 
Rs -.23* -.42** -.39** -- -.17 
C .69** .54** .44** -.17 -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
 
 
                                    
   116 
In summary, our results based on LME components for individuals 
lead to a small sample. Therefore, our results must be accepted with 
caution. Hence, we will supplement our data with studies including LME 
components across individuals (or nomothetic data bases) in the following. 
 
 
5.2 Nomothetic data base 
The introduced meta-analysis based on individual data is 
supplemented by studies including only nomothetic data. In line with the 
previous meta-analysis, we will first present our results with a bare-bones 
meta-analysis and then with a psychometric meta-analysis. 
 
5.2.1 Bare-bones meta-analysis  
The following meta-analytic results are presented in two sections. 
The first section describes the results for the achievement correlations 
across the judgment tasks presented in Table 20 and Figure 13. The 
second section reveals the additional correlations of components of the 
LME across the judgment tasks in Tables 21 to 23 and Figures 14 to 17. 
 
5.2.1.1 Judgment achievement 
The achievement correlations are summarized in Table 20 and 
Figure 13. There was a moderate mean (.40) from the 49 achievement 
correlations across 1151 analyzed judgment achievements by 1055 
judges. The 75% rule indicates that there were true differences in effect 
sizes across judgment tasks. Accordingly, separate meta-analyses were 
calculated for categories of studies like the research area and the 
experience level in the different research areas.  
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Table 20  
Bare-bones meta-analysis according to the method of Hunter-Schmidt 
(2004) supplemented by a trim-and-fill analysis on judgment achievement 
(ra), separated into research area and experience level  
 
Research area 
 
k 
 
N 
 
ra 
 
varcorr 
 
80% CI 
 
75% 
Medicine 10/11 258/262 .40/.39 .00/.oo .40/.38 .40/.38 157/134 
Business 9/13 239/332 .50/.19 .07/.25 .15/-.45 .84/.84 24.45/13.56 
Education 4/5 156/176 .39/.37 .00/.02 .39/.13 .39/.50 177.89/53.75 
Psychology 14/15 249/257 .22/.21 .00/.00 .22/.20 .22/.20 448.50/319 
Miscellaneous 12/17 249/291 .44/.37 .02/.07 .28/.00 .61/.66 67.55/43.98 
Overall 49/58 1151/1285 .39/.30 .02/.07 .23/-.04 .55/.64 69.42/36.49 
 
Experts in: 
       
Business 6/9 116/136 .36/.25 .01/.05 .26/-.03 .46/.52 87.73/60.24 
Education 2 40 .57 .00 .57 .57 975.69 
Psychology 4/6 59/70 .10/.06 .00/.00 .10/.06 .10/.06 975.77/635.55 
Miscellaneous 5/7 15/23 .65/.30 .00/.00 .65/.30 .65/.30 401.60/158.46 
Overalla 27/32 488/518 .37/.32 .00/.01 .37/.19 .37/.46 129.00/84.6 
 
Students in: 
       
Business 3 123 .63 .10 .23 1.00 8.52 
Education 2 116 .33 .00 .33 .33 27143 
Psychology 10 190 .26 .00 .26 .26 606 
Miscellaneous 11/16 234/279 .43/.31 .01/.06 .33/.00 .53/.00 86.40/52.59 
Overall 25/29 663/695 .40/.41 .02/.41 .21/.41 .59/.76 58.94/40.28 
Note. k = number of correlations (i.e. judgment tasks). N = total sample size for all judgment tasks combined. ra 
= weighted mean correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). varcorr = corrected variation according to 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). 80% CI = 80% credibility interval for true score 
correlation distribution. 75% = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artefacts, if below 75%, it 
indicates moderator variable. /Fill-and-trim analysis results after a publication bias is indicated. athis analysis 
includes medical experts. Grey boxes: Results not confirmed by the trim-and-fill analysis. 
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The achievement correlations were lowest in psychology (ra = .22) 
and increased for studies applied to the educational (ra = .39), the 
medicine (ra = .40) and the miscellaneous professional area (ra = .44), and 
to a higher value for studies in business areas (ra = .50), resulting in the 
highest level of achievement. In addition, the 75% rule indicates 
moderating variables not only across studies, but also in the meta-
analyses of the sub-group of business and other research area studies, or 
the two research areas with the highest judgment achievements.  
Furthermore, it is clear that the greatest variability is found in 
business-sciences judgment achievement. We reran the analysis, 
however, separating the experience level of the judges. This separation 
revealed that in experts’ judgment achievement across or within research 
areas no moderator variables were indicated. On the other hand, it is also 
clear, that students’ judgment achievement in business sciences is 
responsible for the moderator variable indication in students’ judgment 
achievement across research areas.  
Finally, our trim-and-fill application when a publication bias was 
indicated confirms our results with some exceptions, such as in business 
science. In this category, the suggested judgment achievement values 
decreased from a high value of .50 to a low value of .19. This is explained 
by experts’ judgment achievement, as there was no publication bias 
indicated in studies using business students. In the same way, there is a 
decrease in experts’ judgment achievement in other research areas to a 
moderate level. Although the judgment-achievement values for students in 
other research areas is stable, there are now moderator variables 
indicated. It must also be mentioned that after a publication-bias correction 
judgment achievement in educational science indicated moderator 
variables, but it despairs after we separated the analysis according to the 
experience level.  
In the following, the additional components are considered, in order 
to clarify the underlying reasons for the reported achievement values.  
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Legend 
Medical science (experts)
Business science (experts)
Business science (students) 
Educational science (experts)
Educational science (students)
Psychological science (experts)
Psychological science (students)
Miscellaneous research areas (experts)
Miscellaneous research areas (both)
Miscellaneous research areas (students)
 
 
Note. The same legend is applied to the following Figures 14 to 17.  
 
Figure 13. The forest plot of judgment achievement (ra), separated into the 
applied research areas, and within these into experience levels. The 
studies in the forest plots are in the same order as in Table 5 and 6. 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
80% credibility interval for judgment achievement (ra)
Total medical science (ra = .40, varcorr = .00)
Total business science (ra = .50, varcorr = .07)
Total educational science (ra = .39, varcorr = .00)
Total psychological science (ra = .22, varcorr = .00)
Total other research areas (ra = .44, varcorr = .02)
Overall judgment tasks (ra = .39, varcorr = .02)
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5.2.1.2 Judgment achievement components 
Knowledge components. A high average value of the knowledge 
component G (.63) is presented in Figure 14 and Table 21 (note that the 
sample sizes vary, because some components of the LME could not be 
calculated). The overall meta-analysis of the G component indicates 
moderator variables. However, also a separation into research areas 
indicates moderator variables in each area. The average value of the 
component G in the studies separated by the research areas is high, 
except for the moderate value (.38) in psychological studies. Hence, we 
reran the analysis, separating the experience level within research areas. 
Against our expectation, students’ knowledge across research areas is 
higher than experts’ knowledge, but both components are high and also 
indicate moderator variables. A look at the different research areas, 
however, shows that the knowledge component decreases from a 
moderate value (.38) across areas to a low level (.17) in psychological 
experts’ knowledge component, leading to the only value which is not 
high. Finally, the moderator-variable indication in the experts’ knowledge 
component is dominated by business and medical sciences experts. An 
inspection of the scatter plot of correlations suggested the exclusion of the 
study by Roose and Doherty (1976) and Mear and Firth (1987), both 
studies are also the only ones with low judgment achievement in the 
business category, which leads to the hypothesis that maybe judgment 
achievement is associated with a low knowledge component. After the 
exclusion of these two studies, no moderator factors were evident (G = 
.81; varcorr = .00; k = 4; N = 62). The exclusion of the study by Roose and 
Doherty (1976) with a large number of 64 cues also supports the view that 
the extreme number of cues enhanced the variability of the data.  
Finally, our trim-and-fill method application if a publication bias is 
indicated reveals that the knowledge analysis is robust against it, except in 
the category of psychology students and other research area, leading to a 
moderate instead of a high knowledge component.  
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You will find the legend on page 119.  
 
 
Figure 14. The forest plot of the knowledge component (G), separated into 
the applied research areas, and within these by the experience level. The 
studies in the forest plots are in the same order as in Table 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
80% credibility interval for knowledge (G)
Total medical science (G = .61, varcorr = .02)
Total business science (G = .66, varcorr = .07)
Total educational science (G = .73, varcorr = .01)
Total psychological science (G = .38, varcorr = .02)
Total other research areas (G = .68, varcorr = .07)
Overall judgment tasks (G = .63, varcorr = .05)
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Table 21 
Bare-bones meta-analysis according to the method of Hunter-Schmidt 
(2004), supplemented by a trim-and-fill analysis of the knowledge 
component (G), separated into research areas and experience levels  
 
Research 
area 
 
 
k 
 
 
N 
 
 
G 
 
 
varcorr 
 
 
80% CI 
 
 
75% 
Medicine 10/11 258/262 .61/.59 .02/.02 .44/.37 .78/.80 50.72/41.85 
Business 9 239 .66 .07 .33 1.00 15.85 
Education 4 156 .73 .01 .60 .86 35.62 
Psychology 9/11 105/121 .38/.24 .02/.11 .17/-.17 .58/.66 73.77/45.46 
Miscellaneous 12/17 249/313 .68/.49 .07/.16 35/-.02 1.00/1.0 19.26/17.90 
Overall 44/47 1007/1019 .63/.63 .05/.06 .34/.30 .93/.93 24.91/23.34 
 
Experts in: 
 
 
      
Business 6/7 116/129 .55/.45 .05/.11 .25/.02 .84/.87 33.56/26.45 
Education 2 40 .89 .00 .89 .89 313.80 
Psychology 4/5 59/65 .17/.13 .00/.00 .17/.14 .17/.14 444.93/302 
Miscellaneous 5/6 15/19 .92/.71 .00/.03 .92/.48 .92/.94 768.55/80.9 
Overalla 27/32 488/508 .57/.53 .04/.06 .32/.20 .83/.85 43.69/38.55 
        
Students in:        
Business 3 123 .78 .05 .49 1.00 6.95 
Education 2 116 .68 .00 .59 .77 51.03 
Psychology 5/7 46/62 .65/.37 .03/.17 .42/-.16 .87/.90 57.65/35.14 
Miscellaneous 11/15 234/271 .66/.53 .06/.13 .34/.07 .98/1.00 24.15/22.03 
Overall 21/27 519/631 .69/.52 .04/.16 .41/.00 .97/1.00 21.81/14.41 
Note. k = number of correlations (i.e. judgment tasks). N = total sample size for all judgment tasks combined. G 
= weighted mean correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). varcorr = corrected variation according to 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). 80% CI = 80% credibility interval for true score 
correlation distribution. 75% = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artefacts, if below 75%, it 
indicates moderator variable. /Results of the fill-and-trim analysis after a publication bias is indicated.
 athis 
analysis includes medical experts. Grey boxes: Results not confirmed by the trim-and-fill analysis. 
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Consistency. Figure 15 and Table 22 indicate that on average the 
subjects were highly consistent in their judgments (Rs = .77). The 75% 
rule indicates a lack of homogeneity of the single effect sizes, and further 
meta-analyses were conducted. Moderator factors are indicated for 
studies related to all research areas, except for studies in other research 
areas. Hence, we reran the analysis, separating the experience level 
within research areas. Although the overall expert-consistency 
component indicated no moderator variables, psychology and medical 
experts’ consistency indicated moderator variables. A scatter plot of 
medical experts’ consistency component, however, reveals a low value 
of the three physicians in the study by Einhorn (1974). In a following 
meta-analysis of medical experts, with the exclusion of Einhorns study, 
no moderator variables are evident (Rs = .81; varcorr = .00; k = 9; N = 
255). Although scatter plots of experts in business science were created, 
no possible judgment tasks could be identified, as all values are high. 
Finally, across research areas, students’ consistency is clearly 
dominated by students in business sciences. However, scatter plots of 
the three included judgment tasks indicate that all values are high, and 
thus, no judgment task could be identified for a possible exclusion in a 
reanalysis.  
Finally, the moderator variable indicated in our publication-bias 
analysis supplemented by the fill-and-trim method reveals no influence in 
the consistency component, as all consistency values are still high. 
However, this analysis leads to moderator indications in experts’ 
consistency component based mainly on the values of experts’ 
consistency in the other research areas. In addition, there are moderator 
variables indicated in the psychology student’s category.  
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You will find the legend on page 119.  
 
Figure 15. The forest plot of the consistency component (Rs), separated 
into the applied research areas, and within these by the experience level. 
The studies in the forest plots are in the same order as in Table 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
80% credibility interval for consistency (Rs)
Total medical science (Rs = .81, varcorr = .00)
Total business science (Rs = .81, varcorr = .01)
Total educational science (Rs = .73, varcorr = .01)
Total psychological science (Rs = .79, varcorr = .01)
Total other research areas (Rs = .71, varcorr = .00)
Overall judgment tasks (Rs = .77, varcorr = .01)
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Table 22 
Bare-bones meta-analysis according to the method of Hunter-Schmidt 
(2004), supplemented by a trim-and-fill analysis of the consistency 
component (Rs), separated into research areas and experience levels  
 
Research 
area 
 
 
k 
 
 
N 
 
 
Rs 
 
 
varcorr 
 
 
80% CI 
 
 
75% 
 
Medicine 
 
10/12 
 
258/265 
 
.81/.79
 
.00/.00
 
.75/.68
 
.86/.89 
 
74.95/53.63 
Business 9/11 239/303 .81/.67 .01/.06 .66/.33 .95/1.00 28.60/15.00 
Education 4/6 156/196 .73/.53 .01/.14 .62/.04 .84/1.00 43.52/9.90 
Psychology 12 150 .79 .01 .69 .88 71.34 
Miscellaneous 12/17 249/272 .71/.64 .00/.05 .66/.34 .75/.92 90.86/34.01 
Overall 47/58 1052/1260 .77/.61 .01/.12 .66/.16 .88/1.05 53.34/14.61 
 
Experts in: 
       
Business 6/7 116/119 .84/.61 .00/.00 .84/.60 .84/.60 268.23/105.37 
Education 2 40 .92 .00 .92 .92 1241.73 
Psychology 4/5 59/65 .85/.80 .01/.02 .75/.60 .95/.99 48.83/33.04 
Miscellaneous 5/6 15/19 .95/.75 .00/.05 .95/.45 .95/1.00 1724.68/66.77 
Overalla 27/29 488/496 .83/.81 .00/.01 .80/.66 .87/.94 89.61/37.21 
        
Students in:        
Business 3 123 .77 .03 .56 .98 12.68 
Education 2 116 .66 .00 .66 .66 422.27 
Psychology 8/11 91/115 .74/.57 .00/.09 .74/.18 .74/.95 107.28/35.15 
Miscellaneous 11 234 .69/.63 .00/.00 .69/.52 .69/.73 148.50/80.0 
Overall 17/33 399/664 .70/.56 .01/.10 .60/.15 .80/.97 69.27/20.84 
Note. k = number of correlations (i.e. judgment tasks). N = total sample size for all judgment tasks combined. Rs 
= weighted mean correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). varcorr = corrected variation according to 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). 80% CI = 80% credibility interval for true score 
correlation distribution. 75% = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artefacts, if below 75%, it 
indicates moderator variable. /Results of the fill-and-trim analyses after a publication bias is indicated. athis 
analysis includes medical experts. Grey boxes: Results not confirmed by the trim-and-fill analysis. 
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Environmental predictability. The overall level of the environmental 
predictability component Re (.73) was high (see Figure 16 and Table 23). 
The 75% rule also indicates the presence of moderated relationships in 
the environmental-predictability component. Further analyses separating 
correlations into research areas were conducted. The largest relationship 
was found between environmental predictability and studies from the 
miscellaneous research area (Re = .88). The largest variation of 
component Re is in business studies, but this area has the largest range of 
cues (up to 64 cues) of all the categories. However, again, all task 
predictability values are high, implying no research-area differences in the 
type of task. On the other hand, the 75% rule indicates moderator 
variables for the studies from the business or the miscellaneous research 
area. An additional meta-analysis under exclusion of studies could not 
identify judgment tasks with possible moderator variables in this category. 
Hence, we reran our analysis, separating the experience level in studies 
within research areas. Although experts’ task predictability is lower than 
students’ task predictability, they are both still high. Furthermore, experts’ 
task predictability indicated no moderator variables in comparison to 
students’ task predictability. A closer look at the scatter plots of students’ 
task predictability in business and other research areas, which indicated 
moderator variables, reveals that all included values are high. Thus, we 
could not identify any task characteristics which could influence our 
results. 
Finally, after a trim-and-fill application if a publication bias is 
indicated in the psychology category, moderator values are revealed 
which can't be explained by the experience level. In addition, the high 
value in experts’ task predictability in other research areas reaches a 
moderate value. Finally, although the business experts’ task-predictability 
component is stable, there are now moderator variable indicated. 
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You will find the legend on page 119.  
 
 
 Figure 16. The forest plot of the task-predictability component (Re), 
separated into the applied research areas, and within these by experience 
level. The studies in the forest plots are in the same order as in Table 5 
and 6. 
 
 
 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
80% credibility interval for task predictability (Re)
Total medical science (Re = .67, varcorr = .00)
Total business science (Re = .71, varcorr = .02)
Total educational science (Re = .70, varcorr = .00)
Total psychological science (Re = .68, varcorr = .00)
Total other research areas (Re = .88, varcorr = .01)
Overall judgment tasks (Re = .73, varcorr = .01)
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Table 23  
Bare-bones meta-analysis according to the method of Hunter-Schmidt 
(2004), supplemented by a trim-and-fill analysis of the task-predictability 
component (Re), separated into research area and experience level  
 
Research 
area 
 
 
k 
 
 
N 
 
 
Re 
 
 
varcorr 
 
 
80% CI 
 
 
75% 
Medicine 10 258 .67 .00 .67 .67 105.89 
Business 9 239 .71 .02 .53 .89 34.97 
Education 4 156 .70 .00 .70 .70 257.26 
Psychology 14/16 249/265 .68/.62 .00/.05 .59/.33 .77/.91 77.79/32.53 
Miscellaneous 12/16 249/289 .88/.82 .01/.07 .76/.07 1.00/1.16 23.75/12.82 
Overall 49/58 1151/1348 .73/.58 .01/.12 .59/.13 .88/1.00 44.21/14.37 
 
Experts in: 
       
Business 6/8 116/133 .62/.50 .00/.07 .62/.14 .62/.85 108.29/34.31 
Education 2 40 .68 .00 .68 .68 1690.13 
Psychology 4/5 59/76 .80/.61 .00/.09 .80/.22 .80/1.00 256.36/22.98 
Miscellaneous 5/7 15/23 .69/.34 .00/.00 .69/.33 .69/.33 356.44/153.73 
Overalla 27/32 488/540 .68/.58 .00/.05 .68/.28 .68/.88 126.13/36.47 
 
Students in: 
       
Business 3 123 .79 .02 .66 .97 13.91 
Education 2 116 .71 .00 .71 .71 145.93 
Psychology 9/13 176/220 .63/.52 .00/.08 .58/.14 .69/.89 91.12/27.88 
Miscellaneous 11/14 234/267 .89/.79 .00/.06 .81/.47 .97/1.12 39.67/12.57 
Overall 26/32 663/787 .77/.61 .02/.13 .60/.14 .94/1.00 31.23/12.10 
Note. k = number of correlations (i.e. judgment tasks). N = total sample size for all judgment tasks combined. Re 
= weighted mean correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). varcorr = corrected variation according to 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). 80% CI = 80% credibility interval for true score 
correlation distribution. 75% = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artefacts, if below 75%, it 
indicates moderator variable. /Results of the fill-and-trim analyses after a publication bias is indicated. athis 
analysis includes also medical experts. Grey boxes: Results not confirmed by the trim-and-fill analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
   129 
Unmodeled knowledge. In contrast to other components of the 
LME, the overall average value for the unmodeled knowledge component 
C was quite low (C = .08), corresponding to an rc2 value of only .16% (see 
Figure 17 and Appendix G: Table 1). Furthermore, there is no variation in 
the data. Hence, we also reran our analysis, separating our data into 
different research areas as well as by experience level within research 
areas. Finally, our C component analysis was completely confirmed by our 
publication-bias analysis supplemented with the trim-and-fill method. To 
summarize: All values remain low, with a small variance, and indicate no 
moderator variables.  
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You will find the legend on page 119.  
 
 
Figure 17. The forest plot of the non-linear knowledge component (C), 
separated into the applied research areas, and within these by experience 
level. The studies in the forest plots are in the same order as in Table 5 
and 6. 
 
 
 
-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
80% credibility interval for non-linear knowledge (C)
Total medical science (C = .19, varcorr = .00)
Total business science (C = .07, varcorr = .00)
Total educational science (C = .02, varcorr = .00)
Total psychological science (C = .00, varcorr = .00)
Total other research areas (C = .04, varcorr = .00)
Overall judgment tasks (C = .08, varcorr = .05)
                                    
   131 
5.2.2 Psychometric meta-analysis  
In the following, our results of a psychometric meta-analysis will be 
described. For an overview of our correction we refer to chapter 4.5.2. 
We must mention that we only corrected this analysis for 
measurement error, and the study by Szucko and Kleinmuntz (1981) for 
the artefact of dichotomisation.  
 
5.2.2.1 Judgment achievement 
As noted previously, in educational, psychological, and the 
miscellaneous area, there were no area-specific retest-reliability values 
available for our measurement-error correction. However, in line with 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004), we assume that there is no perfect study and 
that there are always artefacts such as measurement error included. 
Hence, we used three different retest-reliability values for our 
measurement-error corrections: the average retest-reliability value of .78 
by Ashton (2000), supplement by two extreme values (.90 as a high retest-
reliability value, and .50 as a low retest-reliability value).   
The psychometric meta-analysis is summarized in Table 24 and in 
Figure 18. There is a moderate mean (.45) from the 49 achievement 
correlations across 1151 judgments, if we assume high retest-reliability 
values (.90). This result is supported by our correction using .78 as retest-
reliability value. On the other hand, if we assume a retest-reliability value 
of .50, judgment achievement clearly increases to a high value. In 
addition, the 75% rule no longer indicates any moderator variables and 
presents the value of measurement-error corrections. Although the 
correction allows only a small increase in the explanation of the judgment 
achievement variance when it’s corrected by .90 retest-reliability value, so 
it's clearly an increase by a .50 retest-reliability correction and also shows 
how different retest-reliability values influence our results. Without such an 
analysis, we would clearly underestimate the value of the average 
judgment-achievement value.  
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However, as the 75% rule also indicates moderator variables, we 
checked for differences in research areas. Hence, we reran our analysis, 
separating it into five suggested research areas. This meta-analysis lead 
to an increase of judgment achievement in medical science, from a 
moderator to a high value (.53). In this category, additionally 13% variance 
in observed correlation is attributable to all artefacts explained by 
measurement error. The highest increase in the explained variance is 
found in educational science (178%). In the other areas there is no 
increase in the explanation of the variance by our measurement-error 
correction. All judgment achievement increases to a high value, except in 
psychology science, if we assume retest-reliability values of .78 in our 
analysis. In psychology science, no high value is reached even if we 
assume a retest-reliability value of .50. Finally, our analysis also indicated 
moderator variables in business and in other research areas, so, we reran 
the analysis, separating the experience level within the areas.  
First, our analysis across the areas, separating the experience 
level, shows that experts reach a slightly higher judgment achievement 
than students and indicates no moderator variables. Hence, the analysis 
separating experts within the research areas clearly shows that there are 
no moderator variables evident in any research area. On the other hand, 
this analysis still reveals moderator variables in the category of business- 
science students. A closer look at the scatter plots of students’ judgment 
achievement in business reveals that one study (Wright, 1979) had low 
values and could influence our results. If we exclude this study, judgment 
achievement increases (ra = .97; varcorr = .00; k = 2; N = 76), but still 
indicates moderator variables (75% rule = 30.51).  
Finally, our trim-and-fill application if a publication bias is indicated 
confirms the analysis done in the bare-bones meta-analysis. The results 
can be found in parentheses in Table 24, below the psychometric meta-
analysis results. However, there was one exception: The judgment 
achievement of students in business science deceases to a moderate 
value instead of a high value.  
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Figure 18. A comparison of the different corrected psychometric analyses.  
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5.2.2.2 Judgment achievement components 
Knowledge component. In our psychometric meta-analysis, the 
knowledge component across areas increased minimally at 10% (G = .77) 
to 15% (G = .83, see Table 25). Hence, we revealed an increase of 1.57% 
to 9.37% attributable for measurement errors due to all artifacts. In 
addition, the 75% rule clearly indicates that there were true differences in 
effect size across judgment tasks. Accordingly, separate meta-analyses 
were calculated for research areas. This analysis shows that our increase 
in the G component in this meta-analysis across research areas is 
dominated by the medical category. In medical science, the knowledge 
component increases clearly to .82, and also the percent variance in 
observed correlation attributable to all artifacts increased to 3.66%. 
However, there is still a moderate knowledge component (.42) in 
psychological science. After a measurement correction with a retest-
reliability value of .50, also the knowledge component in psychological 
science increases to a high level (.76). Finally, there are still moderator 
variables indicated in all areas except educational science. Hence, we 
reran our analysis, separating experience levels. Against our expectation, 
our analysis implied that experts have lower knowledge components than 
students across research areas, but both values are still high. However, 
our analysis also reveals that there are differences in research areas. 
Hence, the experience level could explain the heterogeneity in psychology 
and other research areas. In education and other research areas, the 
experts also have higher knowledge components than students, but not in 
psychology science. In psychology science, there is a clear difference 
between low experts’ knowledge components to high students’ knowledge 
components. In addition, in business science, the same pattern – that 
students have a better knowledge component – is revealed, but both G 
components in business science are still high, and moderator variables 
are indicated in both categories. 
Finally, our trim-and-fill application if a publication bias is indicated 
confirmed our previous analysis for a bare-bones meta-analysis. 
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Consistency components. Our measurement-corrected consistency 
component increases minimally at 8%, if we assume a high retest-
reliability value of .90 in our correction (see Table 26). In comparison to 
our bare-bones meta-analysis, this correction procedure reveals that there 
are now no moderators indicated.  
However, we reran our analysis, separating different research 
areas. Hence, in comparison to our bare-bones analysis of the 
consistency component, our medical-science and educational-science 
consistency analysis reveals no further moderator variables. However, in 
business and also in psychology science there are still moderator 
variables indicated in the constancy component. Hence, we analysed the 
data considering also the experience level of the judges within the 
research areas. At first glance, our results are in line with our expectation 
that expert’s judge more consistently than students. Although there are no 
moderator variables indicated in the different experience levels, we reran 
our analysis considering also the research areas, in order to check if there 
are clearly no differences in research areas. Our analysis shows that 
although the experts’ and also the students’ analysis indicated no 
moderator variables, there are clearly variables indicated in psychological 
experts’ and in students’ business consistency.  
Finally, our trim-and-fill analysis used if a publication bias is 
indicated reveals that maybe moderator variables are also indicated in our 
across analysis, as implied by our bare-bones meta-analysis. In addition, 
also the educational areas now indicated moderator variables. 
Furthermore, all found publication bias could not be eliminated by the 
experience level of the judges. It must, however, be mentioned that all 
consistency components after a trim-and-fill analysis still remain high.  
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The environmental predictability component. In our measurement 
corrections including the environmental component, we only used a one-
side correction, hence, this correction is a conservative one. If we look at 
the environmental-component analysis across areas, however, there is 
also a high value, which increases by 9% (see Table 27). In addition, there 
are clearly moderator variables indicated. However, a rerun of our 
analysis, separating different research areas, reveals that this moderator 
variable indication is dominated by study of the other research category. 
On the other hand, if we rerun the analysis and separate the experience 
level, it is also clear, that students’ tasks indicated moderator variables. 
Hence, we reran an analysis, separating the experience level within the 
research areas. However, this analysis is also in line with our bare-bones 
meta-analysis, revealing the same pattern that a meta-analysis of task in 
psychology or other research areas done by students still indicated 
moderator variables.  
To summarise: In our psychometric meta-analysis of the 
environmental-predictability component, the same pattern as in our bare-
bones meta-analysis was found. However, our corrections let clearly 
increase the explained heterogeneity and also the task predictability 
values. Finally, our publication-bias analysis with the trim-and-fill method 
confirms the analysis done in the bare-bones meta-analysis. It must be 
mentioned that in the environmental-predictability analysis reached a 
value up to 1 are excluded to prevent an overcorrection.  
The C Component. As the component C is almost zero and 
indicates no heterogeneity, we added our psychometric meta-analysis in 
the Appendix G: Table 2.  
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5.2.3 Intercorrelation of the components 
The intercorrelations of the LME components across areas reveal a 
strong correlation between judgment achievement and all components, 
except for the moderate correlation between judgment achievement and 
the component C (see Table 28). Even though this is the strongest C 
component correlation, the C component correlates only weakly with the 
other components. The same pattern is found with the Rs component.  
However, if we separate the data base into different experience 
levels, such a strong correlation between judgment achievement and 
judgment consistency in experts’ judgments is not confirmed. In addition, 
there is a clear increase in the C component correlations with other 
components in experts’ judgments except for the Rs component. 
Furthermore, also the Re component and Rs component now reach a 
strong correlation. On the other hand, LME intercorrelation of the 
components in students’ judgments reveals a low correlation between the 
ra and C component.  
In addition, the intercorrelation between the components in different 
research areas of experts’ judgment confirms a heterogeneous picture of 
the LME intercorrelations (see Appendix G: Tables 3, 4). First of all, in the 
other research area there are overall components a high intercorrelation 
between the components – it must be mentioned – that this category only 
includes Stewart’s meteorology studies (1990, 1997). Secondly, we also 
found a highly negative correlation in psychology science, whereas 
judgment achievement is strongly negatively correlated with the Re and Rs 
components. Thirdly, high negative correlations are also found in 
education science between the G components and all others components. 
On the other hand, if we look at students’ judgments, the mentioned 
patterns are not confirmed.   
 Altogether, beside the found heterogeneity in our LME 
components, there is also a great heterogeneity in the intercorrelation 
between the LME components (see Tables 28 and 29; Appendix G: 
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Tables 3, 4). This should be taken into account in the interpretation of our 
results.  
 
Table 28 
Intercorrelation of the LME components  
 
 
 
Components 
Components ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .81** .57** .56** .44** 
G .81** -- .22 .50** .18 
Rs .57** .22 -- .29* .27 
Re .56** .50** .29* -- .17 
C .44** .18 .27 .17 -- 
Experts:      
ra -- .92** .41* .65** .63** 
G .92** -- .34 .45* .48* 
Rs .41* .34 -- .50** .03 
Re .65** .45* .50** -- .35 
C .63** .48* .03 .35 -- 
Students:      
ra -- .66** .84** .51** .29 
G .66** -- .40 .49* -.20 
Rs .84** .40 -- .50** .35 
Re .51** .49* .50** -- .19 
C .29 -.20 .35 .19 -- 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
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Table 29 
Intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas  
 
Components in: 
 
Components 
Medical science ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .93** .44 .90** .63 
G .93** -- .35 .73* .40 
Rs .44 .35 -- .53 .29 
Re .90** .73* .53 -- .67* 
C .63 .40 .29 .67* -- 
Business science      
ra -- .92** .54 .97** -.33 
G .92** -- .43 .91** -.02 
Rs .54 .43 -- .47 -.66 
Re .97** .91** .47 -- -.21 
C -.33 -.02 -.66 -.21 -- 
Education science      
ra -- .86 .79 -.63 -.49 
G .86 -- .37 -.93 -.86 
Rs .79 .37 -- -.05 15 
Re -.63 -.93 -.05 -- .96* 
C -.49 -.86 .15 .96* -- 
Psychology science      
ra -- .45 -.19 -.07 .25 
G .45 -- -.76* .45 -.07 
Rs -.19 -.76* -- .29 -.27 
Re -.07 .45 .29 -- -.65 
C .25 -.07 -.27 -.65 -- 
Miscellaneous      
ra -- .78** .85** .40 .46 
G .78** -- .74** -.10 -.05 
Rs .85** .74** -- -.08 .48 
Re .40 -.10 -.08 -- .44 
C .46 -.05 .48 .44 -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
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5.2.4 Robustness analysis 
To control for the robustness of our reported results, we checked 
several factors such as a) the type of models such as the fixed-effects 
models or random-effect model (see chapter 4.4.4) and b) the used 
weighting strategy (see chapter 4.5.1.1) and finally, c) the type of 
correlation (Product-non product correlation, see chapter 4.3.7).  
 
 
5.2.4.1 Type of used model 
To check if our results depend on the used random-effect model 
(see Figure 19, random-effect model, HS = Hunter and Schmidt estimator) 
we checked our bare-bones meta-analysis results (see Tables 20 - 23) 
against a fixed-effect model and a further random-effect model with the 
estimator suggested by DerSimonian and Laird (DL, 1986). An overview of 
the overall judgment achievement estimations dependent on different 
models is found in Figure 19 (for details see Appendix H: Tables 1 - 5). In 
addition, it is to mention that only in the Hunter and Schmidt estimation 
credibility intervals are used (represented by the dashed lines, see chapter 
4.5.1.1). To summarize our analysis differs only slightly if we focus on all 
LME components overall and between research areas. These differences 
could be explained by rounding showing clearly that our results are robust. 
Hence, we conclude that our results are independent on the used models 
and assume that this is also the case within research areas.  
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Figure 19. Comparison of different model used in meta-analytic research. 
 
 
5.2.4.2 Weighting strategy 
In the Table 30 our meta-analysis are repeated for all LME 
components across subject areas and between subject areas. However, 
we used another weighting strategy with the number of judges and 
profiles, representing the used weighting strategy we used in our meta-
analysis with idiographic data. If we compare this analysis with our bare-
bones meta-analysis considering also nomothetic data then it's clearly that 
the values are comparable with some exceptions as the moderate 
achievement values in medical (.40) decreases to a low value (.29). 
However, as the variance increases also the level of moderator variables 
increases leading to more moderator variables indications. Hence, our 
analysis of the nomothetic data base is more conservative than the 
estimation of our idiographic data base.  
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5.2.4.3 Type of correlation 
For this robustness analysis we refer to Kaufmann and Athanasou 
(2009). To summarize it, with a reduced sample base we found no 
indication that this sample the type of correlations systematically 
influenced the robustness of our results.  
 
5.2.4.4 Conclusion 
Our different sensitivity analysis shows clearly that our results are 
robust against the introduced factors such as used model and the type of 
correlation. On the other hand, we would like to highlight that the used 
weighting strategy using also profiles leads to liberal results and should 
therefore, also be considered in the interpretation of our results.  
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6 DISCUSSION 
Brunswik’s achievement concept formalized by the LME led to 
numerous publications revealing why some people are more accurate than 
others. Hence, these meta-analysis gives an impression of how well 
artifact corrected judges are in different areas separated by experience 
level. To overcome the ecological and the individualistic fallacy, two types 
of data base were used. The idiographic data base includes only LME 
component by single judges. This data base is supplemented by LME 
component across judges in our nomothetic data base.  
In the following, we will first discuss specific aspects in relation to 
our data base, starting with the idiographic data base, and then follow-up 
with specific aspects concerning also our nomothetic data base. Secondly, 
we will also focus on the limitations of our meta-analyses. Finally, we will 
give a comprehensive outlook for further analyses and studies.  
 
6.1 Idiographic-based meta-analysis 
To overcome the ecological fallacy (Robinson, 1950, see chapter 
2.3.4.1), we conducted a meta-analysis based on individual-level data.  
The major finding of the meta-analysis applied to all selected 
studies is that humans judge a given criterion with a moderate 
achievement of .38 (Figure 9, Table 13). Additionally, one has to take into 
account the large credibility interval of the judgment achievement. 
Furthermore, there are individual differences among the judges’ 
achievements. However, all credibility intervals are higher than zero, 
hence, the relationship generalization across persons in our meta-analysis 
is supported. But, can a similar conclusion be drawn considering different 
domains? Better judgment achievements were attained by those studies 
applied to the research areas denoted here as “other” and to the 
educational research areas (Table 13). Studies applied to the medical, 
business, or psychology sciences showed lower judgment achievements.  
To clarify the contrasting results of the above judgment 
achievements, their components were considered. Firstly, judgment 
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achievement can increase from a moderate level of .38 (judgment 
achievement) to a high level (.55, error-free judgment achievement, see 
Table 16) under optimal situations – except for those studies applied to 
business, even if they are also corrected for artefacts. 
Furthermore, the environmental predictability is related to the 
moderate achievement level. In addition, moderate judgment achievement 
is related to the high level of consistency that was attained in both the 
combined and separated studies’ meta-analysis.  
We would like to highlight that knowledge introduces the highest 
variability, which should be checked also with our nomothetic data base. In 
addition, further analysis reveals possible moderator variables, such as 
experience levels within research areas. It was surprising that Shanteaus 
(2002) recommendation that experts reach a better judgment achievement 
was not confirmed in business and psychology science. However, as the 
data base is too small, we refer to our discussion on our nomothetic data 
base. In addition, the obtained results suggest that judgment achievement 
is also influenced by other factors, such as the number of cues, as the 
exclusion of the study with the highest number of cues lead to a higher 
knowledge value. As Miller (1956) showed, memory limits the amount of 
information or number of cues that can be processed. It can be argued 
that the subjects judged tasks with a limited number of cues more 
accurately than tasks with more cues. The effect of increasing information 
by adding cues has been addressed by several researchers (Nystedt, 
1974; Nystedt & Magnusson, 1972). 
To summarize, our results lead us to the conclusion that there are 
some area differences. Especially given that the differences between 
areas still remain after artefact correction. Therefore, we assume that the 
different research areas could be a possible moderator variable also in 
lens studies. In addition, because of the underlying heterogeneity of the 
LME components, our results imply that research theories that mainly 
focus on the task-side (see the Fast and Frugal Heuristic Approach, 
Gigerenzer et al., 1999) or focus on the judge-side, clearly short cut the 
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explanations of differences in judgment achievement. In line with 
Brunswik, we therefore recommend to focus on both sides – after the data 
is corrected for possible artefacts – in order to find the main sources of the 
judgment achievement heterogeneity on the task and judges’ side.  
In addition, it is surprising that although an array of reviews on 
judgment achievement have been published (e.g. Aegisdottir et al., 2006; 
Grove et al., 2000, see chapter 2), none of them focus on idiographic 
values. So, against our intention, our results could not be compared 
directly with other results found, and, we have to refer to the discussion of 
our nomothetic data base.  
However, as with most research, there are limitations to consider in 
the interpretation of the results found in the reported analysis. Hence, the 
six major limitations are illustrated in the following. The six points are 
related to the Hunter-Schmidt approach, artefact corrections, cue-
intercorrelations, publication bias, and further robustness analysis. 
Additional information is also taken from Kaufmann et al., 2007. 
First, it must be mentioned that the Hunter-Schmidt method is 
usually applied at the nomothetic level, i.e. across studies. Because the 
idiographic approach was used here, the analyses were carried out across 
persons. Therefore, a problem in our meta-analysis is that the judgment 
achievement of persons in the same study is more homogenous than that 
of persons between studies. In addition, the same persons judged two or 
more tasks; therefore the correlations were not independent in most 
cases. This problem was neglected, however, because of the size of the 
sample of persons (331 of 370) who judged only one task. Finally, the 
sample size of 30 judgment tasks and 370 analyzed judgment 
achievements that used an idiographic approach restricts the generality of 
the results. Therefore, the inclusion of studies using a nomothetic research 
approach led the generality of our results to increase. In addition, in our 
comparison between idiographic and nomothetic studies we clearly show 
that the idiographic approach is neglected in the current research. Hence, 
we would like to advise future researchers to reconsider the individual 
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level, as this also prevents the ecological fallacy, as mentioned above. 
However, as far as we know, it is the first time that the Hunter-Schmidt 
method is used with individual data. There is no bare-bones nor 
psychometric meta-analysis published, according to Hunter and Schmidt 
(2004) using individual data. However, there is some theoretical 
discussion on this point in meta-analytic research (see Viechtbauer, 2007). 
In addition, in medical science, meta-analysis using individual patient data 
is highly recommended as an individualistic approach, but medical meta-
analysis seldom uses a Hunter and Schmidt approach or prefers the fixed-
effect model approach (e.g. Smith & Williamson, 2007). Altogether, our 
research brings back the focus to the individualistic approach 
recommended by Brunswik and ignored by most meta-analytic 
researchers.  
We see this as a fruitful supplementation of the commonly used 
study data – to reveal the introduction of ecological fallacy and to focus on 
the aggregation problems (Wittmann, 1985, 1988). We highly recommend 
further research on this topic that could inspire research on meta-analytic 
approaches, and also, the reported evaluation research on meta-analytic 
research introduced in chapter 4.4.5. Hence, the reported point suggests a 
more idiographic-based psychological research instead of the dominance 
of the nomothetic research, as is typical in JDM. This claim for more 
idiographic studies was already supported in the early days by Brunswik. 
Secondly, although in our artefact correction we used an idiographic 
approach, the corrected measurement values are nomothetic – individual 
data was, seldom available, only the authors of one study reported it. 
However, we do not assume that there is no measurement error included; 
hence, we used the nomothetic-based retest-reliability values. To prevent 
an overcorrection of our data, we did not correct any objective criterion for 
measurement error. Furthermore, we did not correct any cues’ reliability 
values because of missing data. Consequently, our results are a rather 
conservative estimation.  
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Thirdly, to understand the eventual effect of the increase of the 
number of cues, we also have to take their intercorrelations with already 
existing cues into consideration, which was not possible in our analysis 
because of missing data.  
Fourthly, there was no publication bias or trim-and-fill application 
used with this data base. As research on publication bias focuses only on 
aggregated data as study information, we see the current estimators as 
not suitable for our individual data base. In addition, as meta-analyses are 
seldom performed on individual data, we also promote further meta-
analysis based on individual data, leading to more sophicated and suitable 
estimators for publication bias.  
Fifthly, all further robustness analyses include our nomothetic-data-
base. However, we see the separate analysis of the idiographic data also 
as a robustness analysis from the nomothetic-data-base point of view. 
Hence, one type of robustness analysis is the comparison of our 
idiographic and our nomothetic data base (for more information, see 
Kaufmann & Athanasou, 2009). Anyway, a comprehensive robustness 
analysis should urgently be done also with our idiographic data base.  
In summary, the findings lead to the conclusion that humans predict 
a criterion with a moderate judgment achievement. Furthermore, the high 
error-free judgment achievement of persons implies that judgment 
achievement can be better than moderate. However, in line with Brunswik, 
we recommend the comparison of individual data first. As our results imply 
that judgment achievement is different between research areas, we further 
recommend comparing judgment achievement within one research area – 
separated by experience level – then the comparison with the values of 
other research areas (see Shanteau, 2002). Hence, our study clearly 
shows that the LME-based research is widely used in different research 
areas, and that this should be taken into account when studying judgment 
achievement.   
As this data base includes 30 judgment tasks of 370 analysed 
individual sets of data, we added studies using a nomothetic data base, in 
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order to overcome some of the reported limitations of our studies. By 
means of the increase of our data base, the validity of our results is 
checked.  
 
6.2 Nomothetic-based meta-analysis 
Our meta-analysis of the components of correlations of the LME of 
31 studies incorporated 1055 persons in 49 judgment tasks. The major 
finding of our bare-bones meta-analysis is that humans’ ability to judge a 
given criterion is moderate (.40). Our results are also supported by the 
previously discussed results of our idiographic data base and are in line 
with Karelaia and Hogarth’s meta-analysis (2008). 
However, to clarify the results of humans’ ability for JDM, we looked 
at the underlying sources – the components – of judgment achievement. 
First, the moderate ability of humans’ judgment achievement is also 
related to a high consistency of persons across judgment tasks. Second, 
the high environmental predictability shows that the criterion could be well 
judged. Therefore, the moderate ability of humans to judge is also related 
to high environmental predictability. Third, a high value of the error-free 
judgment achievement – the knowledge – of the judge is presented. 
Hence, the judgment achievement could increase from a moderate level of 
.40 to a high level of .69, except in studies applied to psychological 
science. The obtained results also support a good ability of humans’ JDM, 
except for psychological judgments. However, it should be added that the 
results from our idiographic data based are confirmed that there is a great 
variability in our data, especially in the knowledge component. 
 In addition, our psychometric meta-analysis reveals that judgment 
achievement clearly increases because of artefact correction to a high 
level of .55, if we assume a .50 retest-reliability value for our correction. 
Hence, with the exception of psychological science – each research area 
finally reaches a high level. Our analysis also reveals a moderate G 
component in psychology science, in comparison to high values in all 
other areas. In addition, with an artefact-correction, each component 
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clearly increases across research areas as well as between research 
areas.  
Despite the exclusion of some studies, most meta-analyses still 
indicated moderating variables at the across-study level. However, the 
excluded studies are heterogeneous; therefore, no study characteristics 
which influence the components of achievement are revealed. If we 
compare our results with our idiographic data base, we find that the levels 
in business and psychological science are not the same. In business 
science, judgment achievement reaches a high value also in the 
nomothetic data base, without any measurement-error corrections, in 
comparison to the low values in our idiographic data base. The reverse 
pattern is found in psychological science. We would like to mention, 
however, the already introduced limitation of the number of judgment tasks 
in the idiographic data base leading to a reduced generalization of the 
results.  
Consequently, because of our results based on our nomothetic data 
base, our suggested moderating variables, such as experience level within 
research areas, are discussed in more detail in the following. Against our 
expectation we found in both data bases that it is clearly not the case that 
experts judge better than non-experts, if we look at the overall level 
without any separation into research areas.  
However, if we include the difference in areas in our experience 
analysis, then such an analysis clearly reduces the heterogeneity – only in 
business students’ judgment achievements are moderator variables 
indicated. Surprisingly, students in business science clearly reach better 
judgment achievement than experts. This conclusion is also in line with 
our idiographic analysis. Moreover, experts and students in psychology 
science have a low judgment achievement, although, only students reach 
a high knowledge level. Hence, besides the low knowledge level, there 
have to be other factors responsible for the low judgment achievement in 
psychological science. Our results should be taken with caution, however, 
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because the sample in each category is small, which leads also to 
publication bias indications (see below).  
Finally, we want to add, that perhaps the number of used cues 
influences judgment achievement. As can be seen in the scatter plots as 
well as forest plots; each of them includes studies ordered according to 
the number of cues within the experience level in a research area. Our 
plots support the hypotheses that not only the number of cues and the 
research area should be considered, but also the types of cues – if we get 
a quantitative type of cue, for example a temperature measurement (see 
Stewart et al., 1997), or simply a description of the cue, for example a 
video (see Bernieri et al., 1996; Reynolds & Gifford, 2001). It is also 
subject to critique in our study that the cue-intercorrelation is not 
considered because of missing data. Therefore, in the future, we 
recommend that studies using the LME should also report the 
intercorrelation of the cues they use (see also Cooksey, 1996, p. 318). 
Finally, we want to refer to Kaufmann and Athanasou (2009), where a 
detailed illustration of the extreme points of correlation in association with 
the number of cues used in judgment tasks is presented. However, as it is 
the case with the reported data base – the number of judgment tasks in 
each category using only one cue leads to samples too small to answer 
this question satisfactorily. However, at first glance, there is no tendency 
revealed that fewer used cues – as suggested by the Fast and Frugal 
Heuristic Approach (Gigerenzer et al., 1999) – clearly lead to better 
judgment achievement. Further research is needed, however. In addition, 
we want to mention that with the used LME representing the cues in an 
additive way implying that judgment achievement increases with the 
increase of the number of cues. Hence, maybe the equation does not 
represent the environment or the decision maker’s policy with absolute 
accuracy. However, before answering this question satisfactorily (whether 
the number of cues systematically influence judgment achievement) we 
have to consider the mentioned intercorrelation between the cues, the 
type of cues and finally, also the aggregation level of the cues.
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As a highlight, not only the intercorrelation between the cues should 
be considered in the interpretation of our results, but also the introduced 
intercorrelation of the LME components. The high positive correlation 
across research areas between the LME components, except the C 
component, is not confirmed, if we focus on the different research areas 
and experience levels. Hence, the low judgment-achievement value found 
in psychological research – especially of psychological experts – could be 
explained by the negative intercorrelation between judgment achievement 
with task predictability and with consistency. This means that an increase 
in task predictability and in consistency would lead to a decrease of 
judgment achievement. It must be mentioned that such a negative 
intercorrelation between the LME components is not found in 
psychological students’ LME components, although they reach a low 
judgment-achievement level too. Hence, this negative intercorrelation of 
LME components is rather associated with the G components, as students 
get a higher value compared to experts.  
To summarize our meta-analysis, the main interest of this work is to 
clarify whether judgment achievement is stable across different research 
areas, as suggested by the Brunswikian tradition. We conclude that such 
an analysis is in line with the results found by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) 
of an overall moderate judgment achievement. However, we supplement 
this conclusion as to that judgment achievement over all research areas is 
clearly not stable and in judgment achievement, the analysis should be 
done first from an individual perspective, then including studies from the 
same research areas – separated by the experience level – and finally, 
aggregated across judgment tasks considering also the aggregation 
principle as suggested by Wittmann (1985). From our point of view, only 
such a comprehensive analysis would reveal the importance of the 
underlying heterogeneity found in both data bases and consider possible 
aggregation bias. In addition, only such a procedure can in further 
research answer the question satisfactorily (whether the number of cues 
used in judgment tasks actually influences judgment achievement). The 
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observed results support the ability of human estimating and decision-
making, except in the area of psychology. This could be explained by low 
G values and negative LME-component intercorrelation. In addition, 
experts’ judgment achievement is clearly not better than students’ 
judgment achievement – across and within areas. However, students’ 
business judgment achievement still indicates some moderator variables. 
As in this category two studies have no cue information, our hypothesis 
that the number of cues also influences judgment achievement can't be 
checked, hence, this questions is still open.  
Before we focus on the limitations of our studies, we would like to 
mention our different robustness analyses to check our introduced results. 
First, our publication-bias calculations. Although it is recommended 
by meta-analytic research to check the robustness of the results by means 
of publication-bias calculations, we were surprised by the resulting 
heterogeneity of our publication bias estimations. First, our publication 
analysis with Owen’s fail-safe number of 61 indicated no publication bias 
across judgment tasks at first glance. In addition, our publication-bias 
analysis supplemented by the trim-and-fill method does not completely 
support the robustness of our results. However, we would like to mention 
that the underlying data base was heterogeneous, also leading to 
problems in such an analysis. Hence, Rothstein (2008, p. 78) concludes: 
“…be cautioned, that the effects of publication bias can be hard to 
disentangle from other sources of heterogeneity…”, and we also consider 
this in our data interpretation, as our data base is heterogeneous as well. 
In addition, in association with our publication-bias estimations we would 
like to mention that this calculation is normally only applied to bare-bones 
meta-analyses. We are not aware of any psychometric meta-analysis 
using publication-bias analysis supplemented by the trim-and-fill method 
and would also like to highlight the novelty of the research areas on 
publication bias leading to appropriate estimates in the future and 
recommend to take our analysis with caution, especially the results in 
business and educational science.  
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Secondly, as introduced, we use a random-effect model, although 
most meta-analysts use fixed-effects models. However, our sensitivity 
analysis represents that such a model leads to a conservative estimation.  
Thirdly, in our robustness analysis we checked the different 
weighting strategies used. In our idiographic-data based meta-analysis we 
used the number of profiles used in every task as a weighting factor. On 
the other hand, in our nomothetic-data based meta-analysis we used the 
number of judges as a weighting factor. After our robustness analysis we 
conclude that the weighting strategy used with our idiographic-data based 
meta-analysis leads to more indications of moderator factors in 
comparison to the weighting strategy used with our nomothetic data base. 
However, as the estimated average judgment achievement is the same, 
we use the strategy also recommended by Hunter and Schmidt (2004) and 
weight only the number of judges. Moreover, a profile-weighting strategy 
leads also to an exclusion of studies in which the number of judges’ 
profiles is unknown – such as was the case with the study by Reynolds 
and Gifford (2001). Hence, such a strategy would limit the generalization 
of our results.  
Fourthly, we assume that the study characteristic type of correlation 
(pearson vs. non-pearson correlation) does not consistently influence the 
LME components, as shown in our previous analysis (see Kaufmann & 
Athanasou, 2009). 
To summarize, our meta-analysis based on the nomothetic data 
base has to be seen as a rather conservative estimation by our robustness 
analysis, first in relation to other reviews in the field, as we used a random-
effect model. Secondly, also in comparison to our idiographic-data based 
analysis, in which we used another weighting strategy. Finally, as 
introduced in our discussion on the idiographic-data based analysis, also 
in the nomothetic data base analysis our artefact correction is rather 
conservative, as we did not correct any objective criterions.  
So, if we compare the idiographic and the nomothetic data base, 
first from a bare-bones meta-analysis point of view – it's visible that not the 
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same pattern is found of differences in research areas. Hence, we want to 
mention that in our idiographic-based data only 30 different tasks 
representing only a small sample of judgment tasks are included, and 
therefore these results should be taken with caution. On the other hand, 
the introduced great variation found in our idiographic database is visible 
in our scatter plots and confirmed by our conservative estimation based on 
the nomothetic data base.  
In this study, every effort was undertaken to conduct an extensive 
analysis of the literature and to obtain reliable and valid findings that would 
aid enhancement and enrichment of judgment achievement in the 
framework of SJT. However, as with most research, there are some 
limitations to consider in the interpretation of the results found in this 
dissertation, which are presented next. The major points – exclusion 
criteria, missing data, diagnostic vs. prognostic tasks, lack of task 
independency, LME critiques, and vicarious functioning concept – are 
discussed in the following. More information is taken from Kaufmann and 
Athanasou (2009). In addition, the following critique points are 
supplemented by research recommendations which overcome the 
presented limitations of our study.  
First, our exclusion criteria can be criticised, because we only 
considered achievement studies – feedback and learning studies were 
excluded. We see this selection as an advantage, as this represents daily 
judgments. Normally, we seldom get any feedback, which is the basis for 
learning. For example, in a hospital, physicians rarely get feedback about 
their decisions (see Katsikopoulos et al., 2008). Hence, our studies also 
represent realistic situations than is perhaps the case with feedback or 
learning studies. However, in a further analysis, the control group used in 
feedback and learning studies could be included and compared to 
increase the generalization of our results. Furthermore, a partial inclusion 
leading to a comparison would be interesting from the point of view, to 
exclude that any judgment achievement differences are already introduced 
by the study type as feedback, learning or achievement study. In addition, 
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Karelaia’s and Hogarth’s work (2008) should be considered 
complementary to ours, as they completely included feedback as well as 
learning studies.  
In addition, it should be mentioned that we excluded one study 
which used a dynamic situation (see Kirlik, 2006). This decision to only 
analyses studies which use a statistic situation was made to reduce 
possible variance caused by differences between dynamic and stable 
decision-making situations. However, if we compare these studies – with 
our judgment achievement values found in Figure 9 it becomes clear that 
this study reaches even higher judgment-achievement values, as in Kirlik’s 
study the overall judgment achievement is .96, comparable to the values 
found in meteorology studies (Stewart, 1997). “Additionally, probability 
95% of all the research in research in JDM is based on static tasks” (see 
Hammond, 2007, p. 238). Therefore, before an analysis like ours can 
conducted on dynamic situations, it is necessary to have more studies on 
these subjects to answer the research question, whether dynamic tasks 
are actually responsible for an increase in judgment achievement. This 
would be in line with Brunswik and call for representative design, in the 
meaning not to use questionnaires and change only single cues, leading 
to a new judgment situation which is quite unnatural of our daily life 
judgments. Generally, we suggest to transform the LME analysis from 
experimental studies to “naturalistic” studies, such as Kirliks’ study (2006). 
In line with this suggestion, we want to add that most of the used LME 
studies in our meta-analysis are so-called univariate Lens Models, with 
exception of the study by Cooksey et al. (1986). However, the 
multivariable Lens Model is a better representation of a real-world decision 
maker.  
Finally, we excluded studies aggregating their data across cues, 
such as Wittmann’s (1985). In such an aggregation procedure, the 
individual variation is not eliminated. So, these studies imply an even 
greater individual heterogeneity than found in our studies. However, such 
studies would be ideal for inclusion in a further analysis and to focus on 
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the differences between the aggregation procedures used in the studies 
(Wittmann, 1988). By how much would this type of aggregation study 
actually increase the heterogeneity in our data? Such an increase would 
even enforce individual differences in judgment achievement. 
Secondly, a further limitation of our studies is that of missing data 
for a comprehensive analysis. Hence, we did not correct educational, 
psychological or other research areas for measurement errors with 
reported retest-reliability values, but used a theoretical estimation to check 
the robustness of the data. One can criticize our analysis in that the 
differences are introduced by our retest-reliability corrections. However, 
we want to emphasize that this is clearly not the case, because also our 
bare-bones meta-analysis already implies area differences. Finally, such a 
theoretical estimation of possible measurement errors is also 
advantageous in that our analysis is not bordered by the type of reliability 
values (e.g. consistency reliability, retest-reliability), as different reliability 
types also lead to different values. In addition, when regression models 
were estimated, bias-adjusted R2 is well-established in linear regression 
models. Without such an adjustment, the correlation values could be 
overestimated. However, whether researchers used adjusted R2 is not 
clearly visible from the studies, with some exceptions, such as Stewart 
(1990, 1997). Hence, we assume that the author used the adjusted R2 
calculations. Anyway, we calculated the bias-adjusted R2 and rerun the 
overall meta-analysis (see Appendix I). 
Thirdly, a further limitation of our analysis worth mentioning is that 
Wiggins (1973) differentiated prognostics and diagnostics tasks. We, 
however, did not focus on this aspect, but recommend including it in 
further analyses. Our hypothesis is that diagnosis reaches a better 
judgment achievement than prognosis, as this type of task also includes 
diagnoses (see Katsikopoulos et al., 2008), and a time constant has to be 
considered. Hence, this task type is more complex than diagnose tasks. 
Further research on this aspect is urgently needed to clarify the suggested 
hypothesis.  
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Fourthly, a further limitation in our research is that our analyses 
were affected by a lack of independence between correlations of judgment 
tasks in the same study (see Table 4). However, as this separation is often 
also made by the authors (e.g. Gorman et al., 1978; Stewart, 1997), we 
see this also in line with their research goal to find out the differences 
between judgment tasks. Had we not used such a strategy, it wouldn't 
have been possible to find out whether judgment achievement as in the 
study by Stewart (1997) is based on the number of cues or other task 
characteristics. Hence, we used the smallest unit of task to have as 
precise an analysis as possible to find the underlying judgment task 
characteristics maybe influencing the LME components.  
Fifthly, our analysis neglected LME critiques, as it is often criticized 
the overfit of the linear regression used application. Overfitting is the case 
when too many informations are included in the models against the used 
number of informations by the judge. Hence, regression application also 
includes noise or simply too many free parameters – or irrelevant 
information for the judge. During the last decade, the Bayesian paradigm 
was used to control overfitting. This approach developed robust estimates 
of both environment and parameters, such as cues in our examples (for 
details, see Martignon & Hoffrage, 1999). Hence, a further Bayes theorem 
correction of our correlation values would be a proper estimation of our 
values (see Stewart, 1990). Consequently, in further analysis this fact 
should be included and added. If it is not possible to receive such values 
from literature, theoretical estimations could be used. Consequently, our 
results have to be interpreted with caution.  
Sixthly, it must be mentioned that we only considered the 
achievement concept and neglected the underlying vicarious-functioning 
concept, because the LME does not detect the use of vicarious functioning 
by subject, nor does it measure the contribution of vicarious functioning to 
achievement. Hence, this work emphasizes that such research should 
urgently be done (for an example see Scholz & Tietje, 2002), because 
                                    
   163 
individuals adjust to the environment under so many different and 
changing circumstances. 
Despite the mentioned limitations of our studies, our results achieve 
more transparency of judgment achievement and thus give researchers in 
this area a reference for their results. In addition, they get a better 
understanding of the sources of differences in JDM by means of the 
presentation of the components of the LME dependent on judgment tasks. 
This information also helps to identify task characteristics (e.g. number of 
cues) that may influence judgment achievement. Finally, our idiographic 
as well as nomothetic results enables the comparison of results with our 
meta-analysis in more detail. This is fruitful, as researchers in the 
psychological field can now get a comprehensive overview and realise the 
uniqueness of their results and follow our recommendation to focus on the 
G value in their research. Additional suggestions for further research are 
given in the following.  
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In the previous discussion we already introduced some research ideas. 
Besides these we emphasize in the following that further research should 
reveal why judgment achievement in meteorology studies is so high in 
comparison to psychological studies, implying research differences in 
judgment achievement. 
First of all, we see the Hunter and Schmidt approach as a fruitful 
research tool in relation to classical statistical tests for further research on 
estimating judgment achievement. Hence, we would like to emphasize the 
following argumentations: 
1) Compared to commonly used, classical statistical tests, the Hunter 
and Schmidt method uses random-effects instead of fixed-model 
models (see chapter 5.2.4.1).  
2) Furthermore, although current statistic methods realise the 
importance of measurement error as longitudinal studies, none of 
them realise that there are other important artefacts, which should 
be considered as well (see chapter 4.4.4). 
3) Finally, although the power of studies is discussed today (see 
Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989), Hunter and Schmidt already 
recognized that in meta-analysis research we have to be careful 
and look for other tools than significant tests (see chapter 4.5.1.1) 
to evaluate research (see Hunter & Schmidt, 2004, p. 8).  
These three points clearly show Hunter and Schmidt’s advanced 
thinking in statistics and their search for research tools to overcome the 
weaknesses of classical statistics. Furthermore, their permanent search 
for better research tools made this meta-analysis approach a useful tool 
for the future for both types of data base – idiographic and nomothetic.  
The Hunter and Schmidt approach is still in development, and so 
this meta-analytic method has not yet reached an end stage of 
development. Hunter and Schmidt (2004) pointed out: 
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All quantitative estimates are approximations. Even if these 
estimates are quite accurate, it is always desirable to make them 
more accurate, if possible. (p. 168) 
Hence, our analysis could practically also support further correction 
in the direction of using the successful symmetry concept with the method 
of Hunter and Schmidt for a further artefact correction (Wittmann, 1988). 
As this concept is already being successfully applied in research, we see it 
as a supplement of the introduction to the Hunter and Schmidt meta-
analytic method, so that further work will also be in line with Hunter and 
Schmidt’s permanent intention to improve the approach. Hence, we could 
check whether high values found in meteorology in comparison to the low 
values in psychology are due to the asymmetry between the aggregated 
criterion and judgments (see Wittmann, 1985). In addition, according to 
Hammond (2007), we judge an objective criterion more accurately than a 
subjective one. However, our results that psychological judgments – 
mostly evaluated against subjective criteria are less accurate than 
meteorological judgments-evaluated against objective criteria support this 
hypothesis at first glance. Also education science used subjective criteria 
for their evaluation, but reaches a high judgment achievement level. 
Hence, this hypothesis clearly needs more research.   
Beside this, many further questions arise, such as: Do the 
components of correlations of the LME vary systematically with 
demographical data of the judges (e.g. gender, age)? Or can the persons 
included in this meta-analysis be categorized according to their 
components of the LME? Do special judgment or task types exist? 
Furthermore, the studies could also be described in relation to the 
introduced CCT (see Hammond, 2000) to emphasise the value of the 
extern validity in LME studies – however, the internal validity is totally 
ignored in our analysis. Therefore, in a further meta-analysis, studies from 
Box 2, 3 (see Figure 2) should be included and compared to each other. 
As introduced, with the LME component it is also possible to 
calculate the success of expert models. According to Wiggins (1973), this 
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data base for expert modeling is his first suggested rule of thumbs for 
expert modeling: When criterion information exists, collect it and use it to 
construct statistical models of data combination (p. 220). Hence, such an 
analysis is highly recommended. The backgrounds for expert models are 
that they are superior to human judgment (Camerer, 1981; Grove et al., 
2000), except in a “broken leg cue” situation. A “broken leg cue” situation 
resembles a situation in which a condition is changed so quickly that a 
constructed model can't react to it. But human beings are capable of 
adapting to the new environmental situation quite fast. In addition, Karelaia 
and Hogarth (2008) concluded that: High heterogeneity … further 
highlights the importance of identifying the task and judge characteristics 
that favour bootstrapping (p. 419). In addition, our analysis reveals also 
high variability underlying all LME components, so the question arises, 
whether a pattern could be found in the way that there are tasks in which 
expert models are useful or not. Especially in psychological science (or 
prediction of violence, see also Aegisdottir et al., 2006, p. 368) the 
success of expert models would be useful to overcome the low judgment-
achievement level found in our study. Therefore, we are looking forward to 
the first meta-analysis according to Hunter-Schmidt (2004), considering in 
more detail expert models in the same way as the already done analysis 
based on idiographic and nomothetic data (see Appendix J, Kaufmann, 
Sjödahl, Athanasou & Wittmann, 2009). The nomothetic analysis could 
also directly be comparable with the study by Armstrong (2001) implying 
area differences in expert models applications. 
However, an alternative to cognitive modelling to the regression 
approach is the Fast and Frugal Heuristic Approach. There are numerous 
articles comparing both approaches and leading to the superiority of the 
Fast and Frugal Heuristic Approach (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Smith & 
Gilhooly, 2006). On the other hand, there are several critics referring to the 
fact that we neglected the assumption for a regression analysis in the Fast 
and Frugal Heuristic Approach, therefore this approach is superior. 
However, we showed that with our conservative artefact-corrected 
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estimation that accuracy clearly increases. Hence, our analysis perhaps 
supports the superiority of the regression approach in comparison with the 
Fast and Frugal Heuristic Approach in some judgment tasks. However, 
there are no studies available at the moment comparing directly artefact-
corrected judgment accuracy with the judgment achievement in the LME 
approach with the Fast and Frugal Heuristic Approach using an array of 
judgment tasks – ideally such research should be done with the suggested 
research design by Wittmann (1985) based on the Catell-boxes, using 
several single persons, tasks, and criterions (see Wittmann & Klumb, 
2004). We would like to highlight that the use of real tasks – the 
ambulatory assessment approach (Fahrenberg, 2006) – could be an ideal 
approach for such research. This research would be a 2000 version of 
Brunswik’s research on perception constancy in Berkley.  
With the same type of research, also critique to the Lens Model 
research can be overcome. For example, Kirlik (2006) criticised the lens 
model, and therefore also the LME research as follows: 
One deficiency of the traditional lens model is that it portrays a view 
of the organism without any control over the environmental 
structure to which it must adapt. This is because there are no 
resources within that model to describe how an organism might use 
action to adapt the environment given its own needs and capacities 
for actions. (p. 214) 
In line with this critique further research should also consider the 
aspect of action by including judgment achievement studies. Hence, not 
only is the adaptation to the environment also the adaptation of the 
environment, such as actions necessary to enhance our knowledge about 
internal cognition. For example, if you look around where you are at the 
moment, you will perhaps see some post-it messages like, tomorrow 
library, deadline of submission, today valentine’s day. As you can see, you 
also adapt the environment, in that you would forget all these things if you 
haven't written them down.  
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In summary, although our study reveals some limitations and leads 
to suggestions for further research, the motivation for this work, which 
could also inspire further researcher is based on the following statement 
by Hammond (1996): 
I came to the conclusion after his [Brunswik] suicide that the best 
strategy was not to present and argue for the entire Brunswik 
approach, but to carry out empirical research on specific topics that 
at least some psychologists (and graduate students) would find 
interesting. In short, small deeds would have to speak louder than 
provocative words. So I took pieces of Brunswikian theory and 
method and went to work with these, … (p. 245) 
 In line with this statement, we hope that the presented work is one 
step in the direction to critically evaluate Brunswik’s suggested theory and 
method with empirical facts and to reinspire an academic discussion about 
Brunswik’s work and his value for the future of psychology research, 
mostly for a fruitful methodological approach in cognitive psychology.  
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APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
C  Consistency component of the LME 
CCT  Cognitive Continuum Theory 
DL  DerSimonian and Laird estimator (1986) 
FM  Fixed-effect models 
G  Linear knowledge component of the LME 
JDM   Judgment and Decision Making 
LME    Lens Model Equation 
nr  Study number according to Tables 5 and 6 
r0  Type of correlation is unknown 
ra  Judgment achievement 
Re  Environmental predictability component of the LME 
Rs  Consistency component of the LME 
RM  Random-effect models 
rr  Retest-reliability value 
SJT  Social Judgment Theory 
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B: Table 3  
Results (hits and date) of our literature search in German in the data base 
Wiso-Net 
 
 
 
Search engine 
  
Wiso-Net 
 
Keywords 
 
hits/date 
 
Soziale Urteilstheorie 
 
0/08.08.08 
Linsen-Modell Gleichung 4/11.08.08 
Linsen Model 28/11.08.08 
Linsen Modell 224/11.08.08 
Urteilsleistung 0/11.08.08 
Linsen Modell Analyse 37/11.08.08 
Idiographischer Ansatz 1/11.08.08 
Urteilsgenauigkeit 2/11.08.08 
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APPENDIX C: LME COMPONENT CALCULATION 
 
 
The G component in the LME (see Equation C: 1): 
 
 
(C: 1) 
 
 
 
The C component in the LME (see Equation C: 2): 
 
 
(C: 2) 
 
        
 
The Rs component in the LME (see Equation C: 3): 
 
 
 
(C: 3) 
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APPENDIX D: COMPARISON WITH THE META-ANALYSIS BY 
KARELAIA AND HOGARTH (2008) 
 
In the following Table D: 1, reasons for exclusion of studies in our 
meta-analysis are specified.  
 
D: Table 1  
Reasons for the exclusion of studies in our meta-analysis 
 
Study 
 
Reason for exclusion 
 
Grebstein (1963) 
Todd (1954) 
 
Study published before 1964  
 
Brisantz & Pritchett (2003) 
 
N-system lens model (see chapter 2.4.1) 
 
Kirlik (2006) 
 
Dynamic judgment task 
 
Cooksey, Freebody, & Wyatt-Smith (2007) 
 
Agreement between two policy capture 
models 
 
Stewart, Middleton, Downton, & Ely (1984) 
Wittmann (1985) 
 
Aggregation across cues 
Cooksey, Freebody, & Bennett, 1990 
 
Repeated tasks after one week  
Dalgleish (1988) 
Hirst & Luckett (1992) 
O'Connor, Remus, & Lim (2005) 
Feedback study  
 
Doherty, Ebert, & Callender (1986) 
 
Police capturing study 
(see chapter 2.4.1) 
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D: Table 2  
A study list and the explanations for different coding in our data base in 
comparison to Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) 
 
nr 
 
Study 
 
Explanation for the different coding in our data base: 
12 Wright (1979) 
 
In contrast to Karelaia and Hogarth, we didn't 
separate our studies into two groups of persons, as 
there are the same number of profiles, and the 
number of cues and also the component Re are the 
same.  
 
13 Harvey & Harries 
(2004) 
This experiment showed that judges’ ability to 
combine forecasts that they receive from more 
knowledgeable advisors is impaired when they have 
previously made their own forecasts for the same 
outcomes. We used only the baseline. 
 
15 Cooksey, Freebody, & 
Davidson (1986) 
As there are two criterions available, and relating to 
them the LME values, we coded these studies with 
two tasks, reading comprehension and word 
knowledge, instead of only one task as suggested by 
Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) (Univariate instead of 
multivariate Lens Model). 
 
22 Gorman, Clover, & 
Doherty (1978) 
As the authors described the lens-model components 
for the interview and the paper-people treatment and 
mention these as two experimental treatments, this 
represents two types of tasks for us. Also, the number 
of profiles varies. 
 
27 Stewart, Roebber, & 
Bosart (1997)a 
We separated this study into four tasks, as there are 
different numbers of cues, different numbers of 
profiles, as well as different time and weather 
forecasts. Each task also has different Re values. 
Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) included them as one 
task. 
Note. nr = study number according to Table 5 and 6.  
ais coded as learning study by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008).
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To summarize, five studies of the 19 overlapping studies are 
included with difference in separating in judgment task (see D: Table 1) 
leading to 14 studies. Hence, differences in the data-base of the remaining 
14 studies are presented in the following. However, first, we will compare 
four study characteristics (see Table D: 2), then the LME components (see 
Tables D: 3, 4).  
 
D: Table 3  
Study-characteristics agreement with the data-base by Karelaia and 
Hogarth (2008)  
 
 
nr 
 
 
Study 
 
Number 
of judges 
 
Number of 
judgments 
 
Number 
of cues 
 
Expertise 
level 
      
2 Levi (1989) = = = = 
3 LaDuca et al. (1988) = = = = 
4 Smith et al. (2003) = = = = 
7 Ashton (1982) = = = = 
8 Roose & Doherty (1976) = = 66(64/5) = 
11 Mear & Firth (1987) = = 12(10) = 
12 Wright (1979) = = = a 
13 Harvey & Harries (2004) = = b = 
15 Cooksey et al. (1986) = = = = 
16 Wiggins & Kohen (1971) = 90(110)c = = 
17 Athanasou & Cooksey (2001) = = = = 
18 Szucko & Kleinmutz (1981) = = 10(3, 4) = 
19 Cooper & Werner (1990) 10, 11 
(18)d 
= = = 
20 Werner et al. (1989) = = = = 
21 Werner et al. (1983) = = = = 
22 Gorman et al. (1978) = 57(75) = e 
27 Stewart et al. (1997) = = = f 
28 Steinman & Doherty (1972) = = = = 
29 MacGregor & Slovic (1986) = = = = 
Note. nr = study number according to Table 5 and 6. = data agreement, if the data does not agree, the Karelaia 
and Hogarth (2008) value is reported and supplemented by our value in parentheses.  
avalue can not be compared, because the study was separated into two groups by Karelaia and Hogarth (2008).  
bit was not available.  
cWe used 110 profiles, like Armstrong (2001), in contrast to Karelaia and Hogarth (2008).  
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dKarelaia and Hogarth (2008) separated their data set in two groups (10 psychologists, 11 case managers). In 
our study, only the evaluation of nine psychologists and nine case managers were included, as footnotes 
mention that “one psychologist and two case managers consistently labelled every case as not violent. 
Consequently, these judges were dropped from within-judge correlation analyses involving predictive accuracy 
and components of the lens model” (Cooper & Werner, 1990, p. 445). 
eKarelaia and Hogarth (2008) coded the experience level with training experience, hence, it is not directly 
comparable, as we didn't include such a category.  
fWe coded this study differently, separating students and experts, in contrast to Karelaia and Hogarth (2008), 
labelling all participants as experts. 
 
To summarize: the 19 overlapping studies, showing a 92% 
agreement relating to study characteristics. However, 6 studies can’t be 
compared in relation to LME (see Table 2, plus the study by Cooper & 
Werner, 1990). Hence, in the following, the 13 studies are compared in 
relation to the LME components.  In seven studies, or 50% of the studies, 
no differences relating to the LME components were found (see D: Table 
4). The six studies with differences in LME components are reported in D: 
Table 5. 
 
D: Table 4  
The seven studies with no differences in the LME components  
 
nr 
 
Study 
2 Levi (1989) 
4 Smith (2003) 
8 Roose & Doherty (1976) 
11 Mear & Firth (1987) 
16 Wiggins & Kohen (1971) 
20 Werner et al. (1989) 
21 Werner et al. (1983) 
Note. nr = Study number according to Table 5 and 6. 
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D: Table 5  
The six studies with differences in the LME components  
 
nr 
 
Study 
 
ra 
 
G 
 
Rs 
 
Re 
 
C 
 
3 
 
LaDuca et al. (1988) 
 
.66 
 (.61)z  
 
.84 
 (.74)z 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
7 Ashton (1982) .77  
(.75)z 
.91 
(.86)z 
= = = 
17 Athanasou & Cooksey 
(2001) 
= .47  
 (.44)z 
.83  
(.75)z 
= = 
18 Szucko & Kleinmuntz 
(1981) 
 
= .36 
 (.32)z 
= = = 
28 Steinman & Doherty 
(1972) 
.68 
(.65) 
.95 
(.85)z 
= = = 
29 MacGregor & Slovic 
(1986) 
= = = = = 
Note. nr =  Study number according to Table 5 and 6. = data agreement, if the data does not agree, 
 the Karelaia and Hogarth (2008) value is reported and supplemented by our value in parentheses. 
 zDifferences due to the not applied z-transformation in our study. 
 
 
 
To summarize, if we compare our data (see D: Table 4 and 5), we 
have an agreement of 88%.  
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APPENDIX E: PSYCHOMETRIC META-ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO 
HUNTER AND SCHMIDT (2004) 
 
Cumulating artefacts corrections in a psychometric meta-analysis 
 
1) Cumulating artefacts  
 
As already introduced, artefacts information was collected. In this 
step, each available artefact was considered separately (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2005, p. 151). 
First, the mean and the standard deviation of the corresponding 
attenuation factor was computed for each mentioned artefact (see chapter 
4.5.2.3). Then, the available attenuation factors (e.g. Ave (aj), Ave(bj), see 
Equation E: 1) were combined by multiplication. An attenuation factor ( A  
(Aj)) is the result. 
 
 
 
A (Aj) = Ave(ai)*Ave(bj)*Ave(cj)….etc.     (E: 1) 
 
 
 
2) Correction of the mean correlation 
 
In this second step, the fully corrected mean correlation (R ) is the 
corrected mean correlation in a bare-bones meta-analysis ( r , see 
Equation 2) is divided by the attenuation factor, as can be see in the 
following Equation E: 2:  
  
R = Ave(ρ) = 
A
r                 (E: 2) 
  
 
3) Correcting the standard deviation of correlations 
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In the third step, we estimated the variance in the corrected 
correlation due to artefact variance. Therefore, we computed the sum of 
the squared coefficient of variation (V) across the attenuation factors (see 
Equation E: 3): 
 
...+
)(
)(
+
)(
)(
= 2
2
2
2
bAve
bSD
aAve
aSD
V       (E: 3) 
 
 
Furthermore, we estimated the variance (S) in corrected study 
correlations, accounted for by variation in artefacts as a product (see 
Equation E: 4). 
 
 
VARS 222 =         (E: 4) 
 
 
Finally, the unexplained residual variance ( 21S ) in the corrected 
study correlation was calculated (see Equation E: 5): 
 
 
222
1 = SRS   -        (E: 5) 
 
 
Consequently, the fully corrected variance (Var(ρj)) is (see Equation 
E: 6):  
 
Var(ρj) = 2
22
1
A
SS
      (E: 6) 
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It is important to note that in the following psychometric procedures 
the estimation of credibility intervals, the 75% rule, and finally, the 
detection of moderator variables is the same as in a bare-bones meta-
analysis, consequently the same steps as already reported are used. 
 
In the following Table E: 1 represents the introduced correction of 
dichotomized variables according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, see also 
chapter 4.5.2.3.2). 
 
E: Table 1  
The correlations corrected for dichotomizing 
 
                              Corrected correlation 
                             (Correlation according to Szucko & Kleinmuntz, 1981) 
  
Components 
Judge ra G Rs Re C 
1 .02(.02) -.20(-.17) .56(.47) .62(.52) .11(.09) 
2 .28(.23) .20(.17) .53(.44) .62(.52) .30(.25) 
3 .52(.43) .70(.58) .59(.49) .62(.52) .44(.37) 
4 .32(.27) .22(.18) .66(.55) .62(.52) .37(.31) 
5 .40(.33) .41(.49) .61(.51) .62(.52) .36(.30) 
6 .10(.08) .91(.76) .44(.37) .62(.52) -.10(-.08) 
 
Overall 
 
.28(.23) 
 
.38(.32) 
 
.56(.47) 
 
.62(.52) 
 
.25(.21) 
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APPENDIX F: RESULTS OF OUR IDIOGRAPHIC-BASED                  
META-ANALYSIS 
 
F: Table 1  
Judgment achievement separated into low, medium, and high level –
reported by number and percent  
   
Judgment achievement: N (%) 
 
Research area 
 
Low (>.29) 
 
Medium (>.49) 
 
High (<.49) 
 Medical science 60 (63) 13 (13) 22 (23) 
 Business science 17 (42) 5 (13)a 18 (45) 
 Educational science 9 (15) 9 (15) 40 (69) 
 Psychological science 35 (61) 16 (28) 6 (11) 
 Miscellaneous 59 (49) 26 (21) 35 (30) 
 
Overall 
 
180 (49) 
 
69 (17) 
 
121 (33) 
 
Experts (210) 
 
96 (46) 
 
28 (13) 
 
86 (41) 
Non-experts (160) 84 (52) 41 (26) 35 (22) 
    Note. % = is rounded. aonly students included
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Medical science (experts)
Business science (experts)
Business science (students) 
Educational science (experts)
Educational science (students)
Psychological science (experts)
Psychological science (students)
Miscellaneous research areas (experts)
Miscellaneous research areas (students)
Averaged mean
80% Credibility Interval
 
 
Legend 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F: Figure 1. The scatter plot of the non-linear knowledge component (C) in 
the 365 analyzed judgments in 29 different tasks, separated into the 
applied research areas. The 29 different tasks are in the same order as 
listed in Table 5 and 6.  
 
 
 
 
Study with the highest number of cues (Roose & Doherty, 1976) 
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F: Table 2  
Experts’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas  
 
Components in: 
 
Components 
Medical science ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .85** .14 .79** .47** 
G .85** -- .22* .60** .16 
Rs .14 .22* -- .14 -.08 
Re .79** .60** .14 -- .31** 
C .47** .16 -.08 .31** -- 
Business science      
ra -- .96** .64** .96** .11 
G .96** -- .49** .95** .11 
Rs .64** .49** -- .56** -.12 
Re .96** .95** .56** -- .11 
C .11 .11 -.12 .11  
Education science      
ra -- .47** .49** .24 .24 
G .47** -- -.16 -.44** .00 
Rs .49** -.16 -- .23 -.35* 
Re .24 -.44** .23 -- -.15 
C .24 .00 -.35* -.15 -- 
Psychology science      
ra -- .36 .55 -.20 .87* 
G .36 -- -.41 a -.14 
Rs .55 -.41 -- a .81 
Re -.20 a a -- a 
C .87* -.14 .81 a -- 
Miscellaneous      
ra -- .72** .89** .99** .87** 
G .72** -- .79** .65** .60* 
Rs .89** .79** -- .83** .87** 
Re .99** .65** .83** -- .81** 
C .87** .60* .87** .81** -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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F: Table 3 
Students’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas  
 
Components in: 
 
Components 
Business science ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .33 -.24 a .27 
G .33 -- -.56 a -.82 
Re -.24 -.56 a a .38 
Rs a a -- -- a 
C .27 -.82 .38 a -- 
Education science      
ra -- .94** .64** a .00 
G .94** -- .50* a -.18 
Rs .64** .50* -- a -.28 
Re a a a -- a 
C .00 -.18 -.28 a -- 
Psychology science      
ra -- .46** .19 .17 .26 
G .46** -- .42** -.67 -.30* 
Rs .19 .42** -- -.43** -.45 
Re .17 -.67 -.43** -- .44** 
C .26 -.30* -.45** .44** -- 
Miscellaneous      
ra -- .93** .64** -.50** .61** 
G .93** -- .45** -.48** .47** 
Rs .64** .45** -- -.35** .34** 
Re -.50** -.48** -.35** -- -.30** 
C .61** .47** .34** -.30** -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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APPENDIX G: RESULTS OF OUR NOMOTHETIC-BASED  
META-ANALYSIS 
G: Table 1 
Bare-bones meta-analysis according to the method of Hunter-Schmidt 
(2004) supplemented by a trim-and-fill analysis of the nonlinear knowledge 
component (C), separated into research area and experience level  
 
Research 
area 
 
 
k 
 
 
N 
 
 
C 
 
 
varCorr 
 
 
80% CI 
 
 
75% 
Medicine 10 258 .19 .00 .19 .19 268.01 
Business 8/10 215/221 .07/.06 .00/.00 .07/.06 .07/.06 1201.17/1285.76 
Education 4 156 .02 .00 .02 .02 3999.13 
Psychology 9/13 105/141 .00/-.04 .00/.00 .00/-.04 .00/-.04 959.64/769.29 
Miscellaneous 12/16 249/287 .04/.00 .00/.00 .04/.00 .04/.00 361.89/260.87 
Overall 43/51 983/1075 .08/.04 .00/.00 .08/.04 .08/.04 339.51/221.19 
 
Experts in: 
       
Business 6 116 .08/.08 .00/.00 .08/.08 .08/.08 1216.97/1216.97 
Education 2 40 .02 .00 .02 .02 124434 
Psychology 4/6 59/70 -.04/-.06 .00/.00 -.04/-.06 -.04/-.06 628.52/601.52 
Miscellaneous 5/6 15/23 .22/.08 .00/.00 .22/.08 .22/.08 2872.94/869.40 
Overalla 27/28 488/554 .12/.07 .00/.00 .12/.07 .12/.07 378.19/219.50 
 
Students in: 
       
Business 2 99 .05 .00 .05 .05 1677.99 
Education 2 116 .02 .00 .02 .02 1677.89 
Psychology 5/7 46/62 .04/.06 .00/.00 .04/.06 .04/.06 3314.43/4019.04 
Miscellaneous 11 234 .03/-.03 .00/.00 .03/-.03 .03/-.03 506.97/248.42 
Overall 20 495 .03/.00 .00/.00 .03/.00 .03/.00 710.93/322.24 
Note. k = number of correlations (i.e. judgment tasks). N = total sample size for all judgment tasks combined. C 
= weighted mean correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). varcorr = corrected variation according to 
Hunter and Schmidt (2004, variance of true score correlation). 80% CI = 80% credibility interval for true score 
correlation distribution. 75% = Percentage variance of observed correlations due to all artefacts, if below 75%, it 
indicates moderator variable. athis analysis includes medical experts. /Results of the trim-and-fill analyses after 
a publication bias is indicated. 
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G: Table 3 
Experts’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas  
 
Components in: 
 
Components 
Business science ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .95** .27 .96** .39 
G .95** -- .24 .90* .65 
Rs .27 .24 -- .34 -.25 
Re .96** .90* .34 -- .34 
C .39 .65 -.25 .34 -- 
Education science      
ra -- -1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 1.00** 
G  -1.00** -- -1.00** -1.00** -1.00** 
Rs 1.00** -1.00** -- 1.00** 1.00** 
Re 1.00** -1.00** 1.00** -- 1.00** 
C 1.00** -1.00** 1.00** 1.00** -- 
Psychology science      
ra -- .99* -.91 -.78 .68 
G .99* -- -.88 -.72 .56 
Rs -.91 -.88 -- .96* -.83 
Re -.78 -.72 .96* -- -.93 
C .68 .56 -.83 -.93 -- 
Miscellaneous      
ra -- .89* .88* .99** .94* 
G .89* -- .99 .82 .94* 
Rs .88** .99** -- .81 .95* 
Re .99** .82 .81 -- .90* 
C .94* .94* .95* .90* -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
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G: Table 4 
Students’ intercorrelation of the LME components in the different areas  
 
Components in: 
 
Components 
Business science ra G Rs Re C 
ra -- .97 .92 1.00* 1.00** 
G .97 -- .99 .94 -1.00** 
Rs .92 .99 -- .89 -.100** 
Re 1.00* .94 .89 -- 1.00** 
C 1.00** -1.00** -1.00** 1.00** -- 
Education science      
ra -- 1.00** -1.00** -1.00** -1.00** 
G 1.00** -- -1.00** -1.00** -1.00** 
Rs -1.00** -1.00** -- 1.00** 1.00** 
Re -1.00** -1.00** 1.00** -- 1.00** 
C -1.00** -1.00** 1.00** 1.00** -- 
Psychology science      
ra -- -.07 1.00** .14 -.13 
G -.07 -- -.07 .86 -.94* 
Rs 1.00** -.07 -- .14 -.13 
Re .14 .86 .14 -- -.85 
C -.13 -.94* -.13 -.85 -- 
Miscellaneous      
ra -- .81** .94** .22 .26 
G .81** -- .72* -.24 -.24 
Rs .94** .72* -- .03 .38 
Re .21 -.24 .03 -- .53 
C .26 -.24 .38 .53 -- 
Note.  ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailes). 
* Correlation is significant at the .005 level (2-tailes). 
a Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 XXII
APPENDIX H: RESULTS OF OUR ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
H: Table 1 
Judgment achievement (ra) estimated by the fixed-effect model and by a 
random-effect model 
 
Model  
 
ra 
 
SE 
 
95% CI 
    
Research area    
Medicine    
FE .39 .06 .27 - .51 
RM  .39 .06 .27 - .51 
    
Business    
FE .49 .06 .37 - .62 
RM  .50 .12 .26 - .74 
    
Education    
FE .38 .08 .23 - .54 
RM  .38 .08 .23 - .54 
    
Psychology    
FE .22 .06 .09 - .34 
RM  .22 .06 .09 - .34 
    
Miscellaneous    
FE .44 .06 .31 - .56 
RM  .47 .07 .33 - .62 
    
Overall    
FE .38 .03 .33 - .44 
RM  .39 .03 .32 - .46 
Note. ra = weighted mean correlation. 95% CI = confidence interval. FE = Fixed-effect model. RM = Random-
effect model (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986) 
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H: Table 2 
Knowledge component (G) estimated by the fixed-effect model and by a 
random-effect model  
 
Model  
 
G 
 
SE 
 
95% CI 
    
Research area    
Medicine    
FE .60 .06 .48 - .72 
RM  .60 .06 .46 - .73 
    
Business    
FE .66 .06 .53 - .79 
RM  .66 .11 .43 - .87 
    
Education    
FE .73 .08 .57 - .88 
RM  .73 .08 .57 - .88 
    
Psychology    
FE .38 .09 .18 - .56 
RM  .41 .11 .18 - .63 
    
Miscellaneous    
FE .68 .06 .55 - .80 
RM  .77 .09 .58 - .96 
    
Overall    
FE .63 .03 .57 - .69 
RM  .64 .04 .55 - .73 
Note. G = weighted mean correlation. 95% CI = confidence interval. FE = Fixed-effect model. RM = Random-
effect model (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986) 
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H: Table 3 
Consistency component (Rs) estimated by the fixed-effect model and by a 
random-effect model  
 
Model  
 
Rs 
 
SE 
 
95% CI 
    
Research area    
Medicine    
FE .80 .06 .68 - .93 
RM  .80 .06 .68 - .93 
    
Business    
FE .80 .06 .67 - .93 
RM  .80 .06 .67 - .93 
    
Education    
FE .73 .08 .57 - .88 
RM  .73 .08 .57 - .88 
    
Psychology    
FE .78 .08 .62 - .94 
RM  .78 .08 .62 - .94 
    
Miscellaneous    
FE .71 .06 .58 - .83 
RM  .71 .06 .58 - .83 
    
Overall    
FE .76 .03 .71 - .82 
RM  .76 .03 .71 - .82 
Note. Rs = weighted mean correlation. 95% CI = confidence interval. FE = Fixed-effect model. RM = Random-
effect model (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986) 
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H: Table 4 
Environmental predictability (Re) estimated by the fixed-effect model and 
by a random-effect model  
 
Model  
 
Re 
 
SE 
 
95% CI 
    
Research area    
Medicine    
FE .66 .06 .54 - .79 
RM  .66 .06 .54 - .79 
    
Business    
FE .70 .06 .58 - .83 
RM  .71 .06 .58 - .83 
    
Education    
FE .70 .08 .54 - .86 
RM  .70 .08 .54 - .86 
    
Psychology    
FE .68 .06 .56 - .80 
RM  .68 .06 .56 - .80 
    
Miscellaneous    
FE .88 .06 .76 - 1.00 
RM  .88 .06 .75 - 1.00 
    
Overall    
FE .73 .03 .67 - .78 
RM  .73 .03 .67 - .78 
Note. Re = weighted mean correlation. 95% CI = confidence interval. FE = Fixed-effect model. RM = Random-
effect model (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986) 
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H: Table 5 
Non-linear knowledge component (C) estimated by the fixed-effect model 
and by a random-effect model  
 
Model  
 
C 
 
SE 
 
95% CI 
    
Research area    
Medicine    
FE .18 .06 .06 - .30 
RM  .18 .06 .06 - .30 
    
Business    
FE .07 .06 -.06 - .20 
RM  .07 .06 -.06 - .20 
    
Education    
FE .02 .08 -.13 - .18 
RM  .02 .08 -.13 - .18 
    
Psychology    
FE -.00 .09 -.19 - .18 
RM  -.00 .09 -.19 - .18 
    
Miscellaneous    
FE .05 .07 -.09 - .20 
RM  .05 .07 -.09 - .20 
    
Overall    
FE .08 .03 .02 - .15 
RM  .08 .03 .02 - .15 
Note. C = weighted mean correlation. 95% CI = confidence interval. FE = Fixed-effect model. RM = Random-
effect model (DerSimonian & Laird, 1986) 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 XXVII
APPENDIX I: BIAS-ADJUSTED R2 
 
I: Figure 1. Comparison of Rs bias-adjusted values and non-adjusted 
values included in our meta-analysis. 
 
 
I: Figure 2. Comparison of Re bias-adjusted values and non-adjusted 
values included in our meta-analysis. 
 
Legend 
Studies with great differences between values included in our meta- 
analysis and bias-adjusted values. These studies are labeled by their study 
number see Tables 5, 6. 
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I: Table 1 
Meta-analysis according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004). 
 
Meta-analysis 
 
k 
 
N 
 
r 
 
SDra 
 
95% CI 
 
Q 
 
 
Non-corrected 
Rs- values 
 
 
 
391 
 
 
 
1007 
 
 
 
.77 
 
 
 
.01 
 
 
 
.73 
 
 
 
.80 
 
 
 
79.69*** 
 
Bias-adjusted Rs- values 
 
391 
 
1007 
 
.72 
 
.01 
 
.67 
 
.77 
 
98.20*** 
        
Non-corrected 
Re- values 
 
411 
 
979 
 
.72 
 
.02 
 
.67 
 
.77 
 
106.27*** 
Bias-adjusted Re- values 411 979 .67 .03 .61 .73 126.01*** 
Note. k = number of correlations (i.e. judgment tasks); N = total sample size for all judgment tasks combined; ra 
= average corrected correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004); SDra = Standard deviation of corrected 
correlation according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004); SDres = residual standard deviation; 95% CI = 95% 
confidence interval; Q = statistic used to test for homogeneity in the true correlations across judgment tasks; *** 
p < .001.1 three judgment tasks were  excluded (Einhorn, 1974; Kim et al., 1987) because it was not possible 
with the Wright syntax (2005) to include tasks with only three judges.  
 
 
Although there are some differences indicated, our analysis shows 
that if the bias-adjusted correction would influence our results then 
psychological values are rather overestimated then underestimated.  
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APPENDIX J: SUCCESS OF SINGLE EXPERT MODELS 
 
J: Figure 1. The scatter plot of single expert model success (GRe-ra).  
 
Note. The legend you will find on page XV. 
 
According to Camerer (1981) and Goldberg (1970) with the product 
of the lens model components knowledge (G) and environmental 
predictability (Re) the validity of the expert model (i.e. regression model, 
LME) are captured. As research has shown, often judgments based on the 
perfectly reliable regression model perform better then the original 
judgment by the less than perfectly reliable human. Therefore, it can also 
be shown how well the regression model, or simply a linear model, 
substitutes the judge as measure of expert success by subtracting 
judgment achievement from the product term (GRe, see Camerer, 1981, p. 
413).  
However, as our scatter plots imply high heterogeneity this should be 
the scope of further research to reveal some regularity. For example, can 
the expert model success in educational and other research areas be 
confirmed with the nomothetic data base?   
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